Chapter VI - Investigation of Possible Conspiracy

Circumstances Surrounding The Assassination

Selection of Motorcade Route

On October 4, 1963, Oswald applied for a position with Padgett Printing Corp., which was located at 1313 Industrial Boulevard, several blocks from President Kennedy's parade routes Oswald favorably impressed the plant superintendent who checked his prior job references, one of which was Jaggars-Chiles-Stovall, the firm where Oswald had done photography work from October 1962 to April 1963. The following report was written by Padgett's plant superintendent on the reverse side of Oswald's job application: "Bob Stovall does not recommend this man. He was released because of his record as a troublemakerHas Communistic tendencies." Oswald received word that Padgett Printing had hired someone else.

Oswald's employment with the Texas School Book Depository came about through a chance conversation on Monday, October 14, between Ruth Paine, with whom his family was staying while Oswald was living in a rooming house in Dallas, and two of Mrs. Paine's neighbors. During a morning conversation over coffee, at which Marina Oswald was present, Oswald's search for employment was mentioned. The neighbors suggested several places. where Oswald might apply for work. One of the neighbors present, Linnie Mac Randle, said that her brother had recently been hired as a schoolbook order filler at the Texas School Book Depository and she thought. the Depository might need additional help. She testified, "and of course you know just being neighborly and everything, we felt sorry for Marina because her baby was due right away as we understood it, and he didn't have any work..."

When Marina Oswald and Mrs. Paine returned home, Mrs. Paine promptly telephoned the Texas School Book Depository and spoke to Superintendent Roy Truly, whom she did not know. Truly agreed to interview Oswald, who at the time was in Dallas seeking employment. When Oswald called that evening, Mrs. Paine told him of her conversation with Truly. The next morning Oswald went to the Texas School Book Depository where he was interviewed and hired for the position of order filler.

On the same date, the Texas Employment Commission attempted to refer Oswald to an airline company which was looking for baggage and cargo handlers at a salary which was $100 per month higher than that offered by the Depository Co. The Employment Commission tried to advise Oswald of this job at 10:30 a.m. on October 16, 1963. Since the records of the Commission indicate that Oswald was then working, it seems clear that Oswald was hired by the Depository Co. before the higher paying job was available. It is unlikely that he ever learned of this second opportunity.

This served also to explain the long package which he took with him from Irving to the Depository Building the next morning. Further, there is no evidence that Ruth Paine or Marina Oswald had reason to believe that Oswald's return was in any way related to an attempt to shoot the President the next day. Although his visit was a surprise, since he arrived on Thursday instead of Friday for his usual weekend visit, both women testified that they thought he had come to patch up a quarrel which he had with his wife a few days earlier when she learned that he was living in Dallas under an assumed name.

The arrangement of the three boxes in the window and the one on which the assassin may have sat has been described previously. Two of these four boxes, weighing approximately 55 pounds each, had been moved by the floor-laying crew from the west side of the floor to the area near the southwest corner. The carton on which the assassin may have sat might not even have been moved by the assassin at all. A photograph of the scene depicts this carton on the floor alongside other similar cartons. (See Commission Exhibit No. 1301.) Oswald's right palmprint on this carton may have been placed there as he was sitting on the carton rather than while carrying it. In any event both of these 55-pound cartons could have been carried by one man. The remaining two cartons contained light block-like reading aids called "Rolling Readers" weighing only about 8 pounds each. Although they had been moved approximately 40 feet from their normal locations at the southeast corner window, it would appear that one man could have done this in a matter of seconds.

In considering the possibility of accomplices at the window, the Commission evaluated the significance of the presence of fingerprints other than Oswald's on the four cartons found in and near the window. Three of Oswald's prints were developed on two of the cartons. In addition a total of 25 identifiable prints were found on the 4 cartons. Moreover, prints were developed which were considered as not identifiable, i.e., the quality of the print was too fragmentary to be of value for identification purposes.

As has been explained in chapter IV, the Commission determined that none of the warehouse employees who might have customarily handled these cartons left prints which could be identified. This was considered of some probative value in determining whether Oswald moved the cartons to the window. All but 1 of the 25 definitely identifiable prints were the prints of 2 personsan FBI employee and a member of the Dallas Police Department who had handled the cartons during the course of the investigation. One identifiable palmprint was not identified.

