1. The Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) (1) was the outgrowth of an activist student group in Cuba that originally fought against Batista.(2) In the late spring of 1960,(3) three DRE leaders escaped from Cuba(4) and arrived in Miami.(5) They immediately offered their services to the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FRD) with the intent of organizing an anti-Communist student organization within this group.(6) Nevertheless, it later was decided that the DRE would be an "affiliate," but not a member of the Frente.(7) The leaders of the DRE were kept on a regular monthly retainer by the U.S. Government, as were all members engaged in training for paramilitary operations and propaganda dissemination.(8) They were also supplied with weapons and ammunition on occasion.(9).

  2. The first DRE infiltration team (10) landed in Cuba in November 1960, (11) with the objective of organizing anti-Castro student propaganda and conducting general harassment operations.(12)

  3. By April 1961, 400 guerrillas(13) were operating effectively from the Sierra Maestra mountains.(14) Nevertheless, 74 men were captured (15) concurrently with a failure to receive air-dropped supplies.(16) This capture was a severe setback for the DRE underground prior to the Bay of Pigs.(17)

  4. One leader was also arrested in April 1961, but his true identity was unknown to the authorities and he was released following an interrogation.*18) Escaping again to Miami, he made three daring attempts to reinfiltrate Cuba in 1961. Although he failed, his exploits reportedly made him an underground hero to the students in Cuba.(19)

  5. The DRE chief of military operations,(20) who also infiltrated into Cuba prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion and told the committee that the Cuban underground believed it had the total backing of the United States.(21) By March 1961, however, one leader testified that the underground realized the invasion would be a failure, because the U.S. Government had failed to perform even before the invasion.(22) "It never got us the supplies it promised and never did the things it was supposed to do," he claimed.(23) Another leader was also upset about Agency performance and once wrote to friends threatening to kill CIA personnel if anything ever happened to one person as a result of Agency bumbling.(24) The DRE chief of military operations told the committee he thought the invasion was designed to fail and that it was only conceived to relieve the pressure building in the anti-Castro exile community.(25)

  6. Although DRE members had a deep-lying opposition to U.S. plans and policies,(26) they continued to accept U.S. funding, continue despite evaluation of the group as an "enfant terrible."(27) CIA headquarters received a report that the five top officials of the DRE had established a position for themselves as "oracles," because of their ability to acquire money from the U.S. Government.(28) This support allowed the DRE to play an inordinately influential role in the exile community.(29) According to the DRE chief of military operations, by July 1962, the DRE had taken to soliciting support for proposed propaganda operations but actually using the funding for military operations.(30)

  7. For instance, in early September 1962, the DRE official said he received a call from another leader notifying him of an impending major military operation.(31) The latter told him the DRE had all the weapons, ammunition, and support it needed.(32) The raid turned out to be the attack on the Blanquita Theater in Havana, which received a great deal of publicity.(33) Castro even raved about it, claiming it was an attempt on his life by the CIA.(34) In fact, according to the DRE official, the raiders did not know that Castro was scheduled to be at the theater the night of the shelling.(35) In any event, there was a tremendous uproar when the raiders returned to theUnited States. The DRE leaders were called to Washington to confront U.S. Governement officials, including Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and Cia Operations Chief, Richard Helms,(36) who both told them they were doing a great job but wasting their time in such independent actions.(37)

  8. As a result of the Blanquita raid publicity, the DRE was subsequently able to raise about $200,000 in private funds. That enabled the group to establish an operating base on Catalina Island near the south coast of the Dominican Republic from which it hoped to make a major strike against Cuba.(38) Nevertheless, after the October 1962 missile crisis,(39) the Dominican Republic Government informed the DRE leaders that the United States was putting great pressure on it to shut down the DRE operations and it therefore could no longer permit the group to operate out of its country.(40)

  9. Thus, the DRE was, of all the anti-Castro groups, one of the most bitter toward President Kennedy for his "deal" with the Russians.(41) In a letter dated February 21, 1963 and addressed simply to "sirs," the DRE said it was grateful for the initial support of the United States, but could no longer operate under restricitons of U.S. policy. The DRE demanded that the U.S. Government, ". . . understand that the Cubans cannot continue waiting for the international policies, because those dying of hunger are Cubans, because it is our country that bodily suffers slavery, because it is our blood that runsin Cuba."(42)

  10. Despite such strong sentiment, the DRE continued to accept support although its more militant member had been urged to join Manuel Artime's Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR) forces.(43) Whether or not this suggestion was ever taken by any DRE members is not documented, but the top leaders remained a homogeneous group and, by 1964, were soliciting additional financial support outside the U.S. Government. They were successful in receiving some funds from the Bacardi rum family in Miami.(44)

  11. Although the DRE continued its relationship with the U.S. Government until the end of 1966,(45) the group's activities, like those of other anti-Castro organizations, declined in intensity and effectiveness.

  12. Because the DRE was an extremely militant "action" group, the committee was especially interested in DRE operations prior to the assassination of President Kennedy on November 22, 1963.

  13. As noted, one of the effects of the Blanquita raid in September 1962, was to garner the DRE a blast of national publicity, which, in turn, gave the leaders of the group the opportunity to solicit additional funding from wealthy individuals who were sympathetic to their anti-Castro cause.(46) Among those who wound up supporting the DRE was Miami multimillionaire William Pawley, a staunch rightwing conservative, former owner of the Havana bus system, and a friend of former CIA Director Allen Dulles.(47) Another supporter of the DRE was a friend of Pawley's, former Ambassador to Italy Clare Boothe Luce,(48) then the wife of Time-Life publishing boss HenryLuce, and later, a Nixon appointee to the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

  14. In its review of DRE activities, the committee took special interest in a relatively recent series of events involving Clare Boothe Luce. In October 1975, Luce was being interviewed by Vera Glaser, a reporter and columnist for Knight newspapers, when she told Glaser of an alleged incident involving member of the DRE and Lee Harvey Oswald.(49) At the time, Senator Richard Schweiker and Senator Gary Hart were in the midst of their subcommittee investigation of the Kennedy assassination as part of the Senate select committee inquiry into intelligence activity.

  15. According to Glaser's report of the interview, this is basically what Luce told her:

  16. Luce said that after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, her friend, William Pawley, persuaded her to help sponsor a fleet of motorboats for a group of anti-Castro Cubans who, Pawley envisioned, would be Cuban "Flying Tigers," flying in and out of Cuba on intelligence-gathering missions. Pawley had helped start Gen. Claire Chennault's original Flying Tigers in World War II. Luce said she agreed to sponsor one boat and its three-man crew. She said she met with this Cuban boat crew about three times in New York and, in 1962, published a story about them in Life magazine. (50)

  17. Following the missile crisis in October 1962, Luce said that the Kennedy administration clamped down on exile activities against Cuba, and the Pawley-sponsored boat raids were discontinued. Luce said she never saw her "young Cubans," as she called them, again.(51)

  18. Then, on the night of Kennedy's assassination, Luce said she received a call from New Orleans from one of the boat crew Cubans. Luce told Glaser she would call him Julio Fernandez. She said the Cuban told her he called because he wanted to tell her about some information he had concerning the President's killer, Lee Harvey Oswald.(52)

  19. Luce told Glaser that, according to "Julio Fernandez," Oswald had approached the anti-Castro group to which Fernandez belonged and offered his services as a potential Castro assassin. The Cubans, however, did not trust Oswald, suspected he was really a Communist, and decided to keep tabs on him. They eventually penetrated Oswald's Communist "cell" and tape recorded his talks, including his bragging that he could shoot anyone, even the Secretary of the Navy.(53)

  20. Then suddenly, Luce said Fernandez told her, Oswald came into some money, went to Mexico City and finally to Dallas. Luce said Fernandez told her he still had the tape recordings of Oswald, as well as photographs of Oswald and samples of handbills Oswald had distributed on the streets of New Orleans. Fernandez, she said, asked her what he should do.(54)

  21. Luce said she advised him to catact the FBI immediately. She then told Glaser that she did not think about the story again until the Garrison investigation hit the Headlines in 1967. Luce said she then contacted the Cuban who had called her. He told her his group had followed her instructions and turned their material over to the FBI. But, he said, they were advised to "keep their mouths shut" until further contact. Further contact was never made, he said.(55)

  22. Luce said that Fernandez then told her that one of the members of his group had since been suddenly deported and that another had been murdered. He himself, he said, wanted nothing further to do with the Kennedy assassination.(56)

  23. After Luce told her this story, Vera Glaser immediately went to Senator Schweiker and told him about the alleged Oswald encounter.(57) Intrigued, Schweiker contacted Luce directly and asked her for information about the Cuban who had called her (58) As a result, Schweiker sent a staff investigator in search of "Julio Fernandez," No such individual was ever found.(59)

  24. During the course of its own investigation into the Luce allegations, the committee reviewed the 1977 CIA Task Force report that dealt with the newspaper reports of the incident.(60) According to the task force report, Luce called then CIA Director William Colby on October 25, 1975, and told him that Schweiker had called her to ask her for details about the allegations. She said she had given Schweiker the name of Justin McCarthy who, along with Pawley, had initially aroused her interest in helping the anti-Castro Cubans. Nevertheless, she said she did not tell Schweiker how to locate him.(61)

  25. Luce told Colby that after she talked to Schweiker, she had contacted McCarthy. he told her that he doubted that anything would come of a congressional probe and suggested instead that she contact Colby. Luce then told Colby that McCarthy gave her the names of three Cubans with whom he had been associated in DRE activities. They were Luis Fernandez Rocha, Jose Antonio Lanusa, and someone he remembered only by his code name, "Chilo."(62)

  26. According to the 1977 task force report, as a result of Luce's call to him. Colby contacted Justin McCarthy and attempted to persuade him to call Senator Schweiker and provide him with any information or evidence he might have. McCarthy said he did not want to get involved because there were too may "political opportunists" in Washington.(63)

  27. With this background of information, the committee decided to conduct its own investigation into the Luce allegations.

  28. Luce told the committee basically the same story given to Vera Glaser.(64) Luce was specifically asked if she was certain the late night call on November 22, 1963, came from New Orleans. She was definite in her answer that it did. The Warren report account of the Bringuier/Oswald association was outlined for her. She responded that it sounded much the same as the type activity in which her "boys" were engaged. Luce also told the Committee she did not recognize the name Jose Antonio Lanusa, mentioned in her conversation with Colby in 1975.(65)

  29. The committee located in Miami three anti-Castro Cubans, who were among the leaders of the DRE in 1963. One of them, Juan Manuel Salvat Roque, was a founder of the group. He was interviewed by committee investigators on February 7, 1978.(66) Although Salvat did not recall Luce's involvement with the DRE, he said he "heard" William Pawley had provided the group some support.(67) He said that, as far as he remembers, the group never received a large amount of money from any single individual, but received small contributions from a great many people.(68) He said that, according to his knowledge, Carlos Bringuier, the New Orleans delegate of the DRE, wasthe only member of the group who ever had any contact with Oswald.(69) Committee records, moreover, indicate that Carlos Bringuier became the New Orleans delegate to the DRE in the summer of 1962.(70) As detailed elsewhere, Bringuier and Oswald had a confrontation on Canal Street in New Orleans in August 1963, when Oswald was distributing "Fair Play for Cuba" leaflets. Both Bringuier and Oswald were arrested, but were later brought together to engage in a radio debate.(71) Further, Bringuier previously had arranged for a friend of his, Carlos Quiroga, to approach Oswald and talk to him on the pretense of being interested in pro-Castro activities.(72)

  30. Isidro "Chilo" Borja, another leader of the DRE, was interviewed by the committee on February 21, 1978.(73) Borja said he knew Luce was supportive of the DRE, but said he did not know the extent of her financial involvement.(74) He also recalled Bringuier's contact with Oswald and the fact that the DRE relayed that information to the CIA at the time.(75) Borja said his responsibilities with the DRE involved only military operations (76) and he suggested that Jose Antonio Lanusa, who handled press and public relations for the group, knew Luce and had been in contact with her.(77)

  31. Jose Antonio Lanusa was interviewed by the committee on April 22, 1978,. Lanusa said that on November 22, 1963, he and a small group of DRE members were at a Miami Beach hotel when they heard the news of the assassination of the President.(78) When Oswald's name was broadcast, Lanusa recalled the name as that of someone who had something to do with one of the DRE delegates, so Lanusa and those who were with him went to the Miami DRE office to search the files to determine if Lanusa's suspicion was right.(79) By late afternoon, they had found delegate Bringuier's report from New Orleansdetailing his encounter with Oswald. Along with it was a sample Fair Play for Cuba (FPCC) leaflet and a tape recording of the radio debate.(80) With this discovery, someone immediately called a CIA contact. This person told them not to do anything or contact anyone else for at least an hour. He said he needed that time to contact Washington headquarters for instructions.(81) Nevertheless, Lanusa said, he was so anxious to release the information that Oswald was associated with a pro-Castro group that he contacted the major news organizations before the hour was up.(82).

  32. When the CIA contact called back, he told then the FBI would contact the group. The next day, Lanusa said, Miami FBI agent James J. O'Conner showed up at DRE headquarters. He was given Bringuier's report, the FPCC leaflet, and the tape recording of the radio debate. Lanusa said O'Conner told them they would get a receipt for the material but, Lanusa said, they never did. Neither, he said, was the material ever returned.(83)

  33. Lanusa also told the committee that soon after the DRE shelling of the Blanquita Hotel in 1962, he was introduced to Clare Boothe Luce by Justin McCarthy, who Lanusa said was the DRE's public relations contact with the New York major media.(84) Lanusa said Luce told them she wanted to publish the Blanquita raid story in Life Magazine and that she would give the DRE the $600 she would receive from the magazine as payment for that story.(85) As far as he knows, Lanusa said, that was the only contact any member of the DRE everhad with Luce.(86) Lanusa also said he strongly doubted Luce or William Pawley ever paid for motorboats for the DRE because, he said, he knew how all of the boats were acquired. Lanusa said he had no knowledge of any DRE member having been deported or murdered.(87) Lanusa said, "I think Clare Boothe Luce shoots from the hip without having her brain engaged."(88)

  34. In investigating her allegations, the committee considered the possiblity that Luce incorrectly identified the source of her information. The source of the documentation of Oswald's contact with the DRE was New Orleans-based Carlos Bringuier. Nevertheless, Bringuier told the committee he never engaged in any paramilitary DRE activities(89) and therefore could not have been one of the crew members of the alleged Luce-sponsored motorboat. Bringuier's New Orleans associate, Celso Hernandez, the secretary of the chapter,(90) also said he never received any paramilitary training and did not know Oswald prior to encountering his passing out pro-Castro literature onCanal Street in New Orleans.(91) Bringuier also told the committee he knew Luce by reputation only, had never contacted her personally, and had never given her any information about his experience with Oswald.(92) He further said he was not aware of the fact that Luce was involved in any Cuban exile activities.(93) Bringuier maintained that no member of his DRE group in New Orleans had any contact with Luce during this period of time.(94)

  35. The investigation of the Warren Commission documented that Oswald was interested in establishing a chapter of the FPCC in New Orleans and had contact with the New York headquarters of this pro-Castro organization during the summer of 1963.(95) Luce raised questions about the nature and extent of involvement the New Orleans chapter of DRE had in monitoring Oswald's activities, and its association with the FBI regarding Oswald's Communist activities.

  36. The evidence indicated that the official DRE delegate in New Orleans was Carlos Bringuier, and that he was aided by two Cubans, Celso Hernandez, and Miguel Aguado. In an attempt to monitor Oswald, Bringuier approved the efforts of his friend, Carlos Quiroga, to call on Oswald to elicit additional information about FPCC activities in New Orleans.

  37. None of the New Orleans individuals associated in these events had any involvement in the paramilitary activities of DRE. The New Orleans chapter engaged solely in propaganda and fundraising activities. No New Orleans DRE member had any association with Luce.

