1. Mr. Dulles, With whom I spoke today, recalled his earlier conversation with you on this subject and said that there were still some members of the Commission who were concerned Rest they suppress the NOSENKO information now only to have it surface at a future date. They expressed concern that this could possibly prejudice the entire Warren Commission report. I told Mr. Dulles that this concern was understandable but that we still felt the best course by far would be to omit any reference to the NOSENKO information in the final report. While it is conceivable that NOSENKO might someday be in a position to claim that he provided information on the KENNEDY assassination, I said that the difference between NOSENKO's situation and that of other bona fide defectors was such that it would be less. likely that NOSENKO would be allowed to surface in this way. I noted that if the NOSENKO information were included as is in the final Commission report and then later the facts of NOSENKO's agent mission became public knowledge, this could have perhaps an even greater nega-tive affect on the standing of the Commission's report. The only way for the Commission to avoid this and still use the information would be for them to indicate that doubt existed regarding the source of the information. We would be opposed to this because it would signal to NOSENKO's principals something of how we viewed this case and could also bring about renewed press and public interest in NOSENKO.

2. Mr. Dulles and I then exchanged views on the possibility of finding language which would allude to the existence of other, unverified information on the OSWALD case. This language would permit the Commission to say if challenged in the future on this issue that it had taken the NOSENKO information into consideration in the final report but at the same time it would not be presented in a manner which would be at variance with the important operational considerations we have raised.

3. It was agreed that an effort might be made to find such language if Mr. Dulles is again unsuccessful in persuading his colleagues to eliminate any reference to the NOSENKO information from the report. To attempt this, however, we would have to know precisely in what context the Commission intended to make use of the NOSENKO information. This, Mr. Dulles will have to determine from Mr. Rankin. He will do this as soon as possible. He knows that I am leaving this week and therefore, will contact you as soon as he has the information he needs from Mr. Rankin.

4. I have briefed C/SR/CI on these latest developments and since he and CIA Officer in my shop are fully cognizant of all the problems involved, they can work out language for your approval which hopefully will be satisfactory. C/SR/CI knows Mr. Dulles and would be the most suitable person to work with him directly if this is indicated.

Chief, SR Division

MEMORANDUM
FOR : Chief SR

1. Nosenko's answers to our questions appear to be quite complete. No really new information appears and they are consistent with his previous statements. Their chief value lies in the fact that they elaborate what he has said before concerning OSWALD in the USSR. The details he provides concerning KGB involvement in the OSWALD case eliminate a number of minor obscurities which were present in his earlier statements but they do not change the overall picture of OSWALD's status and activities in t he USSR.

2. There are, however, some rather surprising statements in Nosenko's replies - and these statements may call into question all or part of his story. For example: a) he says (paragraph 5) that although the KGB recognised that OSWALD might have been an American agent, no "unusual measures" were taken to check on this possibility since it had already been decided not to let igim stay in the USSR. b) he says (paragraph 16) that the KGB did not consider recruiting Marina to report on OSWALD "because she was his wife and it was considered dangerous to recruit a wife to report on her husband c) he repeatedly refers to KGB recognition that OSWALD "was not normal" as the reason for KGB failure to take various steps which it could normally be expected to take vis-a-vis a foreigner like OSWALD. In other words, a lack of normality and the KGB's recognition of it provide the peg for the whole story of KGB hankling of the OSWALD matter.

3. Another sequence of events, as related by Nosenko is noteworthy. he states that Marina had no trouble marrying OSWALD because he was a resident of and working in the USSR, and that she had no difficulty leaving the country because she was married to a foreigner. This reasoning seems to overlook the fact that OSWALD had already declared his intention via mail to the US. Embassy) to leave the USSR. If this fact were known to the KGB as we must presume it was, we would expect Marina's marriage request to have given more than routine consideration.

4. Although I believe that the Commission would be interested in the entire set of questions and answers as a follow-up to the information it received earlier from Nosenko via the FBI, perhaps you will think it not advisable to send them on at this late date, especially in view of the continuing doubts concerning Nosenko's bona fides. There are no specific points in specific points in this latest information that change the Oswald story or add significantly to it and would therefore warrant separate transmittal to the Commission in my opinion. When the results of our further checks into Oswald's arrival time in Helsinki are in, we might send along with them Nosenko's statemetn that a 2-4 day delay in obtaining a Soviet tourist visa is not uncommon.

C/SR/CI/ Research