The presence on these cartons of unidentified prints, whether or not identifiable, does not appear to be unusual since these cartons contained commercial products which had been handled by many people throughout the normal course of manufacturing, warehousing, and shipping. Unlike other items of evidence such as, for example, a ransom note in a kidnapping, these cartons could contain the prints of many people having nothing to do with the assassination. Moreover, the FBI does not maintain a filing system for palmprints because, according to the supervisor of the Bureau's latent fingerprint section, Sebastian F. Latona, the problems of classification make such a system impracticable. Finally, in considering the significance of the unidentified prints, the Commission gave weight to the opinion of Latona to the effect that people could handle these cartons without leaving prints which were capable of being developed.

Though the fingerprints other than Oswald's on the boxes thus provide no indication of the presence of an accomplice at the window, two Depository employees are known to have been present briefly on the sixth floor during the period between 11:45 a.m., when the floor-laying crew stopped for lunch, and the moment of the assassination. One of these was Charles Givens, a member of the floor-laying crew, who went down on the elevator with the others and then, returned to the sixth floor to get his jacket and cigarettes. He saw Oswald walking away from the southeast corner, but saw no one else on the sixth floor at that time. He then took one of the elevators back to the first floor at approximately 11:55 a.m.

Bonnie Ray Williams, who was also working with the floor-laying crew, returned to the sixth floor at about noon to eat his lunch and watch the motorcade. He looked out on Elm Street from a position in the area of the third or fourth set of windows from the east wall. At this point he was approximately 20-30 feet away from the southeast corner window. He remained for about "5, 10, maybe 12 minutes" eating his lunch which consisted of chicken and 'a bottle of soda pop. Williams saw no one on the sixth floor during this period, although the stacks of books prevented his seeing the east side of the building. After finishing his lunch Williams took the elevator down because no one had joined him on the sixth floor to watch the motorcade. He stopped at the fifth floor where he joined Harold Norman and James Jarman, Jr., who watched the motorcade with him from a position on the fifth floor directly below the point from which the shots were fired. Williams left the remains of his lunch, including chicken bones and a bottle of soda, near the window where he was eating.

Several witnesses outside the building claim to have seen a person in the southeast corner window of the sixth floor. As has already been indicated, some were able to offer better descriptions than others and one, Howard L. Brennan, made a positive identification of Oswald as being the person at the window. Although there are differences among these witnesses with regard to their ability to describe the person they saw, none of these witnesses testified to seeing more than one person in the window.

One witness, however, offered testimony which, if accurate, would create the possibility of an accomplice at the window at the time of the assassination. The witness was 18-year-old Arnold Rowland, who testified in great detail concerning his activities and observations on November 22, 1963. He and his wife were awaiting the motorcade, standing on the east side of Houston Street between Maine and Elm, when he looked toward the Depository Building and noticed a man holding a rifle standing back from the southwest corner window on the sixth floor. The man was rather slender in proportion to his size and of light complexion with dark hair. Rowland said that his wife was looking elsewhere at the time and when they looked back to the window the man "was gone from our vision." They thought the man was most likely someone protecting the President. After the assassination Rowland signed an affidavit in which he told of seeing this man, although Rowland was unable to identify him.

When Rowland testified before the Commission on March 10, 1964, he claimed for the first time to have seen another person on the sixth floor. Rowland said that before he had noticed the man with the rifle on the southwest corner of the sixth floor he had seen an elderly Negro man "hanging out that window" on the southeast corner of the sixth floor. Rowland described the Negro man as "very thin, an elderly gentleman, bald or practically bald, very thin hair if he wasn't bald," between 50 and 60 years of age, 5 feet 8 inches to 5 feet 10 inches tall, with fairly dark complexion. Rowland claimed that he looked back two or three times and noticed that the man remained until 5 or 6 minutes prior to the time the motorcade came. Rowland did not see him thereafter. He made no mention of the Negro man in his affidavit. And, while he said he told FBI agents about the man in the southeast corner window when interviewed on the Saturday and Sunday following the assassination, no such statement appears in any FBI report.