  38. The first report of Oswald's contact with the DRE in New Orleans came from the group's headquarters in Miami. This information was released to national news organizations, the CIA, and the FBI shortly after the identification of Oswald as Kennedy's assassin. The evidence indicates that the Luce allegations, although related to certain facts, cannot be substantiated in the absence of corroboration by other individuals.

    Submitted by:

    Elizabeth J. Palmer,


    (1) CIA document, Nov. 9, 1967.
    (2) Ibid.
    (3) Interview with Juan Manuel Salvat Roque, Feb. 2, 1978,House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 00529).
    (4) Hal Hendrix, "Red Terrorism Rules at Havana University" Miami News,
    (5) See ref.3, Roque interview, note 3.
    (6) See ref.4, Hendrix, note 4.
    (7) CIA cable to Director from MASH, Sept. 13, 1960.
    (8) Interview, Jan. 16, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 004721).
    (9) Id. at pp.2-3.
    (10) CIA cable to Director from MASH Nov. 4, 1960.
    (11) Ibid.
    (12) Ibid.
    (13) CIA document, Nov. 1, 1961.
    (14) FBI Report from San Francisco, May 26, 1964, Warren Commission Document 1085 d 1.
    (15) Ibid.
    (16) See ref.13.
    (17) See ref.14.
    (18) CIA cable from JM/WAVE, May 9, 1961.
    (19) Ibid.
    (20) See ref. 3.
    (21) Interview with DRE chief of military operations, Feb. 21, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p.2 (J.F.K. Document 005765).
    (22) Ibid.
    (23) Ibid.
    (24) See ref. 13.
    (25) See ref. 21.
    (26) CIA document, Jan. 4, 1963.
    (27) CIA dispatch 12395, Nov. 8, 1963.
    (28) Ibid.
    (29) Ibid.
    (30) See ref. 21, p.2.
    (31) Ibid.
    (32) Ibid.
    (33) Id. at p.3.
    (34) Ibid.
    (35) Ibid.
    (36) Ibid.
    (37) Ibid.
    (38) Ibid.
    (39) Ibid.
    (40) Ibid.
    (41) Ibid.
    (42) CIA letter, Feb. 21, 1963.
    (43) CIA dispatch 12395, Nov. 8, 1963; and FBI No. 105-85440-28, correlation summary, Aug. 11, 1967, p.2.
    (44) CIA cable, June 13, 1964.
    (45) CIA memo, Jan. 3, 1967.
    (46) See ref. 21.
    (47) Robert K. Brown and Miguel Acoca, "The Bayo-Pawley Affair," Soldier of Fortune, 1975, pp. 18-19.
    (48) See ref. 21.
    (49) (J.F.K. Document 01305, attachment, p. 1.)
    (50) Ibid., attachment, p.9.
    (51) Ibid.
    (52) Id. at pp.9-10.
    (53) Id. at p.10.
    (54) Ibid.
    (55) Id. at pp.10-11.
    (56) Id. at p.11.
    (57) Ibid., cover memo.
    (58) Ibid.
    (59) Ibid.
    (60) CIA Task Force Report 1977.
    (61) Ibid.
    (62) Ibid.
    (63) Ibid.
    (64) Outside Contact Report, Dec. 13, 1978,House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 013678).
    (65) Ibid.
    (66) See ref. 3, p. 1.
    (67) Id. at p.2.
    (68) Ibid.
    (69) Ibid.
    (70) Deposition of Carlos Bringuier, May 12, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations,p. 13 (J.F.K. Document 009084).
    (71) See also, House Select Committee on Assassinations report section on Carlos Bringuier.
    (72) Deposition of Carlos Quiroga, May 23, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp.11,12,15 (J.F.K. Document 009394); see also, Warren Commision, vol. X, p. 41.
    (73) See ref. 21.
    (74) Id. at p. 4.
    (75) Ibid.
    (76) Id. at p. 3.
    (77) Id. at p. 4.
    (78) Interview with Jose Antonio Lanusa, Apr. 22, 1978, p. 1, House Select Committee on Assassinations,(J.F.K. Document 007463).
    (79) Ibid.
    (80) Id. at p. 2.
    (81) Ibid.
    (82) Ibid.
    (83) Ibid.
    (84) Id. at p. 3.
    (85) Ibid.
    (86) Id. at p.4.
    (87) Ibid.
    (88) Ibid.
    (89) See ref. 21, p.23.
    (90) Id. at pp. 15-16.
    (91) Interview of Celso "Macario" Hernandes, Feb. 14, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 007486).
    (92) Contact report, Carlos Bringuier, Dec. 2, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 013420).
    (93) Ibid.
    (94) Ibid.
    (95) See also, Warren Report, pp.407-08, 728-29; Warren Commission, vol.X,
    pp.87-90, 94; V.T. Lee Exhibits.


  39. When four of Castro's army officers and 100 men deserted and left for the Las Villas Mountains in August 1960, they formed the nucleus of the Movimiento Insurreccional de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MIRR).(1) Helping lay the groundwork for this organization was the former chief of the 26th of July Movement in Las Villas Province, Dr. Orlando Bosch Avila.(2) Bosch had left Cuba 1 month previously and, from Miami, issued a call for rebel army men to desert.(3) Promoting the defection of army personnel and carryingout sabotage operations throughout Cuba were the early primary activities of the MIRR.(4) In both, it was extremely effective.

  40. Former rebel army officer Victor Paneque assumed military leadership of the group (5) and, within a few months of his escape from Cuba, organized a team of infiltrators to reenter the country to continue MIRR operations.(6)

  41. Orlando Bosch became general coordinator of MIRR, working with individuals and other groups involved in operations against Cuba and securing necessary financial backing.(7)

  42. A pediatrician by profession,(8) Bosch became immersed in his political movement and for 18 years carried out a crusade to overthrow Castro. His efforts at times have been characterized as "bumbling." but he had also been termed "single-mindedly" and "morally committed."(9) Widely viewed in the U.S. press as a Cuban patriot when he first began his anti-Castro activities, Bosch's increased acts of violence gradually changed his image to that of a terrorist.(10) The intensity and violence of his activities, which have always been widely publicized, were a major factor in the committee's decisionto examine Bosch and the MIRR among those Cuban exile organizations considered capable of involvement in an assassination conspiracy.

  43. Bosch was interviewed by the committee in Cuartel San Carlos prison in Venezuela. He is charged with complicity in the October 6, 1975, bombing of a Cubana Airlines plane which resulted in the deaths of 73 people.(11) Although denying involvement in the airplane bombing, Bosch said he approved of it. (12) Claiming terrorism a necessary evil in fighting Castro, Bosch stated, "You have to fight violence with violence. At times you cannot avoid hurting innocent people."(13)

  44. The activities of the MIRR in the early 1960's were carried out by a small group of individuals. There were reportedly never a great deal of members in Miami.(14) In 1966, Bosch claimed to have only 20 men outside Miami, located in various seaport cities in the United States (15) One of the major interests of the MIRR was to blow up vessels trading with Cuba.(16) In this, it was effective, but the MIRR successes in the early 1960's was a result of its association with a number of other anti-Castro organizations and individuals.

  45. Bosch said that in late 1961 he was contacted by Evelio Duque, leader of Ejercito Cubano Anticommunist (ECA), who indicated he might be getting CIA support for his group and wanted Bosch to join him.(17) Together they submitted a plan to the Agency outlining their conditions for CIA support and were informed about a month later the plan had been approved. (18) Acting as the political leader in this alliance, Bosch joined Duque, the military leader, at a camp in Homestead, Fla., and was in touch with a CIA liaison officer.(19)

  46. Bosch soon came to the conclusion that the camp was an exercise in futility. He believed that the CIA had no intention of mounting another invasion or initiating attacks against Cuba. He felt the U.S.-sponsored camps were merely a means of keeping the exiles busy and, privately and unofficially, his CIA contact confirmed his suspicions, Bosch said.(20) After 9 months of frustrating inactivity, he published a pamphlet, "The Tragedy of Cuba," in which he accused the United States of misleading the Cuban exiles. He sent a copy to President Kennedy and then closed down the camp.(21) After this, Bosch said he had no more dealings with the CIA.(22)

  47. Bosch maintained an ongoing relationship, beginning in late 1960, with Frank Sturgis, well-known anti-Castro soldier of fortune; (23) Alexander Rorke, former clerk at the FBI; (24) and William Johnson, an American pilot who, along with Sturgis, provided information to the CIA on Cuban exile activities. (25) Johnson had full control over all MIRR operations.(26) Bosch was concerned with financing raids against Cuba and did not know the nature of the missions until their completion.(27)

  48. According to Johnson, American pilots were placed under contract to fly three airstrikes over Cuba for the MIRR.(28) They were to receive $2,000 per mission.(29) Johnson admitted his own motive was purely mercenary.(30)

  49. Although relatively inactive in 1962,(31) the MIRR engaged in a series of bombing raids over Cuba in 1963 primarily aimed at destroying the production of sugar(32) in an effort to disrupt the economy. It also reportedly conducted airstrikes against a MIG base in Cuba(33) and various other strikes aimed at strategic targets. (34) The raids were effective but not without risk. In several instances, the raiders' planes were shot down and pilots killed.(35)

  50. Concurrent with an association with American adventurers, the MIRR also had associations with other exile organizations. It planned raids against Cuba in cooperation with Commandos L (36) and discussed unity raids with member of RECE.(37) Bosch, at this time, was interested in establishing a base of operations in the Dominican Republic to facilitate long-range planning.(38)

  51. The documentation the committee examined failed to explain how the MIRR was able to finance its extensive operations; further, Bosch did not specify any source. Bosch told the committee that his association with Frank Sturgis alone culminated in 11 airstrikes over Cuba.(39) At that time, he said, they usually rented a plane for $400 plus $60 an hour.(40) Bill Johnson charged $4,000 for pilot fees for each mission.(41) Bosch said he knew the pilots only got $2,000 and Johnson pocketed the rest, but his purpose was to fight Castro whatever it cost.(42) Bosch's commitment to fight Castro extends to the present.(43)

  52. The funds were initially furnished MIRR from a Chicago-based Cuban exile, Paulina A. Sierra, who allegedly collected moneys from gambling interests.(44) Some money came from anti-Castro supporters in Puerto Rico.(45) It is known that the FBI was long interested in the source of finances of the MIRR and in March 1964 authorized a 30-day mail check on it and Bosch in an effort to identify possible sources.(46) During this time, several wealthy Cuban exiles received threatening letters demanding large contributions for the fight against Castro.(47) Bosch was implicated in these extortionattempts,(48) brought to trial, and acquitted.(49) He told the committee that in 1967 he once used the funds he had collected in settlement for a personal injury automobile accident to buy explosives and weapons.(50) Whatever Bosch's methods of raising money, there is no indication he ever used it to enrich himself.(51)

  53. Well financed and totally dedicated, Bosch managed to run a foul of the U.S. Government authorities at least seven times in slightly over a 4-year period. Several of these encounters resulted in his arrest,(52) but he was always acquitted.(53)

  54. In July 1967, Bosch and the MIRR became assimilated into a new movement, known as Cuban Power(54) and the tempo of violent activities increased. On September 16, 1968, Bosch was arrested for firing a bazooka into the hull of a Polish ship anchored in Miami harbor.(55) He was subsequently tried and sentenced to 10 years in a Federal prison.(56) From his prison cell in Atlanta, Ga., Bosch allegedly was making plans to resume bombing Japanese and Spanish ships trading with Cuba as soon as he was released.(57) He was granted parole on November 1, 1972 and immediately begantraveling through Latin America, in violation of that parole.(58) He said his aim in Latin America was to forge alliances with Countries which had powerful Cuban exile communities.(59) So effective was he in making solid political alliances, that in the ensuing years he was able to travel freely, with forged passports, throughout Latin America.(60)

  55. Whether or not Bosch was the principal conspirator in the bombing of the Cuban airliner, it is known that his Cuban Power movement, which merged with other Cuban activists in 1976 (61) to form a Cuban Secret Government(62) engaged in acts of terrorism. (63) This latter group was linked with numerous recent bombing incidents,(64) an assassination attempt against Henry Kissinger.(65) the assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C.(66) and the bombing of the Cuban Airlines plane.

  56. Orlando Bosch, a zealot, turned out to be the most aggressive and volatile of the anti-Castro leaders. That alone could validly raise the question of possible association with the assassination of President Kennedy. In addition, the committee was presented with an allegation that specifically connected him to a conspiracy.(67) but investigation faile to support the claim that Bosch had been in Dallas in november 1963 in the company of Lee harvey Oswald. When asked, Bosch told the committee he was at his home in Miami when he heard President Kennedy had been shot.(68)

    Submitted by:



    (1) FBI No.97-4474, MIRR miscellaneous references, index of anti-Castro organizations, Feb. 8, 1960, p. 1 (J.F.K.Document 009427).
    (2) Ibid.
    (3) Ibid.
    (4) FBI No.97-4474, MIRR sec. 1, cable to Director from Miami, Nov. 2, 1960, item 1,p.2 (J.F.K. Document 009427).
    (5) Id. at p. 1.
    (6) CIA cable to Director from MASH, Nov. 2, 1960.
    (7) CIA updated report.
    (8) Memorandum to staff director, June 15, 1978, re interview with Dr. Orlando Bosch Avila, p. 1 (J.F.K. Document 009362).
    (9) Gloria Marina and Arnold Markowitz, "Fiery Bosch Courts Terrorist Label," Miami Herald, Nov. 8, 1976.
    (10) Ibid.
    (11) See ref. 8.
    (12) "Caracas to Charge Bosch, Trio in Bombing of Cuban Airliner," Miami News, Aug. 23, 1978.
    (13) Ibid.
    (14) FBI No. 97-4474, MIRR sec. 1, report from Miami by George E. Davis, Jan. 18, 1961, item 5, p.3 (J.F.K. Document 009427).
    (15) Ibid., item 3, p. 15, FBI No. 9704474, sec. 6, memo to J. Waler Yeagley from Director, June 22, 1966.
    (16) Ibid.
    (17) See ref. 8.
    (18) Ibid.
    (19) Ibid.
    (20) Ibid.
    (21) Ibid.
    (22) Ibid.
    (23) FBI No. 97-4474, MIRR sec.1, report from Miami, item 3, p.2, Jan. 23,
    1961, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 009427).
    (24) Ibid., item 2.
    (25) Ibid., item 14, p. 6.
    (26) Ibid., item 15, p. 6.
    (27) Ibid.
    (28) Ibid.
    (29) See ref. 8, p. 5.
    (30) See ref. 4, FBI cable, item 2, p. 12.
    (31) Ibid., item 9, p. 5.
    (32) Ibid., items 10, 11, 12, p. 5.
    (33) Ibid., item 14, p. 6.
    (34) Ibid., items 1, 2, 3, p. 8, and items 4, 5, p. 9. 92
    (35) Ibid., items 2, 3, p. 11, and item 1, p. 12.
    (36) Ibid., item 5, p. 14.
    (37) Ibid., item 2.
    (38) Ibid., item 8, p. 9.
    (39) See ref. 8, p. 2.
    (40) Ibid.
    (41) Ibid.
    (42) Ibid.
    (43) See ref. 12.
    (44) See ref. 4, item 16, p. 6.
    (45) Ibid., item 7, p. 11.
    (46) Ibid., item 6, p. 9.
    (47) FBI No. 9-42758, Orlando Bosch, secs. 1,2,4,p.5 (J.F.K.Document 013071).
    (48) Ibid.
    (49) See ref. 9.
    (50) See ref. 8, p. 5.
    (51) See ref. 9.
    (52) See ref. 4, FBI cables, item 6, pp.15, 16, 17.
    (53) See ref. 47, FBI document, item 1, p.2, FBI No. 45-10848.
    (54) See ref. 4, FBI cable, p.18.
    (55) Blake Fleetwood, "I Am Going to Declare War," New Times, May 13, 1977, p.46.
    (56) Ibid.
    (57) See ref. 47, FBI document, sec.4, p.3, FBI No. 45-10848.
    (58) See ref. 55, pp. 46-47.
    (59) Id. at p. 47.
    (60) Ibid.
    (61) Id. at p.48.
    (62) See ref. 4, FBI cable, item 3, p.2.
    (63) See ref. 47, FBI cable, item 1, pp. 1-2, FBI No. 45-10801.
    (64) Ibid.
    (65) See ref. 4, FBI cable, item 14, p.5.
    (66) See ref. 55, p. 51.
    (67) Immunized executive session testimony of Marita Lorenz, May 31, 1978, Hearings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Lorenz, who had publicly claimed she was once Castro's mistress (Miami News, June 15, 1976), told the committee she was present at a September 1963 meeting in Orlando Bosch's Miami home during which Lee Harvey Oswald. Frank Sturgis, Pedro Diaz Lanz, and Bosch made plans to go to Dallas (pp.31-34). She further testified that around November 15, 1963, she, Jerry Patrick Hemming, the Novo brothers, Pedro Diaz Lanz, Sturgis, Bosch, and Oswald traveled in a two-car caravan to Dallas and stayed in a motel where they were contacted by Jack Ruby. There were several rifles and scopes in the motel room (pp.43-54). Lorenz said she returned to Miami around November 19 or 20.
    All possible individuals involved in this allegation were questioned by the committee with the following results:
    --Interviewed on June 16, 1978,Orlando Bosch told the committee he had met Lorenz once in 1962 at which time he was planning an air raid over Cuba with Alexander Rorke. Lorenz later called him and said she wanted to get involved in anti-Castro activities, but Bosch turned her down and never saw her again. He further stated he had never traveled west of New Orleans in his life (JFK Document No. 009363, p .2).
    -- In a March 21, 1978,deposition in Miami, Fla., Jerry Patrick Hemming responded negatively to the questions: "Did you ever drive from Miami to Dallas with Marita Lorenz? Or Frank Sturgis? Or a man identifying himself as 'Ozzie'?"(pp. 170-71).
    --Immunized testimony was received in Washington, D.C., on April 28, 1978, from Pedro Diaz Lanz, who denied Lorenz' allegation (p. 64), and explained his whereabouts on November 22, 1963 (p. 65).
    -- In a March 20, 1978,deposition in Miami, Frank A. Sturgis was asked if he did. ". . . in the company of Marita Lorenz, Leon Oswald and others drive from Miami to Dallas a day or two before the assassination?" Sturgis responded:
    Sir, that is an absolute lie. I have never been with Marita Lorenz and Ozzie, as she calls him, or with Pedro Diaz Lanz, or Marcus Diaz Lanz, or Dr. Orlando Bosch or Jerry Patrick, which she claimed all of us besides some other Cubans, were in two automobiles and left Miami, Fla., 2 days before the assassination of the President of the United States. She is a liar. I took a polygraph examination to that effect that I have never been involved in any conspiracy to kill the President of the United States, nor was I with her at any time conspiring to kill the President of the united States, nor was I with her in any automobie with these people or any other people going to Dallas to plot to kill the President of the United States. She is an absolute liar (p. 157).
    Sturgis said that on November 22, 1963, he was in his home in Miami, Fla.(p.155).
    The committee found no evidence to support Lorenz' allegation.
    (68) See ref. 8, p. 1.


  57. In April 1963, the spirit of the exiled Cubans who hoped to return to a liberated Cuba reached its nadir. The U.S. Governemnt, which had been subsidizing a Cuban anti-Castro organization, the Cuban Revolutionary Council, dropped its extensive backing of this most visible example of American assistance to the Cuban movement.(1) The move came on the heels of an announcement of a tough new policy of the Justice and State Departments. They planned a vigorous enforcement of laws breached by anti-Castro Cuban raiders,who were operating hit-and-run guerrilla attacks from the United States on Cuban and Russian targets.(2) These events resulted in another shuffling of alliances between various Cuban groups, but no bright new hopes.

  58. Despite a common desire to overthrow Castro and return to Cuba, the exiles differed in many ways. They represented the extremes of the political left and right, and everything in between. Many had carried arms against Batista; others were former Batistianos. They differed as to how the counterrevolution could be accomplished. They differed as to what type of government and which leaders would take the place of the ousted government. Unification of these diverse stances seemed doubtful.

  59. Dr. Paulino Sierra martinez, a Cuban exile and lawyer from Chicago, hoped to foster a change. Arriving in Miami in May 1963, Sierra scheduled a series of meetings at a local hotel and invited Cuban exile leaders of all political persuasion to discuss unification for the purpose of military invasion of Cuba.(3)

  60. To many Cubans the idea seemed ridiculously naive.(4) Sierra was hoping to unify elements that had remained splintered throughout most previous efforts, attempting to draw well-known exile leaders when he himself was virtually unknown in the anti-Castro movement.

  61. But Sierra came with some big ideas and big promises. he claimed to represent a group of Americans in Chicago interested in combining their efforts with those of the Cuban exiles to overthrow the Castro regime with or without U.S. Government approval.(5) Sierra told them that American financial interests would participate on condition there was a true unity of the majority of Cubans in exile.(6) For military planning, he claimed he had the assistance of several high-ranking U.S. Navy and Army officers, who would alsohelp arrange for arms and the establishment of training bases in a Latin American country.(7) Most surprisingly, Sierra claimed the Chicago backers were willing to lend assistance to the extent of $30 million,(8) no small sum even for a large-scale government-backed operation. For a private group it was unheard of.

  62. While many Cubans did not immediately join Sierra, by July 1963 he had built a coalition of predominantly rightwing anti-Castro groups and attracted some impressive names from among the exiles to form an organization called the Junta de Gobierno de Cuba en el exilio (JGCE-Junta of the Government of Cuba in Exile.) (9)

  63. Among the groups to join Sierra's junta were the Unidad Revolucionaria faction headed by Juan Medina Vega (10) and the major faction of the 30th of November Group headed by Carlos Rodriguez Quesada.(11) Sierra could also boast the participation of Jose "Pepin" Bosch, president of Bacardi Rum, and Alberto Garrido, a much-admired Cuban entertainer.(12)

  64. In the selection process by which the committee chose those anti-Castro groups to be further investigated, certain factors about the junta discovered in preliminary research indicated a need to carefully examine the purpose and activities of this group.

  65. The junta was active during the critical period of interest to the committee. Sierra surfaced in March 1963(13) and the organization abruptly ceased activity by January 1964.(14) The committee hoped to discover what sparked the group's genesis and what contributed to its final demise.

  66. Its financial backing appeared to be remarkably impressive, and although Sierra claimed the group was to receive funds from American companies whose financial assets in Cuba had been nationalized, it was widely rumored that the money was actually from "gambling interests" of organized crime.(15) There were other rumors that wealthy Texans were behind the group.(16) The committee hoped to determine exactly what means were available to the group and from what source.

  67. Preliminary research also indicated that the Secret Service in Chicago was investigating a "threat to the President" case at the time of President Kennedy's assassination, in which Paulino Sierra was of interest.(17) The committee wished to explore the nature of the allegation and the extent of Sierra's involvement in the case.

  68. The committee obtained considerable information from the contemporaneous investigative reports of the Central Intelligence Agency, the FBI, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service regarding the structure, membership, and activities of the junta. Field interviews and research into reports of the Secret Service probed those questions raised by the alleged threats against the President.

  69. Paulino Sierra Martinez was a tall and dapper lawyer(18) employed in the legal counsel's office of the Union Tank Car Co. in Chicago.(19) Before his immigration to the United States, he had reportedly been employed by Carlos Saladrigas, a minister under Batista.(20) He had also worked with Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez, former senator during Batista's regime.(21) Sierra left Havana in 1960 and settled for a time in Miami where he worked as a judo instructor and translator (Sierra speaks, reads, and writes English, Italian,French, and Spanish).(22) In 1962, he moved to Chicago and was admitted to the Illinois bar under the sponsorship of William Browder, general counsel of Union Tank Car Co., for whom Sierra soon began work.(23)

  70. By early 1963, Sierra had organized a Cuban Lawyer's Association in Chicago and gained somewhat of a reputation as "coordinator" of Cuban activities in the Chicago area.(24) In March 1963, he was mentioned in an article in the Chicago Tribune for his active role in Cuban exile affairs in Chicago.(25) Nevertheless, he still had not made a national name in Cuban exile affairs.

  71. yet, as noted previously, Sierra's meetings with anti-Castro Cuban exiles in Miami in the spring of 1963 produced the official structure of a Cuban government in exile by July.(26) Sierra was named Secretary General, Felipe Rivero Diaz was named Vice Secretary General, Carlos Rodriguez Quesada was appointed head of internal affairs, Juan Medina was to head up finances, Manuel Lozano Pino was named head of external relations, Alberto Garrido was put in charge of propaganda, Reinaldo Pico was given a position in charge of labor issues, and Gilberto Rodriguez was asked to run military operations.(27)

  72. The junta was formed after an organizational meeting in Chicago in June 1963 with Union Tank Car Executive Vice President J. W. Van Gorkum and General Counsel William Browder.(28)Information regarding the meeting is scant. One source who attended said that Van Gorkum and Browder discussed the unity plan only insofar as suggesting that if the group could successfully establish a government in exile, it then might be able to obtain U.S. Government support and financing from other sources.(29)

  73. But evidence exists to suggest that Union Tank Car had a greater role in the junta. The company was reportedly paying for Sierra's personal and travel expenses plus his salary.(30) Browder also told FBI agents in October 1963 that although he did not know the identity of Sierra's backers, he (Browder) kept the group's funds under his control to avoid any possible criticism of misappropriation or mismanagement of funds by Sierra.(31) Browder would not indicate the exact amount under his control other than to say it was "considerable."(32)

  74. There have been several contradictory reports to the CIA and FBI regarding the source of Sierra's funds.

  75. Early reports indicated Sierra's backers were Chicago gamblers. The Miami News headline for an article reporting on Sierra's meetings read "Gamblers Pop Out of Exile Grab Bag."(33) The source of such reports is unclear, although there are indications it may have been Sierra himself.

  76. At Sierra's initial meetings with Cuban groups, he was accompanied by an American named William Trull, (34) who may have been partly responsible for circulation of rumors of the involvement of gambling interests in Sierra's proposals, but whose ultimate relationship to Sierra is obscure.

  77. In an interview with the FBI in June 1963, Sierra said Trull had called him after seeing the March 10 article about Sierra in the Chicago Tribune.(35) Sierra said Trull talked about sponsorship of a unified group of Cuban exiles and vaguely mentioned the owner of the King Ranch and a Mr. "Jarvis," who Trull identified as a millionaire in Texas.(36) Sierra said he was concerned about Trull being involved with "impure" financial sources, and would have nothing further to do with him.(37)

  78. Trull's story is different. A former entertainer from Dallas, Trull said Dierra had first contacted him in March 1963 and proposed that he help Sierra explain Sierra's plan to the Cuban exiles in Miami.(38) Trull said Sierra had wired tickets so that he could join Sierra in Miami for the series of meetings with the exiles.(39) Sierra carefully outlined the proposal Trull was to explain to such Cuban leaders as former Cuban Prime Minister Carlos Prio and Eusebio Mujal, a former Cuban labor leader.(40) Trull reiterated the plan to the Cubans, telling them he represented wealthy American interests who had a business proposition for the Cuban people if they would unify with Carlos Prio as president and Sierra as secretary of a provisional government.(41)

  79. Reports by Cubans who heard Trull lend credence to his tale. Trull was found to be "contradictory" and "vague" about his plan,(42) as might be expected of a person who was just repeating what he had been told.

  80. Trull later told FBI agents that he had dropped names to Sierra such as Cleburg of the King Ranch, but Sierra had told him he did not need Trull's financial influence.(43) Sierra claimed, according to Trull, that representatives of Las Vegas or Cleveland gambling interests had contacted him and offered up to $14 million in exchange for 50-percent interest in gambling concessions in Cuba, provided Sierra was able to organize a successful ouster of Castro.(44)

  81. Trull told the FBI that because he had frequently performed before Cuban audiences, he felt he had been chosen by Sierra and used as an "actor" to sell the Cubans on Sierra's plans.(45)

  82. Sierra had other assistance at his early meetings that disappeared as quickly as Trull. According to a CIA report, one of the promoters for a meeting in May with exiles was George Franci, a Haitian national who had previously been involved in gambling interests in Havana.(46) Franci's name does not show up as involved in any later activities of Sierra, particularly after the stories of gamblers' backing hit the newsstands.

  83. As late as July 1963, Sierra himself was the source of another report that gamblers were backing him. Miguel A. "Cuco" Leon, a colleague of Manuel Artime Buesa, reported that when Sierra visited Nicaragua that month, he told him he represented U.S. gambling concessions in Cuba.(47)

  84. Another possible basis for the stories about Sierra's "gambler's backing" are separate reports of an actual offer to Chicago Cubans in March 1963. Dr. Cesar Blanco of the Chicago-based Cuban Bar Association of Illinois reported a meeting of Cuban exiles on March 11, 1963.(48) He said that a Burt Mold of the American Education League of Los Angeles had asked Blanco how much money the Cubans needed to work out a program to free Cuba.(49) Mold, according to Blanco, the job of head of police in Cuba when the country had been freed.(51)

  85. A CIA report of march 1963 reported that Blanco and Sierra had been approached by gamblers from the West to work with them. (52) It was reported that Sierra spoke about an offer of $10 million in backing for guarantees of gambling concessions in Cuba after Castro was overthrown.(53)

  86. In his public meetings in miami in May, Sierra had publicly named the American Educational League of Los Angeles as being in support of his proposal.(54) When that group challenged Sierra's claims, Sierra backed off, indicating he had received assurances of assistance from other sources.(55) But it is not known whether Mold had made the offer at the behest of the American Educational League or for some other party. His affiliation with the league was just as a member.(56)

  87. If an offer from gambling interests was ever made, it appears that Sierra either backed away from such an offer or began to dress it in legitimate clothing after the adverse publicity.

  88. The backers were identified in public in only the most nebulous terms. Sierra claimed several U.S. companies were behind his plans and these at first were only identified as the Lawyer's Corp. and the American Bankers.(57) Later, he frequently named such large corporations as United Fruit, Esso, Standard Oil, Du Pont, and United States Steel, among others.(58)

  89. The Chicago office of the FBI closed its investigation of Sierra's activities in June 1963, concluding that he was involved in a "con job" rather than any real activities, hoodlum or otherwise.(59)

  90. The FBI's decision to close the investigation may have been justifiable at the time, since there was no indication either through money spent or by actual group-sponsored operations that Sierra had a viable organization.(60) The activities, however, were just beginning.