Mrs. Rowland testified that her husband never told her about seeing any other man on the sixth floor except the man with the rifle in the southwest corner that he first saw. She also was present during Rowland's interview with representatives of the FBI and said she did not hear him make such a statement, although she also said that she did not hear everything that was discussed. Mrs. Rowland testified that after her husband first talked about seeing a man with the rifle, she looked back more than once at the Depository Building and saw no person looking out of any window on the sixth floor. She also said that "At times my husband is prone to exaggerate." Because of inconsistencies in Rowland's testimony and the importance of his testimony to the question of a possible accomplice, the Commission requested the FBI to conduct an inquiry into the truth of a broad range of statements made by Rowland to the Commission.

The investigation showed that numerous statements by Rowland concerning matters about which he would not normally be expected to be mistakensuch as subjects he studied in school, grades he received, whether or not he had graduated from high school, and whether or not he had been admitted to collegewere false.
The only possible corroboration for Rowland's story is found in the testimony of Roger D. Craig, a deputy sheriff of Dallas County, whose testimony on other aspects of the case has been discussed in chapter IV. Craig claimed that about 10 minutes after the assassination he talked to a young couple, Mr. and Mrs. Rowland,

... and the boy said he saw two men on the sixth floor of the Book Depository Building over there; one of them had a rifle with a telescopic sight on itbut he thought they were Secret Service agents or guards and didn't report it. This was aboutoh, he said, 15 minutes before the motorcade ever arrived.

According to Craig, Rowland said that he looked back a few minutes later and "the other man was gone, and there was just one manthe man with the rifle." Craig further testified that Rowland told him that when he first saw the two men, they were walking back and forth in front of the window for several minutes. They were both white men and one of them had a rifle with a scope on it. This report by Craig is contradicted by the testimony of both the Rowlands, and by every recorded interview with them conducted by law enforcement agencies after the assassination.

As part of its investigation of Rowland's allegation and of the general question of accomplices at the scene of the assassination, the Commission undertook an investigation of every person employed in the Texas School Book Depository Building. Two employees might possibly fit the general description of an elderly Negro man, bald or balding. These two men were on the first floor of the building during the period before and during the assassination. Moreover, all of the employees were asked whether they saw any strangers in the building on the morning of November 22. Only one employee saw a stranger whom he described as a feeble individual who had to be helped up the front steps of the building. He went to a public restroom and left the building 5 minutes later, about 40 minutes before the assassination.

Particular attention has been directed to Oswald's departure from the Depository Building in order to determine whether he could have left the building within approximately 3 minutes of the assassination without assistance. As discussed more fully in chapter IV, the building was probably first sealed off no earlier than 12:37 by Inspector Herbert Sawyer. The shortest estimate of the time taken to seal off the building comes from Police Officer W. E. Barnett, one of the officers assigned to the corner of Elm and Houston Streets for the Presidential motorcade, who estimated that approximately 3 minutes elapsed between the time he heard the last of the shots and the time he started guarding the front door. According to Barnett, "there were people going in and out" during this period. The evidence discussed in chapter IV shows that 3 minutes would have been sufficient time for Oswald to have descended from the sixth floor and left the building without assistance.

One witness, James R. Worrell, Jr., claims to have seen a man running from the rear of the building shortly after the assassination, but in testimony before the Commission he stated that he could not see his face. Two other witnesses who watched the rear of the building during the first 5 minutes after the shooting saw no one leave. The claim of Deputy Sheriff Roger Craig that he saw Oswald leave the Depository Building approximately 15 minutes after the assassination has been discussed in chapter IV. Although Craig may have seen someone enter a station wagon 15 minutes after the assassination, the person he saw was not Lee Harvey Oswald, who was far removed from the building at that time.