  91. As soon as the organization was formally set up, Sierra and Felipe Rivero left on a trip to Nicaragua and Colombia to discuss plans for a military base of operations outside the United States.(61) They reportedly spoke with Luis Somoza in Nicaragua and also attempted to obtain the use of the Isle of Andres off of Colombia.(62) It was also reported that Sierra and Rivero traveled to New York, Chicago, St. Louis, and Washington, D.C., to meet with backers and make further arrangements.(63) Later, it was learned that Sierra alone had spent a little over $11,000 on travel expenses by October1963.(64)

  92. The group was also spending money on arms and equipment by late summer 1963. Rich Lauchli, a well-known arms dealer from Collinsville, Ill., was contacted by Sierra in August to purchase a quantity of guns.(65) Soldier-of-fortune and Gerry Patrick Hemming associate, Steve Wilson, was asked by Sierra to deliver the arms to Miami.(66) Sierra also ordered a two-man submarine from California in October 1963,(67) which was transported to miami for storage in the garage of Cuban exile Manuel Aguilar.(68)

  93. The FBI received information that Sierra had been on an arms shopping spree in Detroit accompanied by Jose Cardoso, and purchased $6,000 to $7,000 worth of weapons to be transported to Miami.(69) Dennis Lynn Harber, another Hemming associate, assisted Sierra in the transport of military equipment.(70)

  94. Sierra was also holding discussions with several "action" groups for assistance in a military operation against Cuba.(71) Among those contacted who reportedly signed "pledges" of support were Aldo Vera Serafin of the militant MAPA group (American Patriotic Action Movement);(72) Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and Antonio Veciana Blanch of the SNFE-Alpha 66 alliance;(73) Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez of Comandos L;(74) Eduardo Mor Ruiz, and independent anti-Castro Cuban fighter;(75) and Orlando Bosch of MIRR.(76)

  95. Reports of funds given to those groups indicate Sierra was advancing modest sums from the alleged $650,000 at his disposal. Aldo Vera Serafin reportedly received $3,500(77) and Tony Cuesta of Comandos L received $1,000.(78) Members of the Junta's board of officers also received contributions from Sierra. Carlos Rodriguez Quesada received $2,800; Felipe Rivero Diaz received $1,890; and Gilberto Rodriguez got $1,500.(79)

  96. There are various descriptions of the military operations allegedly being prepared by the Junta. On October 30, 1963, information was received that the Second National Front of Escambray had plans for an operation from a base in the Dominican Republic.(80) The arrangements were allegedly being made by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, head of SNFE, and Abel Camacho in Key West.(81) The plan called for action against a bridge in Oriente Province and had been masterminded by Antonio Veciana and one of the engineers who had designed the bridge.(82) Consistent with this information, it was also reported to the FBI that the Junta offered soldier-of-fortune Joe Garman $11,000 to lead a raid on Oriente Province.(83)

  97. There were other reports that an attack on a Havana oil refinery was planned.(84) Still other reports simply indicated that although all-out war against Castro was the objective, a hit-and-run raid for publicity purposes would be attempted first.(85)

  98. While all these activities were getting underway, Sierra had some conflict with other officers in the Junta. Gilberto Rodriquez Hernandez was replaced as military coordinator in the summer of 1963 because, according to Sierra, Hernandez was feared to be a Castro agent.(86) In turn, Hernandez, who had returned from Cuban prison in April 1963 in the prisoner exchange, called Van Gorkum and Browder at Union Tank Car Co. and complained bitterly about Sierra's lack of leadership.(87)

  99. After Sierra had signed a pact with Alpha 66-SFNE, another member of the Junta, Manuel Lozano Pino, resigned from his position as head of external relations.(88) He objected to the inclusion of such a "left-wing" organization, but also protested Sierra's expenditures.(89)

  100. These complaints may have had something to do with Sierra's summons to Chicago in early November 1963 for a stormy session with Browder.(90) Sierra was blasted for wasting funds, reportedly totaling up to $50,000.(91) According to sources of the CIA and FBI. Sierra was accompanied to the Chicago meeting with Armando Fleites of SNFE, and Browder allegedly ordered Sierra to turn over all moneys and supplies to the SNFE-Alpha 66 alliance.(92) Although several of the Junta officers had asked for Sierra's replacement and had specifically named Jose "Pepin" Bosch as an attractive alternative,(93) Sierra remained in place as the "guiding spirit" for the next 2 months:(94) the remainder of the group's existence.

  101. A CIA memorandum reported on November 20, 1963, of the strange activities of Sierra and the Junta:

    Although he (Sierra) has been some what ubiquitous among Cuban exile leaders in Miami since March 1963,he still remains somewhat of a mystery man in terms of his means of support, and indeed, his long-range objectives. (95)

  102. The report also raised the question of how Sierra managed to remain in the exile political scene so long. "Perhaps his mysterious backers are providing him with sufficient funds to keep the pot boiling for the present," the writer of the memo conjectured.(96) Indeed, Sierra's activities were not only continuing, but he also soon found himself the subject of interest in a Secret Service investigation into a threat against the President.*

    Submitted by:



    (1) "Chronology of United States-Cuban Relations," Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (J.F.K. Document 010426).
    (2) Ibid.
    (3) Staff summary of FBI file for Paulino Sierra Martinez, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp.1 and 2 (J.F.K. Document 012887).
    (4) Id. at p.2 (ref. to FBI LHM re Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez, June 3, 1963).
    (5) Id at p. 1; see also staff summary of CIA file, p. 1 (CIA dispatch 12627, Nov. 20, 1963).
    (6) See ref. 3 (CIA report, Apr. 30, 1963, p. 1, CIA report, May 7, 1963, and FBI 105-121010-3, May 5, 1963, teletype to Director from SAC, Chicago, re Paulino Sierra Martinez, p.2 (J.F.K.Document 012887).
    (7) Id. at p. 1 (ref. CIA report, Apr. 30, 1963).
    (8) Id. at p.2 (ref. to CIA report, May 7, 1963, p.3, FBI 105-121010-3 memo to Attorney General from Director, p.5, FBI 105-121010-35, memo to Director from SAC, Chicago, May 3, 1977).
    (9) Staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (ref. to dispatch 12627, Nov. 20, 1963, and attachments).
    (10) Staff summary of CIA handbook, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Security 020).
    (11) Staff summary of FBI file for Carlos Rodriguez Quesada (ref. FBI 94-1-19634, Aug. 28, 1963), House Select Committee on Assassinations, p.2 (J.F.K. Document 012655).
    (12) Staff summary of CIA files, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p.2 (ref. dispatch 12627, Nov. 20, 1963).
    (13) Id. at p. 1; see also staff summary of CIA handbook, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Security 020).
    (14) Staff summary of CIA handbook (J.F.K. Security 020);see also ref.3, p.6 (ref. to FBI report, Feb. 25, 1964, from Miami, re Paulino Sierra Martinez) (J.F.K. Document 012887).
    (15) Staff summary of CIA handbook, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Security 020).
    (16) See ref. 3, p.4 (ref. FBI memo from Chicago, June 26, 1963, re Paulino Sierra Martinez).
    (17) U.S. Secret Service report, Nov. 27, 1963, to Chief from SAIS Martineau, Chicago, re Homer S. Echevarria, pp.2 and 3. House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 007601);see also Secret Service Report 1266, file CO-2-34,104, Dec. 19, 1963, from Tucker and Noonan, pp.4 and 5.

    *See the agency performance section I D 1 of the committee's report for more information about this threat.

    (18) Staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations (rough notes) (ref. CIA report, Nov. 17, 1963).
    (19) See ref. 3, p. 1 (ref. FBI Report 105-121010 of departure, Jan. 8, 1963).
    (20) Id. at p. 2 (ref. CIA report, May 7, 1963).
    (21) Id. at p. 3 (ref. FBI memo, June 3, 1963, re Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez).
    (22) Id. at p. 4 (ref. FBI memo, June 26, 1963, re Paulino Sierra Martinez.)
    (23) Ibid.
    (24) Id. at p. 8 (ref. FBI memo, Nov. 2, 1963, from Miami).
    (25) News article, Chicago Tribune, Mar. 10, 1963 (J.F.K. Document 013397).
    (26) Staff summary of CIA handbook, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Security 020).
    (27) Ibid.
    (28) See ref. 3, p. 6 (ref. FBI report, Feb. 25, 1964, from Miami, re Paulino Sierra Martinez, information from Gilberto Rodriguez Fernandez).
    (29) Ibid.
    (30) Summary of CIA files, HOuse Select Committee on Assassinations,P.6, undated report.
    (31) Staff summary of FBI file for Carlos Rodriguez Quesada (ref. FBI Rept. 105-1210-31, Jan. 28, 1964, from Chicago, re Paulino Sierra Martinez), House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3.
    (32) Ibid.
    (33) See ref. 3, p. 1 (ref. news article, May 19, 1963, Miami News, Miami).
    (34) Id. at p. 2 (ref. CIA report, May 7, 1963).
    (35) Id. at p. 4 (ref. FBI memo from Chicago, June 26, 1963, re Paulino Sierra Martinez).
    (36) Ibid.
    (37) Ibid.
    (38) Id. at p. 2 (ref. FBI Rept.105-121010-2, June 14, 1963).
    (39) Id. at p. 2 (ref. FBI Rept.105-121010-3, May 25, 1963, teletype to Director from SAC, Chicago, re Paulino Sierra Martinez).
    (40) Ibid.
    (41) Ibid.
    (42) Id. at p. 3 (ref. FBI memo, June 3, 1963, re Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez).
    (43) Id. at p. 4 (ref. FBI memo, June 29, 1963, re Paulino Sierra Martinez).
    (44) Ibid.
    (45) Ibid.
    (46) Id. at p. 2 (ref. CIA report, May 7, 1963);see also staff summary of CIA handbook, House Select Committee on Assassinations.
    (47) See ref. 3, p. 7 (ref. FBI memo, Sept. 23, 1963,re Paulino Sierra Martinez).
    (48) Staff summary of CIA undated report, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 6.
    (49) Ibid.
    (50) Ibid.
    (51) Ibid.
    (52) Id. at p.3, CIA undated report.
    (53) Ibid.
    (54) See ref. 3, p.7 (ref. FBI memo to Director from SAC, Miami, Dec. 10, 1963, re Americanism Educational League).
    (55) Ibid.
    (56) Ibid. (Note: Mold was also listed as a member of "Americans for Freedom" at the same address as the American Educational League. There is no evidence that this group was ever investigated by the FBI. See House Select Committee on Assassinations staff summary of CIA file, p. 6, undated CIA report.)
    (57) See ref. 3, p. 1 (ref. CIA report, Apr. 30, 1963).
    (58) Id. at p.11 (ref. CIA report, July 5, 1963);see also p.2 (ref.CIA report, May 7, 1963; and staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p.6, CIA memorandum, May 9, 1963).
    (59) See ref. 3, p.3 (ref. memo to Director from Sa, Chicago, June 26, 1963, re Paulino Sierra martinez).
    (60) This conclusion is based on a review of all documents pertaining to Sierra.
    (61) See ref. 3, p.10 (ref. CIA report, Nov. 7, 1963), and p.11 (ref. report 406, July 5, 1963).
    (62) Staff summary of CIA files, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p.10 (ref. CIA report, Nov. 7, 1963).
    (63) See ref. 3, p.9 (ref. FBI memo, Nov. 2, 1963, from Miami, re JGCE, p.41).
    (64) Id. at p.9 (ref. CIA report, Nov. 14, 1963).
    (65) Id. at p.7 (ref. FBI memo, Nov. 14, 1963, from Miami re INTERPEN), p.8(FBI memo, Nov. 2, 1963, from Miami re JGCE, pp.29-30); see also Gerry Patrick Hemming chronology from FBI files.
    (66) See ref. 3, p.8 (ref. FBI memo, Nov. 2, 1963, from Miami re JGCE, pp.29-30).(Note: The use of soldiers-of-fortune types such as Wilson and Garman may have been a result of prior contact with Hemming's men by Carlos Rodriguez, Quesada and the MILTN. See FBI notes-Quesada, Hemming chronology).
    (67) Id. at p.10 (ref.CIA report, Oct. 16,1963).
    (68) Ibid.(Note:Aquilar's group affiliation was unknown. However, he was known to be acquainted with Loran Hall, Lawrence Howard and William Seymour, who spent much time at Aquilar's house. See memo, June 5, 1968, of conversation with Aquilar.See also Nov. 1, 1963 memo re Hemming complaint that Hall stole a rifle and that Hall was staying with Aquilar at that time).
    (69) See ref. 3, p.6 (ref. FBI memo, Nov. 1, 1963, from Miami re SNFE).
    (70) Id. at p.7 (ref. CIA report, Nov. 22, 1963); see also staff summary, p.2 (ref. CIA report 4039, Nov. 14, 1963).
    (71) Id. at p.9 (ref. FBI memo, Nov. 2,1963, from Miami, JGCE, p.43) and p.5 (ref. CIA report, May 17, 1963); see also staff summary of CIA file, House
    Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (ref. dispatch 12627, Nov. 20, 1963, with attachment).
    (72) Staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp.1-2 (ref. dispatch 12627, Nov. 20, 1963, with attachment).
    (73) Id. at pp.1-2 and p.5 (ref. CIA memo Apr. 18, 1963).
    (74) Id. at p.2 (ref. dispatch 12627, Nov. 20, 1963, with attachment).
    (75) Ibid.; see also J.F.K. Document 012887 (ref. CIA report, Sept. 27, 1963).
    (76) Staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p.9 (ref. CIA report, Sept. 14, 1963).
    (77) Staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p.2 (ref. CIA report, Nov. 14, 1963).
    (78) Summary, p.8, note 3 (ref. FBI memo, Nov. 2, 1963 from Miami re JGCE, pp.29-30).
    (79) Staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p.2 (ref. CIA report, Nov. 14, 1963).
    (80) See ref. 3, p.7 (ref. FBI memo, Nov. 1, 1963, from Miami re SNFE).
    (81) Ibid.
    (82) Ibid.
    (83) Id. at p.8(ref. FBI memo, Nov. 2, 1963, from Miami re JGCE, pp.29-30).
    (84) Id. at p.10(ref. CIA report, Oct. 15, 1963); see also staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p.2 (ref. report, Oct. 15, 1963 extract).
    (85) Summary, CIA handbook.
    (86) See ref.3, p.9 (ref. FBI memo, Nov. 2, 1963, from Miami re JGCE, p.37).
    (87) Id. at pp.10-11(ref. CIA report. Sept. 13, 1963).
    (88) Staff summary, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p.2 (ref. CIA report, Nov. 14, 1963, extract); see also J.F.K. Document 021887, p.9 (ref. CIA report, Nov. 14, 1963).
    (89) Staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p.2 (ref. CIA report, Nov. 14, 1963).
    (90) See ref. 3, p.8 (ref. CIA report, Dec. 11, 1963).
    (91) Ibid.; see also staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p.2 (ref. dispatch 12627, Nov. 20, 1963, with attachment). 103
    (92) See ref. 3, p.8 (ref. CIA report, Dec. 11, 1963).
    (93) Id. at p. 11 (ref. CIA report, Sept. 13, 1963).
    (94) Staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p.2 (ref. dispatch 12627, Nov. 20, 1963, with attachment).
    (95) Ibid.
    (96) Ibid.


  103. In connection with its investigation of anti-Castro Cuban groups, the committee examined the activities of David William Ferrie, an alleged associate of Lee Harvey Oswald. Among other contentions, it had been charged that Ferrie was involved with at least one militant group of Cuban exiles and that he had made flights into Cuba in support of their counterrevolutionary activities there.

  104. On Monday afternoon, November 25, 1963, Ferrie, Moreover, voluntarily presented himself for questioning to the New Orleans police, who had been looking for him in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy.(1) The New Orleans district attorney's office had earlier received information regarding a relationship between Ferrie and accused assassin Lee Harvey Oswald,(2) including allegations that: Ferrie may have been acquainted with Oswald since Oswald's days in the Civil Air Patrol youth organization in 1954-55, Ferrie may have given Oswald instruction in the use of a rifle and may have hypnotized Oswald to shoot the President, and that Ferrie was in Texas on the day of the assassination and may have been Oswald's getaway pilot.(3)

  105. Ferrie denied all the contentions, stating that at the time of the Presiden's assassination, he had been in New Orleans, busy with court matters for organized crime figure Carlos Marcello, who had been acquitted of immigration-related charges that same day.(4) Other individuals, including Marcello, marcello's lawyer, the lawyer's secretary, and FBI agent Regis Kennedy, supported Ferrie's alibi.(5)

  106. Ferrie also gave a detailed account of his whereabouts for the period from the evening of November 22, 1963, until his appearance at the New Orleans police station.(6) Interviews of Ferie's associates and the results of a field investigation verified Ferrie's statements.(7)

  107. Ferrie's assertion that his Stinson Voyager airplane could not be flown at the time of the assassination was later verified by the FBI.(8) Jack martin, a New Orleans private detective and colleague of Ferrie, who had originally mentioned Ferrie to New Orleans officials, subsequently informed authorities he had no specific information to support his allegations.(9) Thus, the FBI and the Warren Commission concluded that the stories relating to an Oswald-Ferrie relationship were unfounded.

  108. Ferrie died in 1967, shortly after New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison announced he was reopening the Kennedy probe and was interested in Ferrie's activities in 1963. While there was much speculation that his death may have been suicide, the New Orleans coroner determined the death was a result of natural causes.(10) Nevertheless, this further fueled suspicion about his activities.

  109. The committee determined that Ferrie's activities during the months prior to the assassination of President Kennedy warranted examination. The committee was particularly concerned about the possiblity of a relationship between Oswald and Ferrie. Several parallels in the lives of the two emerged:complex personality and political beliefs; difficulty in achieving normal social adjustment; and a pattern of visiting the same locality at the same time, and engaging in similar activities.

  110. A detailed record of Ferrie's life and associates is currently available. The committee examined FBI and Secret Service investigative reports generated immediately after the assassination and FBI and INS reports from before and after the assassination; it received information developed during the 1967-68 Garrison investigation; and it examined the files of the extensive investigation of Ferrie conducted by the Federal Aviation Administration, Eastern Airlines, and the New Orleans police from 1961 to 1963, an investigation that was the result of criminal charges against Ferrie filed in 1961. Additionally, the committee conducted its own field investigation.

  111. Ferrie was born in 1918 in Cleveland, Ohio, the son of James Howard Ferrie, a police captain and an attorney.(11) Ferrie attended parochial grammar and high schools.(12) Although there are no indications that his childhood was anything but normal, numerous acquaintances and associates of Ferrie reveal that he grew to be a complex, even bizarre, individual. One aptly stated, "Not inappropriately, he(Ferrie) was described as a paradox."(13)

  112. His unusual personal appearance was partially a result of the loss of his body hair induced by a rare disease.(14) He wore a makeshift toupee and exaggerated fake eyebrows affixed crudely with glue as compensation.(15) Persons who knew him considered him sloppy and unkept, with a proclivity for foul language.(16)

  113. Ferrie was often described as "very aggressive" and "highly obnoxious."(17) He resented authority,(18) was opinionated, and often difficult to get along with.(19) Yet he was able to exert tremendous influence over his close associates, including many young men in his Civil Air Patrol squadron.(20)

  114. Several of Ferrie's associates indicate he was a homosexual and a misogynist.(21) His sexual exploitation of younger men would eventually cause him numerous problems.

  115. Although his formal education was not extensive, Ferrie was considered highly intelligent, even brilliant.(22) He had originally studied theology in the hope of becoming an ordained priest, but he left seminary school before graduation because of "emotional instability."(23) Later, in 1941, he received a bachelor of arts degree from Baldwin-Wallace College,(24) majoring in philosophy.(25) He also received, through a correspondence course, a doctorate degree in psychology from an unaccredited school, Phoenix University, Bari,Italy.(26) In August 1957, he traveled to Italy to take the final board exam.(27)

  116. Ferrie spent considerable time studying medicine and psychology,(28) especially the techniques of hypnosis which he frequently practiced on his young associates.(29) Ferrie had even set up a labora-ory over his garage,(30) where he claimed he lost his hair, alternately attributing it to a radiation experiment, chemical explosion, and cancer research experiments.(31) He listed his name in the telephone book as "Dr." David Ferrie;(32) many friends did erroneously believe he was a medical doctor and a psychologist.(33) This veneer of respectability and achievement could be the reason Ferrie referred to his Ph.D. degree as his "most prized possession."(34)

  117. Ferrie was also philosphically and politically complex. He considered himself a devout Catholic,(35) and made several attempts to become a priest,(36) even though he described himself as a "theological liberal."(37) He also claimed to be liberal in his civil rights attitude.(38) He was rabidly anti-Communist,(39) however, and frequently critical of each Presidential administration for what he perceived to be sell-outs to communism.(40)

  118. Ferrie often spoke to business and civic groups about politics.(41) Ferrie associates told FBI agents in 1961 that Ferrie had been "critical of the Roosevelt administration * * * (as it) was trying to drive us into communism."(42) Associates also said Ferrie "was also critical of the Truman administration for the same reason."(43)

  119. Ferrie was asked to discontinue his remarks at a speaking engagement in July 1961 before the New Orleans chapter of the Military Order of World Wars.(44) His topic was the Presidential administration and the Bay of Pigs fiasco.(45) The organization put a stop to Ferrie's remarks when he became too critical of President Kennedy.(46)

  120. He apparently expressed his views to anyone who would listen. During an interview with an IRS auditor in 1960, Ferrie was "outspoken" in his derogatory comments about the United States.(47) He complained bitterly about his alleged tax persectuion to such an extent that the agent reported he thought Ferrie was actually deranged, a "psycho."(48)

  121. Ferrie's major avocation and occupation was flying. Even associates who were critical of Ferrie's character considered him an excellent pilot.(49) An early acquaintance believes that Ferrie first started to fly at his father's suggestion to take his mind off of his failures at the seminary.(50) He took lessons at Sky Tech Airway Service in Cleveland, Ohio, between 1942 and 1945.(51) He then worked as a pilot for an oil drilling firm which had jobs in South America. (52) When the company went out of business, Ferrie tried teaching at Rocky River High School,(53) but he was fired in 1948 for psychoanalyzing his students instead of teaching them.(54)

  122. In 1949, Ferrie left the Cleveland area after rumors, that he had taken several young boys to a house of prostitution, circulated through his neighborhood.(55) Although Ferrie's exact movements are not known, it appears he had gone to Tampa, Fla., where he received his instrument rating at Sunnyside Flying School.(56)

  123. In 1950, Ferrie returned to Cleveland. He worked as an insurance inspector,(57) and joined the Army Reserve for a 3-year stint, leaving with an honorable discharge in 1953.(58)

  124. Life started going well for Ferrie. In 1951, he submitted an application to Eastern Airlines, omitting details of his past emotional and occupational difficulties.(59) Eastern Airlines hired him in Miami, and soon transferred him to New Orleans.(60)

  125. Internal Eastern Airlines memoranda indicated Ferrie was accepted for employment, but consideration was given to firing him almost immediately for falsifying parts of his application.(61) The New Orleans branch was advised to keep Ferrie only until a replacement could be found and a "close watch" on Ferrie's progress was recommended.(62) Initial reports, however, were favorable.(63) Ferrie was considered by his fellow pilots to be doing a good job, although he was "odd" at times.(64) Eastern decided to retain him.

  126. Ferrie approached his job enthusiastically, devoting his own time to talking at schools and clubs to promote interest in aviation and travel in the Southwest area.(65) In 1953, the president of Eastern wrote him a letter personally commending Ferrie's efforts on behalf of the company.(66) This early record of dedication and competence may have accounted for Ferrie's longevity as an Eastern Airlines captain, despite complaints through the years.(67) Ultimately, the infractions became too serious, and, after a long investigation and a hearing process that lasted from 1961 until 1963, Ferrielost his job.

  127. Ferrie had always been engrossed in activities related to flying, including the Civil Air Patrol, which he had first joined in Cleveland.(68) Over the years, his difficulties with the hierarchy and authorities of the Civil Air Patrol would increase, but Ferrie remained intensely popular with many of the members and enjoyed a reputation as a first rate instructor and organizer.(69) Jean Naatz, an aviatrix of national renown, stated, "He had done more for the Civil Air Patrol than anyone else and built up the squadron to one of the biggest squadrons in the State of Ohio."(70)

  128. Ferrie also built the same reputation with many CAP cadets in the New Orleans area. One CAP commander said, "David Ferrie is a good organizer * * * he made the CAP at the New Orleans Airport everything it is today. He has a large following among the cadets of the CAP, and is an excellent flying instructor."(71) By 1953, there were about 80 cadets assigned to his squadron.(72) Ferrie spent about 6 hours a week in official CAP activity and much of his own time associating with his cadets.(73) Ferrie became known for his enthusiastic approach to cadet training, emphasizing tutoring in science and mathematics and putting cadets in charge of their own discipline.(74) Thesquadron had an award-winning drill team.(75)

  129. His appeal to several young men may have been related to his taking an extraordinary interest in them: he gave them flying instruction and flight time in his own airplane;(76) he often gave parties at his residence where liquor flowed freely;(77) and he offered his home as a place for the boys to stay when they were unhappy at home.(78) He urged several boys to join the armed forces,(79) to begin careers in aviation,(80) or to join seminaries.(81) Many of Ferrie's cadets became involved in Ferrie's wide spectrum of other activities.(82)

  130. Ferrie's tremendous influence and close assocaition with these young men eventually became a controversial subject with many parents.(83)

  131. Ferrie did not bother to renew his CAP commander charter when it ran out in 1954,(84) although he continued to wear the insignia of the CAP on his fatigues.(85) He did renew his commander charter in 1959, when he augmented his cadet's standard CAP rifle training by instituting an association with the New Orleans Cadet Rifle Club.(86) Ferrie also started a group called the "Falcon Squadron," comosed of Ferrie's closest CAP associates.(87) A group within this group, the "Omnipotents," was allegedly started to train cadets in what to do in the event of a major attack on the United States.(88)

  132. Ferrie's job and ownership of an airplane enabled him to travel around the country with relative ease. He told officials he frequently traveled to Texas and other parts of the South, including Miami.(89) He also visited New York on occasion.(90) The amount of time Ferrie spent in these other cities could not be determined. In August 1959, while in Miami, Ferrie was put under a 24-hour surveillance by customs agents who believed he was involved in gun smuggling.(91) Following a brief investigation, including a tapping of his telephone conversations, it was determined that Ferrie was not involved in any illegal activity, but merely planning an outing for his "scouts".(92) Theinvestigation was dropped.(93)

  133. Ferrie also became involved in other activities. In 1959, he had found an outlet for his political fanaticism in the anti-Castro movement.(94) By early 1961, Ferrie and a young man whom Ferrie had first met in the CAP, Layton Martens, were working with Sergio Arcacha Smith, head of the Cuban Revolutionary Front delegation in New Orleans.(95)

  134. Ferrie soon became Smith's eager partner in counterrevolutionary activities.(96) He reportedly built two miniature submarines, which he planned to use for an attack on Havana Harbor,(97) obtained several rifles and mortars for the proposed invasion,(98) and was reportedly teaching Cubans how to fly.(99) Further, several of Ferrie's cadets claimed to have taken trips to Cuba in Ferrie's airplane.(100)

  135. Ferrie was also involved with Arcacha Smith, adventurer Gordon Novel and Layton Martens in a raid on a munitions dump in Houma, La.(101) In September 1961, the U.S. border patrol received information that Ferrie was attempting to purchase a C-47 airplane for $30,000 and reportedly had a cache of arms in the New Orleans area.(102) The report was never verified. There were also unverified reports that Ferrie provided Arcacha Smith with personal financial assistance.(103)

  136. Arcacha Smith wrote Eastern Airlines then-president Eddie Rickenbacker on Ferrie's behalf requesting a 60- or 90-day leave with pay for full-time work for the CRC. The request was denied.(104) Nevertheless, Ferrie's vacation in April 1961 coincided with the Bay of Pigs invasion.(105) Ferrie's role, if any, is not known.

  137. The CRC in New Orleans was affiliated with the main branch of the CRC in Miami, which had been receiving funds from the U.S. Government.(106) Some of these funds may have been disseminated to the New Orleans branch to cover operating costs. Nevertheless, there is no evidence Ferrie received funds from either the CRC or the U.S. Government and no evidence that Ferrie was connected in any way with the U.S. Government.(107) Ferrie's assistance and interest appears to have been completely voluntary.

  138. During this time Ferrie had continued to have personal problems. In 1960, he had provoked the ire of other CAP commanders while on a cadet campout.(108) The incident ended with Ferrie withdrawing his cadets from the outing and eventually led to his permanent resignation from the CAP in 1960.(109)

  139. Ferrie's troubles intensified when charges were brought against him by parents of boys who had run away from home.(110) In one instance, Ferrie had gained entrance to the New Orleans Detention Center to visit one runaway boy by signing himself in as a doctor.(111)

  140. The parents of another boy complained to authorities that their son was staying with Ferrie.(112) As a result, Ferrie was arrested on August 8, 1961 for contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile.(113)

  141. Cuban exile leader Arcacha Smith* intervened on Ferrie's behalf by telling police that the boy would be returned to his parents if they did not press charges against Ferrie.(114)

  142. But Ferrie was arrested again on August 11, 1961, for crime against nature on a 15-year-old boy and indecent behavior with three others.(115)

  143. An intensive New Orleans police investigation of the charges against Ferrie produced statements from several boys that Ferrie had committed indecent acts with them.(117) The boys also told investigators Ferrie had told them he had had homosexual relations with a married man in Houston.(118) On August 26, Eastern Airlines removed him from the payroll for an indefinite period (119) and the Federal Aviation Administration then opened its own investigation into the charges.(120)

  144. With his problems mounting, Ferrie sought legal aid from New Orleans attorney G. Wray Gill, Sr.(121) Ferrie later testified that he and Gill had entered into an agreement in March 1962 that Gill would represent Ferrie in his legal difficulties in return for Ferrie's research and investigative work on other cases for Gill.(122)

  145. Ferrie also testified that he also entered into a similar arrangement in February 1962 with Guy Banister,(123) a former FBI agent who ran a private investigative firm.(124) By the terms of the agreement, Ferrie's work for Banister included analyzing autopsy reports in payment for Banister's investigative services.(125) Banister stated he handled Ferrie's case "personally".(126)

  146. Ferrie may have first met Banister late in 1960 or early 1961 when Banister, also a strong anti-Communist, was helping to establish the "Friends of Democratic Cuba" organization as an adjunct to Sergio Arcacha Smith's CRC.(127) At the time, Banister's investigative business and the CRC were both located in the Balter Building.(128) In February 1961, Banister was conducting background investigations of the members of the CRC from a list provided by Arcache Smith.(129) In early 1962, both moved their offices to the NewmanBuilding, which carried the two addresses for the two streets it faced: 531 Lafayette and 544 Camp Street.(131)

  147. Jack Martin, a private investigator associated with Banister,(132) may also have been contacted by Ferrie for assistance on his case. Ferrie testified in August 1963 that he had helped Martin on a case involving a phony religious order in Louisville, Ky., in November 1961.(133) Later, Martin wrote letters to the FAA and Eastern Airlines on Ferrie's behalf.(134)
    *Arcacha Smith was having problems of his own. He had moved the office of the CRC to the Newman Building at 544 Camp Street in 1962, but lack of funds caused him to leave town in mid-1962, his reputation among anti-Castro Cubans tarnished by his assocaition with Ferrie. He was also accused by several Cuban exiles of misappropriation of funds.

  148. With this assistance, Ferrie was able to resolve many of his difficulties. At the end of February 1962, Ferrie was tried and acquitted of the charges of extortion.(135) The other charges were nolle prosequied in November 1962.(136)

  149. Ferrie managed to stay afloat financially despite his loss of income from Eastern Airlines in 1961. Although he was categorized as a "poor" credit risk in October 1962 by the New Orleans Retail Credit Bureau,(137) Ferrie made payments on his car(138) and met living expenses.

  150. Meanwhile, he was also attempting to be reinstated as an Eastern pilot. Attorney G. Wray Gill notified Eastern when the last of the charges against Ferrie had been nolle prosequied;(139) Eastern responded with a letter inviting Ferrie to discuss the charges at a meeting in Miami.(140) Ferrie did not go.(141) Instead, several individuals, including one of the boys who had been name din a sex offense charge against him,(142) wrote to Eastern to plead that Ferrie be reinstated.(143) Ferrie also filed a "grievance" against East-ern.(144) Then, in February 1963, he went to Miami with attorney Gill for the hearing regarding his dismissal.(145) Eastern ruled against him;(146) Ferrie filed another grievance.(147)

  151. Hearing dates were scheduled and rescheduled.(148) During this period, Ferrie was often seen at Banister's offices in 544 Camp Street(149) as he prepared his case.