The possibility that accomplices aided Oswald in connection with his escape was suggested by the testimony of Earlene Roberts, the housekeeper at the 1026 North Beckley rooming house. She testified that at about 1 p.m. on November 22, after Oswald had returned to the rooming house, a Dallas police car drove slowly by the front of the 1026 North Beckley premises and stopped momentarily; she said she heard its horn several times. Mrs. Roberts stated that the occupants of the car were not known to her even though she had worked for some policemen who would occasionally come by. She said the policeman she knew drove car No. 170 and that this was not the number on the police car that honked on November 22. She testified that she first thought the car she saw was No. 106 and then said that it was No. 107. In an FBI interview she had stated that she looked out the front window and saw police car No. 207. Investigation has not produced any evidence that there was a police vehicle in the area of 1026 North Beckley at about 1 p.m. on November 22. Squad car 207 was at the Texas School Book Depository Building, as was car 106. Squad cars 170 and 107 were sold in April 1963 and their numbers were not reassigned until February 1964.

Whatever may be the accuracy of Mrs. Roberts' recollection concerning the police car, it is apparent from Mrs. Roberts' further testimony that she did not see Oswald enter a car when he hurriedly left the house. She has stated that when she last saw Oswald, shortly after 1 p.m., he was standing at a bus stop in front of the house. Oswald was next seen less than 1 mile away, at the point where he shot Patrolman Tippit. Oswald could have easily reached this point on foot by about 1:16 p.m., when Tippit was shot. Finally, investigation has produced no evidence that Oswald had prearranged plans for a means to leave Dallas after the assassination or that any other person was to have provided him assistance in hiding or in departing the city.

Background Of Lee Harvey Oswald

Residence in the Soviet Union

I have seen no evidence that would indicate to me that the Soviet Union considered that it had an interest in the removal of President Kennedy or that it was in any way involved in the removal of President Kennedy.

I have not seen or heard of any scrap of evidence indicating that the Soviet Union had any desire to eliminate President Kennedy nor in any way participated in any such event. Now, standing back and trying to look at that question objectively despite the ideological differences between our two great systems, I can't see how it could be to the interest of the Soviet Union to make any such effort.

I do think that the Soviet Union, again objectively considered, has an interest in the correctness of state relations.

This would be particularly true among the great powers, with which the major interests of the Soviet Union are directly engaged.

I think that although there are grave differences between the Communist world and the free world, between the Soviet Union and other major powers, that even from their point of view there needs to be some shape and form to international relations, that it is not in their interest to have this world structure dissolve into complete anarchy, that great states and particularly nuclear powers have to be in a position to deal with each other, to transact business with each other, to try to meet problems with each other, and that requires the maintenance of correct relations and access to the leadership on all sides.
I think also that although there had been grave differences between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy, I think there were evidences of a certain mutual respect that had developed over some of the experiences, both good and bad, through which these two men had lived. I think both of them were aware of the fact that any Chairman of the Soviet Union, and any President of the United States, necessarily bear somewhat special responsibility for the general peace of the world. Indeed without exaggeration, one could almost say the existence of the northern hemisphere in this nuclear age.

So that it would be an act of rashness and madness for Soviet leaders to undertake such an action as an active policy. Because everything would have been put in jeopardy or at stake in connection with such an act.
It has not been our impression that madness has characterized the actions of the Soviet leadership in recent years.

The Commission accepts Secretary Rusk's estimate as reasonable and objective but recognizes that a precise assessment of Soviet intentions or interests is most difficult. The Commission has thus examined all the known facts regarding Oswald's defection, residence in the Soviet Union, and return to the United States. At each step the Commission sought to determine whether there was any evidence which supported a conclusion that Soviet authorities may have directly or indirectly influenced Oswald's actions in assassinating the President.

Oswald's entry into the Soviet Union

There is no evidence that Oswald received outside assistance in financing his trip to the Soviet Union. After he arrived in Moscow, Oswald told a newspaper correspondent, Aline Mosby, that he had saved $1,500 out of his Marine Corps salary to finance his defection, although the news story based upon Oswald's interview with Aline Mosby unaccountably listed the sum of $1,600 instead of $1,500. After this article had appeared, Marguerite Oswald also related the $1,600 figure to an FBI agent. Either amount could have been accumulated out of Oswald's earnings in the Marine Corps; during his 2 years and 10 months of service he received $3,452.20, after all taxes, allotments and other deductions. Moreover Oswald could certainly have made the entire trip on less than $1,000. The ticket on the ship he took from New Orleans to Le Havre, France, cost $220.75; it cost him about $20 to reach London from Le Havre: his plane fare from London to Helsinki, where he received his visa, cost him $111.90; he probably purchased Russian "tourist Vouchers" normally good for room and board for 10 days for $300; his train fare from Helsinki to Moscow was about $44; in Moscow he paid only $1.50 to $3 a night for his room and very little for his meals after his tourist vouchers ran out; and apparently he did not pay his hotel bill at all after November 30, 1959. Oswald's known living habits indicate that he could be extraordinarily frugal when he had reason to be, and it seems clear that he did have a strong desire to go to the Soviet Union.

While in Atsugi, Japan, Oswald studied the Russian language, perhaps with some help from an officer in his unit who was interested in Russian and used to "talk about it" with Oswald occasionally. He studied by himself a great deal in late 1958 and early 1959 after he was transferred from Japan to California. He took an Army aptitude test in Russian in February 1959 and rated "Poor." When he reached the Soviet Union in October of the same year he could barely speak the language. During the period in Moscow while he was awaiting decision on his application for citizenship, his diary records that he practiced Russian 8 hours a day. After he was sent to Minsk in early January 1960 he took lessons from an interpreter assigned to him for that purpose by the Soviet Government. Marina Oswald said that by the time she met him in March 1961 he spoke the language well enough so that at first she thought he was from one of the Baltic areas of her country, because of his accent. She stated that his only defects were that his grammar was sometimes incorrect and that his writing was never good.

Thus, the limited evidence provides no indication that Oswald was recruited by Soviet agents in the Far East with a view toward defection and eventual return to the United States. Moreover, on its face such a possibility is most unlikely. If Soviet agents had communicated with Oswald while he was in the Marine Corps, one of the least probable instructions they would have given him would have been to defect. If Oswald had remained a Marine radar specialist, he might at some point have reached a position of value as a secret agent. However, his defection and the disloyal statements he made publicly in connection with it eliminated the possibility that he would ever gain access to confidential information or programs of the United States. The very fact that he defected, therefore, is itself persuasive evidence that he was not recruited as an agent prior to his defection. The Commission has investigated the circumstances under which Oswald obtained a visa to enter the Soviet Union for possible evidence that he received preferential treatment in being permitted to enter the country. Oswald left New Orleans, La., for Europe on September 20, 1959, having been released from active duty in the Marine Corps on September 11, 1959. He went directly to Helsinki, Finland, by way of Le Havre, France, and London, England, arriving at Helsinki on Saturday, October 10, 1959. Oswald probably arrived in Helsinki too late in the evening to have applied for a visa at the Soviet Union consulate that night. In light of the rapidity with which he made connections throughout his entire trip, he probably applied for a visa early on Monday, October 12. On October 14, he was issued Soviet Tourist Visa No. 403339, good for one 6-day visit in the U.S.S.R. He left Helsinki on a train destined for Moscow on October 15.

The Department of State has advised the Commission that it has some information that in 1959 it usually took an American tourist in Helsinki 1 to 2 weeks to obtain a visa, and that it has other information that the normal waiting period during the past 5 years has been a week or less. According to the Department's information, the waiting period has always varied frequently and widely, with one confirmed instance in 1963 of a visa routinely issued in less than 24 hours. The Central Intelligence Agency has indicated that visas during the 1964 tourist season were being granted in about 5 to 7 days.

This information from the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency thus suggests that Oswald's wait for a visa may have been shorter than usual but not beyond the range of possible variation. The prompt issuance of Oswald's visa may have been merely the result of normal procedures, due in part to the fact that the summer rush had ended. It might also mean that Oswald was unusually urgent in his demands that his visa be issued promptly. Oswald himself told officials at the American Embassy in Moscow on October 31, when he appeared to renounce his citizenship, that he had said nothing to the Soviets about defecting until he arrived in Moscow. In any event, the Commission has found nothing in the circumstances of Oswald's entry into the Soviet Union which indicates that he was at the time an agent of the U.S.S.R.