  152. Ferrie's final grievance hearing was set for July 15, 1963, in Miami.(150) Ferrie, Gill and Banister were in Miami on July 15, 16, and 17 while Eastern Airlines presented its case against Ferrie.(151) The record of these hearings reveals that the company's charges were based on Ferrie's deliberate omissions and inaccuracies in his original application to the company; charges of Ferrie's moral turpitude; and his having misrepresented himself as a medical doctor and psychologist.(152)

  153. The hearings were resumed on August 5.(153) Testifying in Ferrie's defense were former CAP cadet, John Irion; Ferrie's long-time friend, James Lewallen; Ferrie's investigator, Guy Banister; and Ferrie himself.(154) Layton Martens provided a sworn deposition in defense of Ferrie's character.(155) Banister testified to Ferrie's good character supposedly based on his own investigation of Ferrie.(156)

  154. In cross-examination, Banister could not rationalize to the satisfaction of the hearing board the reasons for Ferrie's vituperative remarks in 1961 against President Kennedy(157) nor could he adequately explain Ferrie's involvement with a questionable church group.(158)

  155. On September 30, Ferrie received the final decision from the Eastern appeal board:(159) it unanimously upheld his discharge.(160)

  156. By the fall of 1963, Ferrie had become actively involved in the defense investigation of Federal charges of a fraudulent birth certificate against Carlos Marcello an alleged organized crime leader in New Orleans.(161) Ties to Marcello continued through Ferrie's lifetime. As late as 1966, 6 months prior to his death, Ferrie was working with known Marcello associate, Jacob Nastasi, in an aircargo service. (162) According to information developed during an FBI antiracketeering investigation of Nastasi, Ferrie had previously worked with Marcello associates in another airline company known as United Air Taxi Service.(163) Ferrie's involvement with Marcello may have begun as early as the spring of 1961.(164) An unconfirmed Border Patrol report of February 1962 alleges that Ferrie was the pilot who flew Carlos Marcello back into the United States from Guatemala after he had been deported in April 1961 as part of the U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy's crackdown on organizedcrime.(165) This may have helped Ferrie establish an enduring relationship with the Marcello organized crime family.

  157. The return of Marcello to the United States coincided chronologically with Ferrie's activities with the Cuban Revolutionary Counsel.(166) According to Carlos Quiroga, a Cuban who had been involved with the CRC, Ferrie often provided Arcacha Smith with funds(167) stating, "Ferrie lent him(Arcacha Smith) money when he needed it for his family . . . He (Ferrie) had $100 bills around all the time," even after he had lost his job with the airlines.(168)

  158. An FBI report of April 1961 indicated Marcello offered Arcacha Smith a deal whereby Marcello would make a substantial donation to the movement in return for concessions in Cuba after Castro's overthrow.(169) One explanation of Ferrie's ability to provide funds to Arcacha Smith may be that he acted as Marcello's financial conduit.

  159. Another indication of any early Ferrie relationship with the Marcello organized crime family may be the legal assistance that Marcello's lawyer, Jack Wasserman,(170) provided to Ferrie associates, Layton Martens, who identified himself to police as Arcacha Smith's second-in-command,(171) and Andrew Blackmon.(172) Both had been arrested shortly after Ferrie's arrest for indecent behavior.(173)

  160. Ferrie's ties to the Marcello organized crime family continued through his association with G. Wray Gill, Sr., who was also attorney of record for Carlos Marcello.(174)

  161. Ferrie told the FBI that he had begun work on Marcello's case after his last Eastern grievance hearing.(175) In telling the Bureau about his work for Marcello, however, he mentioned only activities in October and November.(176)

  162. Ferrie said he went to Guatemala on business for Marcello from October 11 to October 18 and from October 30 to November 1.(177) The day after marcello's trial started, November 5, Ferrie purchased a .38 caiber revolver.(178) On the weekends of November 9 and 16, Ferrie stayed at Churchill Farms, Marcello's Louisiana countryside estate.(179) He said he had gone there to map out strategy for Marcello's trial.(180)

  163. New Orleans police records for November 22, 1963, indicate that Guy Banister pistol-whipped Jack Martin on the evening of the assassination in a heated argument over "long-distance telephone calls."(181) Although Marin reported the assault to the police, he refused to press charges against Banister.(182) Within 48 hours, however, Martin had the entire New Orleans police department hunting for David Ferrie.(183) He told the police that Ferrie may have been involved in the Kennedy assassination.(184) Specifically, he suspected, that Ferrie was in Texas on the day of the assassination; that he was supposed to have been the getaway pilot in the assassination; and that Ferrie had known Oswald from their days together in the Civil Air Patrol, when Ferrie had given Oswald instructions in the use of a rifle.(185)

  164. In an attempt to locate Ferrie for questioning, police arrested two Ferrie associates, Layton Martens and Alvin Beauboeuf, at Ferrie's residence and charged then with vagrancy.(186) While Beauboeuf was uncooperative during the questioning,(187) Martens was more talkative.(188) He said Gill had come by to relay a message to Ferrie that his library card was found among Oswald's effects.(189) Martens' story was unsubstantiated.

  165. Ferrie returned to New Orleans on the afternoon of November 25.(190) He and attorney Gill appeared at the district attorney's office around 4:30 p.m.(191) He was questioned by the New Orleans police, the U.S. Secret Service, and the FBI.(192) He denied ever seeing Oswald before.(193)

  166. Ferrie also said that he had been in New Orleans until at least 9 p.m. on November 22, celebrating Marcello's trial victory at the Royal Orleans.(194) He said he then left the city with two friends for some rest and relaxation.(195)

  167. Ferrie's account of his travels between November 22 and November 25 contained some contrdictions. Ferrie said he left New Orleans by automobile, bound for Houston and accompanied by Melvin Coffey and Al Beauboeuf.(196) The group checked in at the Alamotel early on November 23.(197) That date on the motel registrationcard was written over a November 22 notation.(198) The motel employee said that was because of the early morning hour of the checking, however, and that he was certain the correct date was the 23d.(199)

  168. On the afternoon of November 23, Ferrie said he, Beauboeuf, and Coffey went figure skating at the Winterland Skating Rink.(200) The three then went to the Belair Skating Rink(201) before driving 1 hour to Galveston, Tex., where they arrived at 9 p.m. and a short time later, checked into the Driftwood Motel.(202)

  169. Checkin and checkout times for the Houston and Galveston hotels conflict. Alamotel records in Houston indicate that Ferrie and his friends checked into the hotel early on November 23 and did not leave until 8 or 9 p.m. on November 24.(203) Yet the registration records and witnesses at the Driftwood in Galveston show the three registered late on November 23 and checked out at 10 a.m. on November 24.(204)

  170. Records from the motels indicate the group made a number of phone calls.(205) Two calls made from the Alamotel went to radio stations WSHO and WDSH in New Orleans.(206) A collect call went to the Town and Country Motel, Marcello's New Orleans headquarters.(207)

  171. Evidence indicated that Ferrie conducted his own investigation into the Kennedy assassination. Oswald's former landlady in New Orleans, Mrs. Jesse Garner, told the committee she recalled that Ferrie visited her home on the night of the assassination and asked about Oswald's library card.(208) Mrs. Garner would not talk to Ferrie.(209)

  172. A neighbor of Oswald's, Mrs. Doris Eames, told New Orleans district attorney investigators in 1968 that Ferrie had come by her house after the assassination, inquiring if Mr. Eames had any information regarding Oswald's library card. Eames told Ferrie he had seen Oswald in the public library but apparently had no information about the library card Oswald used.(210)

  173. Ferrie also talked with several former members of the Civil Air Patrol in an attempt to find out if any former cadets recalled Lee Harvey Oswald in Ferrie's squadron. Among those contacted was former cadet Roy McCoy, who told the FBI that Ferrie had come by looking for photographs of the cadets to see if Oswald was pictured in any photos of Ferrie's squadron.(211)

  174. The implications of Ferrie's associations, his activities, and the allegations that Ferrie and Oswald had been seen together in Clinton,La., in the late summer, 1963, and were acquainted while both were active in the Civil Air Patrol in 1955, are discussed in the anti-Castro Cuban conspiracy and the organized crime conspiracy sections of the committee's report.

    Submitted by:



    (1) Memo from Sedgebeer to Giarmusso, New Orleans district attorney's office May 22, 1964, House Select Committee on Assassinations(J.F.K. Document 003840); see also New Orleans police report of Francis Martello, Nov. 25, 1963.
    (2) FBI report, No.62-109060, interview of Jerry P. Stein, Nov. 25, 1963, p. 300); and FBI report, No.62-109060, interview of Jack S. Martin, Nov. 25, 1963 (p.309). Note: All FBI reports were obtained from file No.62-109060 unless otherwise specifically noted.
    (3) Jack Martin letter to Robert Robey of FAA, the Federal Aviation Administration, Nov. 25, 1963; FBI report, interview of Jack Martin, Nov. 25, 1963(p.309); and New Orleans police report, interview of Edward Voebel, Nov. 27,1963, FAA, vol.1 (J.F.K. Document 014964).
    (4) FBI report, interview of David Ferrie, Nov. 26, 1963.
    (5) Immunized testimony of Carlos Marcello, Jan. 11, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p.67; FBI report, interview of G. Wray Gill, Nov. 27, 1963; and FBI memo, May 18, 1967, No.62-109060-5255. Regis Kennedy, p. 2 Note: There are discrepancies about whether Ferrie was in the courthouse or in Gill's office on the day of the assassination. Marcello and Kennedy said Ferrie was in the courtroom (both statements were taken some years after the event). Gill said he knew Ferrie was in Gill's office at 12:15 p.m. on Nov. 22, 1963, because Gill had called his secretary at that time to tell her the federal jury had returned a verdict in favor of Marcello. Gill's secretary told Gill that Ferrie had left Gill's office at that time (12:15 p.m.) stating he would return at 1:30 p.m., which he failed to do. Gill's secretary, Aldic Guidroz, was not questioned as to Ferrie's whereabouts. Ferrie told the FBI he was in New Orleans "all day" on Nov. 11, 1963. The date, Nov. 11, may have been a typographical error meant to have been Nov. 22, 1963, since there is no significance to Nov. 11, 1963. See FBI report, Nov. 26, 1963, for interview with Ferrie. (6) FBI report, interview of David Ferrie, November 26, 1963.
    (7) FBI report, interview of Melvin Coffey, November 20, 1973. Coffey told of trip planned since November 20, although he did not know the destination. He said Ferrie and Beauboeuf were particularly interested in ice skating, so they went to Houston.
    (8) FBI report, interview of M. Coffey, November 30, 1963. Coffey said the plane had not been airworthy for some time. He last heard it was used February 1963:FBI report, interview of James Lewallen, November 27, 1963, p. 214; and FBI report, interview of David Ferrie, November 27, 1963, p.200 (Ferrie said the plane had not been airworthy since the spring of 1962). Note: While the evidence tends to show Ferrie's plane had not been in working order for some time, an FAA document indicated that Jack Martin believed Ferrie's Stinson was airworthy as of July 1963, or, at least, that a Stinson aircraft was available to Ferrie at that time. See memo to the file, July 18, 1963, FAA, vol. 1 HSCA (J.F.K. Document No. 014904).
    (9) Secret Service Report No. CO-2-34, 030, December 13, 1963, p.5 (J.F.K. Document No. 014904); see also vol. 5, FAA news article, exhibit A, February 22,1967, Fort Worth Star-Telegram.
    (10) Memo re: Autopsy of Ferrie from Jim Garrison to Jim Alcor (J.F.K. Document No. 003840); see also Newsweek, March 6, 1967, "Carnival in New Orleans" (file Ferrie, D.W.S.W.67.91) (J.F.K. Document No. 014904); see also Fort Worth Star-Telegram, February 23, 1967, "Death of Ferrie Stymies JFK Probe."
    (11) FAA file, vol. 2, Southern Research Investigation, No. 11-N-224,January 25, 1963, p.10 (hereinafter SR-11-N-224 and date) (J.F.K. Document No.014904).
    (12) Id. at p.23.
    (13) Id. at pp.21 and 23.
    (14) Ibid.; and Ibid., December 19, 1963, p. 20. A doctor who treated Ferrie said he suffered from "a disease causing emotional anxiety caused by nervous shock and thyroid deficiency."
    (15) Ibid., SR November 19, 1962, p.10. (Meister said in an interview that Ferrie "wears a toupee, possibly self-mad.") FBI report, September 22, 1961, p. 5. Mrs. Nichols who knew of Ferrie said "he wears a wig." FAA, vol. 4, Robey report, p. 9, interview of Mr. T. W. Christiansen, p.10 and interview Col. Joseph G. Ehrlicker.
    (16) Ibid., FAA, vol. 2, exhibit III, Statement of Cadet; FBI report, interview of Mrs. Dunn and Mrs. Nichols, September 22, 1961.
    (17) See ref. 11, SR-11-N-224, November 19,1962, FAA, vol. 2, p.10, interview of Al Meister.
    (18) Ibid., vol. 3, exhibit XX, Ferrie file from St. Charles Seminary, December 1, 1961. (Ferrie was described as "critical of authority," "careless about observing rules," "ignored authority," "indulges freely in criticism of his superiors"); see also FAA, vol.4, Robey report. p.10, interview of Col. Joseph G. Ehrlicker, "resented authority."
    (19) Ibid., SR-1-N-224, November 19, 1962, FAA, vol.2, interview of George Piazza who told investigators "Ferrie is the type of individual who fancies himself an expert in all matters and, hence, believes himself infallible. To this end Ferrie would express his philosphical ideas in no uncertain terms." See also FAA, vol.III, exhibit XX, Ferrie file from St. Charles Seminary; FAA, vol.4, report of Robey,p.7. Rev. Francis B. Sullivan, professor of theology at St. Charles Seminary, feels Ferrie to be a "preconditioned psycho, impresses people by pretending to be an expert on everything, definitely has a talent for character assassination" (p.11). Douyear McGray called Ferrie "eccentric and dictatorial" (p.12). Al Meister described him as "officious and dictatorial."
    (20) Ibid., FAA file, vol. 4, exhibit III, Statement of Cadet, Dec. 1, 1961. Ferrie seemed to "hold the cadets in the palm of his hand" (p.4). S. R. 11-N-224, Nov. 19, 1962,p.10, interview of Al Meister. He said Ferrie was very influential. Interview of Piazza. He said Ferrie "seemed to have a certain talent and background in the use of psychology and would use this as well as his philosophical ideas to influence some of the youths in the CAP squadron." See also interview of Bob Boyleston. Oct. 17,1978,House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. document No. 012865);FBI report, Oct. 30, 1961, "David William Ferrie," interview of John Harris, who said "Ferrie has a group of young boys whom he supports and controls completely;" FAA, vol.4, Robey report, p.9(J.F.K. document No. 014904), interview of Colonel Harry A. Webb: "I had ability to get affection of the cadets and that they would do almost anything for him."
    (21) Ibid., SR 11-N-244, Nov. 19, 1962, p.10. Meister advised that he had heard through cadet sources "that subject is possibly a homosexual." and also that Ferrie "hated women;" FBI interview of A. Gifford. Nov. 25, 1963; FAA, vol.4, Robey Report, p. 11--Ferrie told Joseph Howard girls and women were no good and intellectually inferior to men, John Johnson said Ferrie thought women dense (J.F.K. document No. 014904).
    (22) Ibid., SR 11-N-224, Jan. 25, 1963, p.16, Mrs. Jean Naatz; FBI report, Sept. 22, 1961, No. 105-104-340-3, p.4, interview of Joseph Lisman and interview of Mrs. Ruby Nichols, p.5.
    (23) Ibid., SR-11-N-224, Dec. 19, 1962, p.19, Ferrie was treated for emotional problems in 1944, FAA, vol. 2, letter of J.H.Ferrie to St. Charles Seminary.
    (24) Id. at pp.18-19, FAA, vol.III, exhibit.
    (25) Ibid., FAA, vol. III, exhibit, transcript of grades from Baldwin-Wallace College, Berea, Ohio, June 9, 1941; lists all courses.
    (26) Synopsis of a Small Business Administration hearing, testimony of Ronald Hubner, Southern Research investigator, p.3 (J.F.K. Document No. 014930). See also vol. K, FAA file, ALPA SBA, D. W. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-63, 48-63, EAL EXH No. 6, letter of Dec. 17, 1962, from U.S. Foreign Service to Mr. Risley, Southern Research (J.F.K. document No. 014904).
    (27) SBA hearing, Ferrie testimony, synopsis, p.4 (J.F.K. document No. 014930).(Ferrie claims he also wrote a doctor's thesis for his degree on an aspect of the psychology of vision-the use of hypnotherapy in retinitis.)
    (28) FAA, vol.4. Robert Robey Report, p. 11, John Johnson, Ferrie told them he had taken a premedical course, p.12 (J.F.K. Document No. 014904); Al Landry said Ferrie told him he was studying at Tulane University; Robert Morrell (FAA, vol.4, Robey Report, p.11) (Ferrie led people to believe he was studying medicine at Tulane University. Karl Koster said Ferrie told him he studied medicine. Ferrie also had a copy of a Ph.D. in psychology on his wall(p.15).
    (29) SBA hearing, synopsis of testimony of John Irion(J.F.K. document No. 014930). FAA, vol. 4, Robey Report, p. 8, Edward W. Strubo advised Ferrie tried hypnosis on the students,p.10 (J.F.K. Document No. 014930); Robert E. Morrell said "he had seen David Ferrie use hypnosis."
    (30) Interview of John Irion. Oct. 19, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (J.F.K. document No. 012754); FAA, vol. 4, Robey Report, p. 8, FAA, vol. 4, report, Aug. 22, 1961, Jefferson Parish Police Department, Juvenile Division (J.F.K. document No. 014904).
    (31) Ibid., FAA, vol. 4, Robey Report, p. 10. Robert Morrell said Ferrie claimed he lost his hair in an experiment with cancer serum. p. 12; Al Landry said Ferrie told him the loss was due to a chemical explosion; Landry's father was told it was due to radiation (p. 13); Larry C. Adams thought it had been "lost in a chemical experiment."
    (32) Synopsis of SBA hearing, Dr. Isadore Yager, p. 2 (J.F.K. Document 014930), and of David Ferrie, pp. 4-5. Ferrie admitted using "Dr.," but for legitimate reasons. He claimed he had a Ph.D. degree from Phoenix University, Bari, Italy; vol. K, FAA file, ALPA SBA, D. W. Ferrie, 15-63-29-63, 48-63 (J.F.K. Document 014904) (EAL Exhibit 4a photocopy of telephone book with Ferrie listing).
    (33) Ibid., FAA, vol. 2, exhibit III, statement of cadet-"he was believed to be a medical doctor and a doctor of philosophy"; SBA hearing, testimony of Dr. Isadore Yager, synopsis, p. 2 (J.F.K. Document 014930).
    (34) Ibid., SBA hearing, Ferrie testimony synopsis, p. 4.
    (35) FAA, vol. 2, exhibit III, p. 4 (J.F.K. Document 014904), statement of cadet-"Ferrie constantly preached to us on the subject of religion * * * insisted we attend church * * * and remember to pray."
    (36) See SR-11-N-224, Dec. 19, 1962 (J.F.K. Document 014904)-although Ferrie denies applying for ordainment to any church (SBA hearing, Ferrie testimony), he has shown such a desire since his youth. See FBI Report 51-109060-4595, Mar. 2, 1967, p. 1, interview of Carl John Stanley. "Archbishop of the Metropolitan Eastern Province, American Orthodox Catholic Church, told the FBI he consecrated Ferrie as bishop in July 1961 but deposed him in January 1962 when it was learned he had been discharged from his Eastern Airlines position because of homosexual activity." See also FAA, vol. 2, exhibit III, p. 4 (J.F.K. Document 014904), statement of cadet-"several times he (Ferrie) considered becoming a priest."
    (37) SBA hearings, testimony of Ferrie synopsis, p. 4 (J.F.K. Document 014930).
    (38) FBI report of SAE. Wall's and T. Viatel's interview of Ferrie, Nov. 27, 1963, 62-109060, supported Kennedy Civil Rights program.
    (39) FAA, vol. 3 (J.F.K. Document 014904). Ferrie letter to Captain G. E. Greiner, Oct. 30, 1961, suggesting persecution of himself by Communists.
    (40) FBI report, interview of Joseph Lisman, Sept. 22, 1961.
    (41) Ibid.
    (42) Ibid.
    (43) Ibid.
    (44) Vol. K, FAA file, ALPA SBA, EAL exhibit No. 7, D. W. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-63, 48-63, title of talk-"Cuba"-April 1961 Present, Future (J.F.K. Document 014904).
    (45) Ibid.
    (46) Ibid.
    (47) FBI report, Nov. 27, 1963, p.199, Ferrie later admitted that after the Bay of Pigs invasion, he severely criticized President John F. Kennedy, both in public and in private. He said he had also been critical of any President riding in an open car and had made the statement that anyone could hide in the bushes and shoot a President. He denied, however, ever making a statment that Kennedy should be killed with the intention that this be done. FAA, vol. 4, p.17, Robey report, interview of Charles Williams, IRS Agent (J.F.K. Docu-ment 014904).
    (48) Ibid.
    (49) Synopsis of SBA hearing, testimony of Cornelius Michael Kramer, p. 4 (J.F.K. Document 014930).
    (50) See ref. 11, FAA, vol. 2, exhibit GGG, SR 11-N-224, Jan. 25, 1963, p.10 (J.F.K. Document 014904).
    (51) Ibid., FAA, vol. 4, attachment J. Ferrie application for employment for Eastern Airlines, Apr. 6, 1951.
    (52) Ibid., FAA, vol. 2, Jan. 25, 1963, p.15.
    (53) Ibid., FAA, vol. 2, exhibit FFF, Dec. 19, 1962, p.20.
    (54) Ibid.
    (55) Id. at p.21.
    (56) Ibid.
    (57) Ibid., FAA, vol.2, exhibit GGG, Jan. 25, 1963, pp.13-14.
    (58) Ibid., FAA, vol.3, exhibit SS, U.S. Civil Service Commission, report of record search, Sept. 29, 1961, for David Ferrie (gives military record).
    (59) Ibid., vol. K, FAA file, ALPA SBA, D. W. Ferrie, No. 1563, 29-63, 48-63, legal brief of Eastern Airlines grievance of David W. Ferrie, pp.9-10.
    (60) Ibid., vol. R, EAL file, Ferrie, D. W., personnel records, June 15, 1951, transferred to New Orleans "due to domicile preference."
    (61) Ibid., FAA, vol.4, attachment L, memo from J. H. Halliburton to Captain J.F. Gill, May 23, 1951; Eastern Airlines received derogatory information from retail credit bureau, May 21, 1951.
    (62) Ibid.; see also memo from J.F. Gill to Captain G. E. Thomas, June 26, 1951, attachment M; and memo from F.A. Stone to G.E. Thomas, July 5, 1951, attachment O.
    (63) Ibid., FAA, vol.4, attachment Q; see also memo, July 13, 1951, from G. E. Thomas to Captain F. A. Stone-"I have had him with a couple of captains here and their reports are nothing but the best. They say he has excellent possibilities."
    (64) Ibid., Attachment P, handwritten note from "George" to Captain John on memo from J.H. Halliburton to Captain G.E. Greiner, July 6, 1959.
    (65) Ibid., FAA, vol.4, attachment T, memo, Mar. 19, 1959, A.T. Thornhill to Captain E. V. Rickenbacker.
    (66) Ibid., FAA, vol. 4, attachment H, letter, E.V. Rickenbacker to D. W. Ferrie, May 23, 1953. Rickenbacker had noted to the file, "This man's efforts bear watching and his qualifications justify his being used and helped whenever possible in line of duty-and even beyond."
    (67) Among the complaints against Ferrie: Ibid., FAA exhibit HHH, Sept. 7, 1960, letter to Ferrie from R. W. Tyler, acting regional counsel for Eastern, re: use of Ferrie's plane by student pilot carrying a passenger. Plane not properly certificated or registered; see ref. 11, SR-11-N-224, Nov. 19, 1962, regarding allowing use of rider pass to George Piazza, who Ferrie claimed was his "ward"; see also FAA, vol. 3, exhibit EE; FAA, vol.3, exhibit II, memo to Captain P.L. Foster, Dec.19,1959, regarding a near miss of a mid-air collision, Nov. 24, 1959.
    (68) Ibid., SR-11-N-224, Dec. 19, 1962, exhibit FFF, p.21.
    (69) FBI report No. 105-104-340-1, September 22, 1961, p.4.
    (70) SR-11-N-224, Jan. 25, 1963, p.15 (J.F.K. Document 014904).
    (70a) Ibid., FAA, vol. 3 exhibit YY, letter to Colonel D.H.Hass, Oct. 21, 1958, from Robert E. Morrell.
    (71) FBI report No. 105-104-340-1, Sept. 22, 1961, p.4.
    (72) FAA, vol.3, exhibit XX, letter, Oct. 21, 1958, Robert Morrell to Colonel D. Hass (J.F.K. Document 014904).
    (73) FBI report No. 105-104-340-1, Sept. 22, 1961, p.4.
    (74) Synopsis of SBA hearing, testimony of John Irion (J.F.K. Document
    014930);FAA, vol.3, exhibit YY, letter, Oct. 21, 1978, from Robert Morrell to Colonel D.A. Hass(J.F.K. Document 014904).
    (75) Ibid., FAA, vol. 4, Robey report, p.9, attachment XX, the CAP Drill Team once went to Dallas, according to Bob Boyleston (HSCA Interview, Oct. 18,1978). Ferrie made all the arrangements and appeared to have had contacts there. (Date of the alleged trip is unknown.) (J.F.K. Document 014904.)
    (76) FAA, vol. 4, pp.14-15, Robey report, Interview of Ted Abernathy. He said flight instructions and flight time were forbidden to CAP cadets (J.F.K. Document 014904).
    (77) Synopsis of SBA hearing, testimony of Ronald Hubner, synopsis p.3. (J.F.K. Document 014930); see also FAA, vol.2, exhibit III, statment of Cadet,p.2(J.F.K. Document 014904).
    (78) Ibid., FAA, vol.2, exhibit III, statment of Cadet, p.2, Ferrie's house was a "center of operations for his group."
    (79) Ibid., FAA, vol.4. Robey Report; p.10, interview of Robert Morrell.
    (80) SBA hearing, Aug. 8, 1963, testimony of James R. Lewallen, p.8 (J.F.K. Document 014930).
    (81) See ref. 11, SR-11-N-224, Nov. 19, 1962, p.21 interview of Spontenelli (J.F.K. Document 014904); FAA, vol.2, exhibit III, statment of Cadet, p.6, Ferrie "encouraged the boys to become priests if they felt inclined in that direction." FAA, vol.4, Robey report. p.11, Father Ward, priest-Ferrie called him up and started sending him CAP members expressing a desire to go into the priesthood; p.13, Al Meister-Ferrie was instrumental in persuading him to go into the seminary.
    (82) Contact report, Layton Martens, May 25, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 008629); see also (J.F.K. Document 003287).
    (83) Synopsis of SBA hearings, testimony of John Espenan, father of Cadet (J.F.K. Document 014930);(See ref.11,SR-11-N-224, Nov. 19, 1962, exhibit EEE. p.9(J.F.K. Document 014904)),ibid., FAA, vol.4, Robey report, p.10. Interview of Colonel J. Ehrlicker.