Defection and admission to residence.

Oswald's "Historic Diary," which commences on October 16, 1959, the date Oswald arrived in Moscow, and other writings he later prepared, have provided the Commission with one source of information about Oswald's activities throughout his stay in the Soviet Union. Even assuming the diary was intended to be a truthful record, it is not an accurate guide to the details of Oswald's activities. Oswald seems not to have been concerned about the accuracy of dates and names, and apparently made many of his entries subsequent to the date the events occurred. Marina Oswald testified that she believed that her husband did not begin to keep the diary until he reached Minsk, 3 months after his arrival in Russia, and scraps of paper found in Oswald's possession, containing much the same information as appears in his diary, suggest that he transcribed the entries into the diary at a later time. The substance of Oswald's writings has been carefully examined for consistency with all other related information available to the Commission. In addition, the writings have been checked for handwriting, and for consistency of style, grammar, and spelling with earlier and later writings which are known to be his. No indication has been found that entries were written or coached by other persons.

However, the most reliable information concerning the period Oswald spent in Moscow in the latter part of 1962 comes from the records of the American Embassy in Moscow, the testimony of Embassy officials, and the notes of two American newspaper reporters, Aline Mosby and Priscilla Johnson, who interviewed Oswald during this period. Oswald's correspondence with his brother and mother has also been relied upon for some relatively minor information. The findings upon which the Commission based its conclusion concerning Soviet involvements in the assassination were supported by evidence other than material provided by the Soviet Union or Oswald's writings. The Central Intelligence Agency has also contributed data on the normal practices and procedures of the Soviet authorities in handling American defectors.

The "Historic Diary" indicates that on October 16, 1959, the day Oswald arrived in Moscow, he told his Intourist guide, Rima Shirokova, that he wished to renounce his American citizenship and become a Soviet citizen. The same day, the guide reportedly helped Oswald prepare a letter to the Soviet authorities requesting citizenship. The diary indicates, however, that on October 21 he was informed that his visa had expired and that he would be required to leave Moscow within 2 hours. During the preceding days, according to the diary, he had been interviewed once and perhaps twice by Soviet officials. During this period the KGB,1 the agency with primary responsibility for examining defectors arriving in Russia, undoubtedly investigated Oswald as fully as possible. In 1959, virtually all Intourist guides were KGB informants, and there is no reason to believe that this was not true of Oswald's guide.

Russia, undoubtedly investigated Oswald as fully as possible. In 1959, virtually all Intourist guides were KGB informants, and there is no reason to believe that this was not true of Oswald's guide.

According to Oswald's diary he attempted suicide when he learned his application for citizenship had been denied. If true, this would seem to provide strong evidence that, at least prior to October 21, there was no undercover relationship between Oswald and the Soviet Government. Though not necessarily conclusive, there is considerable direct evidence which indicates that Oswald did slash his wrist. Oswald's autopsy showed that he had a scar on his left wrist and that it was of the kind which could have been caused by a suicide attempt. The medical records from the Botkinskaya Hospital in Moscow, furnished by the Soviet Government, reveal that from October 21 to October 28 he was treated there for a self-inflicted wound on the left wrist. The information contained in these records is consistent with the facts disclosed by the autopsy examination relating to Oswald's wrist and to other facts known about Oswald. Although no witness recalled Oswald mentioning a suicide attempt, Marina Oswald testified that when she questioned her husband about the scar on his wrist, he became "very angry," and avoided giving her a reply. Oswald's character, discussed in the following chapter, does not seem inconsistent with a suicide or feigned suicide attempt, nor with his having failed to disclose the suicide attempt. Many witnesses who testified before the Commission observed that he was not an "open" or trusting person, had a tendency toward arrogance, and was not the kind of man who would readily admit weaknesses.

Oswald appeared at the American Embassy in Moscow on October 31, 1959, 3 days after his release from the Botkinskaya Hospital. He did not give the officials at the Embassy any indication that he had recently received medical treatment. Oswald's appearance was the first notification to the American Government that he was in Russia, since he had failed to inform the Embassy upon his arrival, as most American tourists did at the time. In appendix XV, Oswald's dealings with the Embassy in 1959 until his return to the United States in 1962 are described in full, and all action taken by the American officials on his case is evaluated. His conduct at the Embassy has also been considered by the Commission for any indication it may provide as to whether or not Oswald was then acting under directions of the Soviet Government.