    (84) Synopsis of SBA hearing, testimony of John R. Espenan, pp.2-3(J.F.K. Document 014930); testimony of David Ferrie, synopsis, p.6; and see ref.11, SR 11-N-224, Nov. 19,1962, exhibit EEE,p.9.
    (85) Ibid., SR-11-N-224, vol. K, FAA file. ALBA SBA, D. W. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-63, 48-63, brief of EAL on grievance of Ferrie, p. 13.
    (86) Ibid., FAA, vol. 2, exhibit GGG, Dec. 19, 1962, p. 6.
    (87) Synopsis of SBA, Hearing, Testimony of Ferrie, testimony of John Ernest Irion (J.F.K. Document 014930); FAA, vol.4, Robey report, p. 14 (J.F.K. Document 014904).
    (88) Ibid., FAA, vol.4, attachment I, Oct. 30, 1961. FBI report: and ref. 11, SR-11-N-224, Dec. 19, 1962, p. 7. While would-be members claimed approaches were made to them to join the group, Banister testified there never was such a group by that name (SBA hearing, Banister testimony).
    (89) Ibid.
    (90a) Secret Service Report, Dec. 13, 1963. No.CO-2-34,030, p. 4, traveled to San Antonio, Corpus Christi, Brownsville (J.F.K. Document 003840).
    (91) FAA, vol.3, exhibit FF, memo to C.J. Simons from S.J. Minnisale, Aug. 14, 1959(J.F.K. Document 014904).
    (92) Ibid.
    (93) Ibid.
    (94) FAA, vol.3, letter to Captain G.E. Greicher, Oct. 30, 1961, from Ferrie (J.F.K. Document 014904).
    (95) See ref. 82, FAA, vol.4, Robey report, attachment I. FBI report, Oct. 30, 1961, interview of Ferrie. Aug. 22, 1961, p.4 (J.F.K. Document 014904): FAA file, ALPA SBA, d. w. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-63, 48-63; EAL EXH; Juvenile Bureau Report, Aug. 18, 1961, item No. H8507-61, p.2.
    (96) Ibid., FBI report. Aug. 22, 1961. Note: It was also reported that Ferrie had applied for a visa to Venezuela on Nov. 15, 1961, which request was denied. Ferrie had also applied for a passport. His purpose is unknown. FAA, vol.5, attachment QQ.
    (97) Ibid. The submarines were found in a Sept. 22, 1961 search of Ferrie's house. Also discovered among Ferrie's effects were: a Morse code key, four model 1903 Springfield rifles, two .22 caliber rifles, one rifle, a flare gun, .38 caliber revolver, a sword, a quantitiy of ammunition, three maps (of Havana Harbor, the coast of Cuba, West Indies, Cuba and North Coast), plus the two submarines. FAA, vol.4, attachments F through I. Ferrie said he purchased the guns at the Crescent Gun Shop, New Orleans.
    (98) Interview of Carlos Quiroga, June 2, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, attached material. See also FBI report 62-109060, FOIA materials, interview of Quiroga by the New Orleans District Attorney's office (J.F.K. Document 008846).
    (99) FAA, vol.4, Robey report, p.12, Michael Finney said Ferrie had been training Cuban pilots in the New Orleans area (J.F.K. Document 014904).
    (100) Interview of John Irion, Oct. 28, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 012754); see ref. 30.
    (101) FBI teletype, May 7, 1967, to Director from New Orleans, 62-109060-5237.
    (102) FAA, vol.4, attachment I, FBI report, Oct. 30, 1961, New Orleans, Los Angeles, for David William Ferrie (J.F.K. Document 014904).
    (103) FBI 62-109060, copy of New Orleans district attorney's interview with Carlos Quiroga, 1968; see also statement of Herbert R. Wagner of Herb Wagner Finance Service, Dec. 6, 1967, indicating that Ferrie assisted Arcacha Smith in obtaining a loan (J.F.K. Document 000834).
    (104) FAA, Vol.5, exhibit BB, July 18,1961, letter from Arcacha Smith to Captain Eddie V. Rickenbacker (J.F.K. Document 014904).
    Ibid., FAA, Vol.5, exhibit CC, letter to Arcacha Smith from J.P. Halliburton, Aug. 1, 1961.
    (105) Ibid., EAL file, Ferrie, D.W., vacation information form, Apr. 17,1961. Request for leave for period April 16-31, 1961. The Bay of Pigs invasion began April 17, 1961.
    (106) Staff review of CIA file for Sergio Arcacha Smith, May 1, 1978, Office of Security, memo from Raymond G. Rocca, May 31, 1961, item F; also, memo from Donovan E. Pratt, Sept. 28, 1967, items A, B, and C, regarding Arcacha Smith. The Sept. 28, 1967 Pratt memo also found in Office of Security file for David W. Ferrie. One local office did believe the group had the "unofficial sanction of CIA"-Lieutenant Martello, p. 10, 11-N-224, Dec. 19, 1962, Exhibit FFF (J.F.K. Document 014904).
    (107) Ibid., SR-11-N-224, Nov. 19, 1963, p. 14; synopsis of SBA hearing, Ferrie testimony, p.7 (J.F.K. Document 014930).
    (108) Ibid.
    (109) See ref. 11, SR-11-N-224, Nov. 19, 1963, p.14.
    (110) SBA hearings, testimony of Roland P. Fournier, re: Ferrie involvement in Alexander Landry and Albert Cheramie cases, pp.1 and 2.
    (111) Ibid.; and vol. k, FAA file, ALPA SBA, D. W. Ferrie, No. 15-63, 29-63, 48-63. EAL exhibit, insert No. 1, Juvenile Bureau report, Aug. 18, 1961, item H-8507-01,p.6.
    (112) Ibid., FAA, vol.D, vol.4, attachment C, investigative results-Jefferson Parish Police Juvenile Division, Aug. 29, 1961, Ferrie "suspected of harboring the juvenile and also encouraging him to run away from home"; ALPA No. 48-63, letter from William G. Bell to Capt. V.O. Rowland, May 2, 1963; and vol. K, FAA file, ALPA SBA, D. W. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-63, 48-63, EAL exhibit, insert No. 1, juvenile bureau report, Aug.18,1961, item No. H-8507-61.
    (113) See ref. 11, SR-11-N-224, Nov. 19,1962, exhibit EEE, p.3 from the Louisiana State Police criminal record for David W. Ferrie, ALPA No.48-63, letter from Bell to Rowland, May 2, 1963.
    (114) Ibid., ALPA file No. 48-63, letter from William Bell to Capt. V. G. Rowland. May 2, 1963; FAA file, ALPA SBA. D. W. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-63, 48-63, EAL exhibit, insert No. 1, juvenile bureau report, Aug. 18,1961, item No. H-8507-61,p.4.
    (115) Ibid., SR-11-N-224, Nov. 19,1962, exhibit EEE, p.3, from Louisiana State Police records for David W. Ferrie, news article. Times-Picayune, New Orleans, La., Aug. 22, 1961, attachment B; Faa, vol.4; FAA, vol.4, attachment C. Jefferson Parish Police Department investigative report.
    (116) Ibid., SR-11-N-224, Dec. 19, 1962, exhibit FFF, p. 10. Lieutenant Martello, pp. 9-10; Secret Service interview of Arnesto Rodriquez, Dec. 9, 1963, by SA's Gerrets and Rice (J.F.K. Document 003759).
    (117) Synopsis of SBA hearing, testimony of Sgt. Roland P. Fournier, New Orleans Police-juvenile bureau (J.F.K. Document 014930).
    (118) FAA, vol.4, attachment C, investigative report of Jefferson Parish, Police Department, New Orleans, Aug. 22, 1961(J.F.K. Document 014904).
    (119) Ibid., FAA, vol. 3, exhibit HH, Aug. 26, 1961, Eastern Airlines to FAA informing them Ferrie had been removed from the payroll; and exhibit JJ, Aug. 29, 1961, Greiner to Ferrie.
    (120) Ibid., FAA, vol. r, exhibit A, case of "Good Moral Character," opened Sept. 8, 1961, by Richard E. Robey, summary of the report; and FAA, vol.3, exhibit KK, Eastern Airlines opened investigation also.
    (121) Synopsis of SBA hearings, testimony of David Ferrie (J.F.K. Document 014930).
    (122) See ref. 11, SR-11-N-224, Nov. 19, 1962, p.6 (J.F.K. Document 014904).
    (123) Ibid., EAL file, grievances of David W. Ferrie, Aug. 5, 1963, vol. 3, testimony of Banister, p. 840.
    (124) Ibid., p.825.
    (125) Ibid., p.855.
    (126) Ibid., p.855.
    (127) Ibid., p.840; see also staff summary of FBI file for Guy Baniser, House Select Committee on Assassinations(J.F.K. Document 012799).
    (128) Guy Banister file, Garrison papers, Aug. 14, 1977 (J.F.K. Document 100189).
    (129) Staff summary of FBI file for Guy Baniser, House Select Committe on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 012799). (Note: Banister explained before the airline pilots board about his work with "Arcacha Smith and others." Banister said, "I had high-ranking Cuban refugees in my office asking me how to go underground and I gave them diagrams for that. I have talked to military and political leaders from the various provinces of Cuba that have slipped out and slipped back." Vol.5, EAL file, grievances of David W. Ferrie, Aug. 5, 1963, vol.3, testimony of Banister, p.841 (J.F.K. Document 014904).
    (130) Secret Service file No. CO-2-34, 030, Dec. 3, 1963, SA. A. Vial, p. 1 4, regarding telephone interview of Sam Newman.
    (131) Interview of Jack Martin, Dec. 5 and Dec. 6, 1977, House Select Commit-tee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 005212 and 005213); and interview of Sam Newman, Mar. 2, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 005962).
    (132) See ref. 131, Martin interview, Dec. 5, 1977; and Martin interview, Dec. 6, 1977.
    (133) Synopsis of SBA hearing, Ferrie testimony, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp.5-6 (J.F.K. Document 014930).
    (134) FAA, vol. 1, correspondence from Jack Martin (J.F.K. Document 014904).
    (135) Ibid., SR 11-N-224, Dec. 19, 1962, p.14.
    (136) Ibid.
    (137) Ibid.
    (138) Ibid.
    (139) Ibid., ALPA No.48-63, letter from G. Wray Gill to Capt. George Greiner, Jan.8,1963.
    (140) Ibid., FAA, vol.3, exhibit KK, letter from Capt. Greiner to Ferrie, Sept. 1, 1961.
    (141) Ibid., FAA, vol. 3, exhibit LL, letter from Ferrie to Capt. Greiner, Sept. 5, 1961.
    (142) Ibid., FAA, vol.2, exhibit AAA, letter of Eric Michael Crouchet to FAA, Oct. 22, 1962.
    (143) Ibid. Among those who intervened on Ferrie's behalf were Congressmen Morrison and Long, old friends of G. Wray Gill.(see ALPA No.48-63, letter from William G. Bell to J. O. Jarvard. May 2, 1963) (J.F.K. Document 014904).
    (144) Ibid., ALPA No. 48-63, letter from EAL, Apr. 11, 1963 to Ferrie, grievance No. 15-63, filed Jan. 21, 1963.
    (145) Ibid., vol. K, FAA file, ALPA SBA, D. W. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-63, 48-63, minutes of meeting, Feb. 18, 1963, Miami.
    (146) Ibid.
    (147) Ibid., grievance No. 29-63, filed Feb. 18,1963, and grievance No.48-63, filed Feb. 13, 1963; ALPA No. 29-63, June 4, 1963, to J.B. Railsback from Charles H. Ruby, Airline Plots Association; letter from Ferrie to EAL, Feb. 15, 1963, in ALPA 29063.
    (148) Ibid., see ALPA files for correspondence; ALPA No. 29-63, ALPA file No. 48-63, letter to Capt. J.T. Robertson from J. B. Railsback, ALPA 45062, and letter to D. W. Ferrie from R. W. Rivenbark.
    (149) Interview of Vernon Goerdes regarding Louise Decker, Feb. 15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 005807); interview of Carlos Quiroga, Feb. 22, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 006190); and ref. 131, Martin interview, Dec. 5, 1977.
    (150) Vol. S-miscellaneous, letter to Capt. George W. Youngerman et al., from J.B. Railsback, EAL Pilots System Board of Adjustment, July 8, 1963 (J.F.K. Document 014904).
    (151) Ibid., vol. T, EAL file, grievances of David W. Ferrie, Miami, transcript of hearing, July 15, 16, 17, 1963, vol.I.
    (152) Ibid., vol.K, FAA file, ALPA SBA, D. W. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-63, 48-63, brief of EAL on grievance of David W. Ferrie, pp.9-10.
    (153) Ibid., vol. U, EAL file, grievances of David W. Ferrie, Miami transcript of hearing, vol.II.
    (154) Ibid., vol. V, EAL file, grievances of David W. Ferrie, transcript of hearing, Aug. 5, 1963, vol.3, pp.461-743.
    (155) Ibid., vol.K, FAA file, ALPA SBA, D.W. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-63, 48-63, brief of EAL on grievances for David Ferrie, p.10 (ALPA Exhibit 24).
    (156) Ibid., vol. V, EAL file, grievances of David W. Ferrie, Aug.5,1963, vol.3, testimony, pp.856-857.
    (157) Ibid., pp.842, 858.
    (158) Ibid., p.8.
    (159) Ibid., FAA, vol.4, Robey report, p.17, July 30, 1963, attachment DDD, letter from William G. Bell; vol.M, EAL file, D.W. Ferrie, ALPA 15-63, filed Jan. 21, 1963, decision of the board, Sept. 25, 1963.
    (160) Ibid., vol. M, EAL file, D.W. Ferrie, ALPA 14-63, filed Jan. 21, 1963, decision of the board, Sept. 25, 1963. (Note: Ferrie was awarded $1,635.90 in full settlement of all claims. See memo from T.J.Kennedy to Capt. C. F. Hamner, Oct. 11, 1963, Ferrie, D.W.,file.)
    (161) FBI report, interview of David W. Ferrie, Dec. 5, 1963.
    (162) FAA, vol.1, attachment L. Ferrie was reportedly fired from his job with Space Airfreight following complaints by FAA officials that operations under Ferrie's direction were not being carried out according to FAA regulations (J.F.K. document 014904).
    (163) FBI Report 92-10976-2, Nov. 27, 1968, pp.1-4.
    (164) Staff summary of Immigration and Naturalization Service file for David Ferrie, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. document 012305).
    (165) Ibid.
    (166) Ibid.; FAA vol.4, Robey report, attachment I, FBI report, Aug. 22, 1961, interview of David Ferrie (J.F.K. document 014904).
    (167) FBI report, interview of Carlos Quiroga by New Orleans District Attorney's Office, 1968.
    (168) Ibid.
    (169) Staff summary of FBI file for Sergio Arcacha Smith, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. document 004110). 121
    (170) Outside contact report, House Select Committee on Assassinations, Mar. 13,1979 (J.F.K. document 014933).
    (171) Ibid.
    (172) Ibid.
    (173) Ibid.
    (174) FBI report, interview of G. Wray Gill, Sr., p.2.
    (175) FBI report, interview of David Ferrie, Nov. 26, 1963, p.3.
    (176) Ibid.
    (177) Ibid.
    (178) Receipt of purchase, Oct. 16, 1978 (J.F.K. document 012523).
    (179) FBI report, interview of David Ferrie, Nov. 26, 1963, p.3.
    (180) Ibid.
    (181) Guy Banister file, item GB-2, Garrison papers, New Orleans Police report, Nov. 22, 1963 (J.F.K. Document 001986). Note: There are conflicting reports as to why Banister attached Martin. Martin has told the committee that it was over a remark he (Martin) had made in jest about the Kennedy assassination. Banister's secretary, Delphine Roberts, who was also present, told the committee the two men came to blows when Martin tried to remove certain files from the office (see interview of Jack Martin, Feb. 15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations,p.3(J.F.K. Document 000212) and interview of Delphine Points Roberts, July 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assas-sinations,p.3(J.F.K. Document 009978). The original police report referenced above indicates Banister and Martin were engaged "in various discussions about personal and political subjects" when the matter of the long-distance telephone calls came up and the conversation grew heated. (182) Ibid.
    (183) FBI interview of G. Wray Gill, Nov. 27, 1963, p. 219, SA J. Smith; FBI teletype, Nov. 26, 1963, to SAC Dallas and Director from SAC, New Orleans, pp. 2-3, 7, and 15.
    (184) Ibid.
    (185) Ibid., pp. 2-4 and 7-8; letter from Jack Martin to Richard Robey, FAA investigator, Nov. 25, 1963. FAA. vol.4(J.F.K. Document 014904).
    (186) FBI report, Nov. 25, 1963, interview of Layton Martens, St. Hoverson, p. 2 (p.302).
    (187) FBI report, Nov. 25, 1963, interview of Alvin Beauboeuf by SA Scheffer (p.307).
    (188) FBI report, interview of Layton Martens, Nov. 27, 1963, SA Hoverson, p.2 (p.303).
    (189) Ibid.
    (190) FBI teletype, Nov. 26, 1963, to Director from SAC, New Orleans,p.16.
    (191) Ibid., Secret Service report, Dec. 13, 1963, CO-2-34, 030, p.4 (J.F.K. Document 003840).
    (192) FBI teletype, Nov. 26, 1963, to Director from SAC, New Orleans,pp. 11-17; Secret Service report, Dec. 13, 1963, CO-2-34-030,p.3(J.F.K. Document 003840).
    (193) FBI teletype, Nov. 26, 1963, to Director from SAC New Orleans, pp.12-13; statement by David W Ferrie in FBI file, p.580, No.44-2064, Dec. 10, 1963.
    (194) FBI teletype, Nov. 26, 1963, to Director from SAC New Orleans, p.13; FBI interview of G. Wray Gill, Nov. 27, 1963.
    (195) FBI interview of David Ferrie, Nov. 26, 1963, No.89-69, pp.3-4. Ferrie's activities for the period Nov. 22-25, 1963 are described in detail in this report; see also FBI interview of Melvin Coffey, Nov. 30, 1963, New Orleans, SA E. Wall.
    (196) FBI report. No. 62-109060-2143, Dec. 18, 1963.
    (197) FBI report, No.62-109060-2143, Dec. 18, 1963, p. 1, interview of Lee Fletcher.
    (198) Ibid.
    (199) Ibid.
    (200) FBI report, No.62-109060-2143, Dec. 18, 1963, p. 1, interview of Chuck Rolland. Ferrie called ahead on Nov. 22, 1963, arrived Nov. 23, 1963 between 3:30 and 5:30, did not discuss operating rink as Ferrie had suggested he would.
    (201) FBI teletype, Nov. 26, 1963, to Director from SAC, New Orleans, p.14.
    (202) FBI report, No.62-109060-2143, Dec. 18, 1963, p. 2.
    (203) FBI report, No.62-109060-2143, Dec. 18, 1963, p. 1.
    (204) FBI report, No.62-109060-2143, Dec. 18,1963, p. 2. Hotel registration card No.38063; checked in 11 p.m., Nov. 23, 1963; checked out Nov. 24, 1963. Mrs. Shirley Dial, clerk at the Driftwood Motor Hotel, recalled three individuals checked out at around 10 a.m. on Nov. 24, 1963.
    (205) FBI report, No. 109060-2143, Dec. 18, 1963, five calls made from Alamotel, Houston, and one call made from Driftwood Motor Hotel, Galveston.
    (206) FBI report, No. 62-109060-2143, Dec. 18, 1963, p. 1.
    (207) FBI report, No. 62-109060-2143, Dec. 18, 1963, p. 1 indicated Ferrie called 947-6435 in New Orleans collect.
    (208) Deposition of Mrs. Jesse Garner, House Select Committee on Assassinations,p.34. Note: While Mrs. Garner believes it was the night of the assassination, it would appear, given that Ferrie left New Orleans that evening, that Ferrie may have come by her house on a later date.
    (209) Ibid.
    (210) Ferrie file, item DF-7, Mar. 11, 1968, Garrison file (J.F.K. Document 008840).
    (211) FBI report, Nov. 27, 1963, interview of Roy, p.212, McCoy 105-82555-10, SA Callendel.