At the Embassy, Oswald declared that he wished to renounce his U.S. citizenship, but the consul to whom he spoke, Richard E. Snyder, refused to accept his renunciation at that time, telling him that he would have to return to complete the necessary papers. However, Oswald did give the consul his passport and a hand-written statement requesting that his American citizenship be "revoked" and "affirm[ing] [his] ... allegiance" to the Soviet Union. (See Commission Exhibit No. 913.) The FBI has confirmed that this statement is in Oswald's handwriting, and Snyder has testified that the letter's phrases are consistent with the way Oswald talked and conducted himself. During the approximately 40-minute interview, Oswald also informed Snyder that he had been a radar operator in the Marine Corps, intimating that he might know something of special interest, and that he had informed a Soviet official that he would give the Soviets any information concerning the Marine Corps and radar operation which he possessed. Although Oswald never filed a formal renunciation, in a letter to the Embassy dated November 3, 1959, he again requested that his American citizenship be revoked and protested the refusal to accept his renunciation on October 31. (See Commission Exhibit 912.)

While at the Embassy, and in a subsequent interview with an American journalist, Oswald displayed familiarity with Communist ideological arguments, which led those with whom he spoke to speculate that he may have received some instruction from Soviet authorities. Oswald's familiarity with the law regarding renunciation of citizenship, observed by both Embassy officials, could also be construed as a sign of coaching by Soviet authorities. However, Oswald is known to have been an avid reader and there is evidence that he had read Communist literature without guidance while in the Marine Corps and before that time. After his arrival in Moscow, Oswald most probably had discussions with his Intourist guide and others, but none of the Americans with whom he talked in Moscow felt that his conversations necessarily revealed any type of formal training. The "Historic Diary" indicates that Oswald did not tell his guide that he intended to visit the Embassy because he feared she would disapprove. (See Commission Exhibit No. 24.) Though Oswald gave Snyder the impression "of an intelligent person who spoke in a manner and on a level, which seemed to befit his apparent level of intelligence," correspondent Priscilla Johnson, who spent about 5 hours talking with him, received a much less favorable impression:

He liked to create the pretense, the impression that he was attracted to abstract discussion and was capable of engaging in it, and was drawn to it. But it was like pricking a balloon. I had the feeling that if you really did engage him on this ground, you very quickly would discover that he didn't have the capacity for a logical sustained argument about an abstract point on economics or on non economic, political matters or any matter, philosophical.

A comparison of the formal note Oswald handed Snyder and his letter of November 3 with the provisions of section 349 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act suggests that Oswald had read the statute but understood it imperfectly; he apparently was trying to use three out of the four ways set out in the statute to surrender his citizenship, but he succeeded in none.

Moreover, persuasive evidence that Oswald's conduct was not carefully coached by Soviet agents is provided by some of his actions at the Embassy. The single statement which probably caused Oswald the most future trouble was his declaration that he had already volunteered to a Soviet official that he would, if asked, tell the Soviet Government all that he knew about his job in radar as a Marine. Certainly a statement of this type would prejudice any possibility of his being an effective pro-Communist agent.

Further, though unquestionably evidencing anti-American sentiments, Oswald's behavior at the Embassy, which brought him exceedingly close to expatriation, was unlikely to have increased his value in any capacity to the Soviet Union. Richard E. Snyder, the official who interviewed Oswald on October 31, testified that he "had every reason to believe" that Oswald would have carried through a formaland therefore effectiverenunciation of his American citizenship immediately if he had let him. However, as a defector, Oswald could have had considerable propaganda value without expatriating himself; and if he had expatriated himself his eventual return to the United States would have been much more difficult and perhaps impossible. If Snyder's assessment of Oswald's intentions is accurate, it thus tends to refute the suggestion that Oswald was being coached by the Soviets. In addition, reporters noticed Oswald's apparent ambivalence in regard to renouncing his citizenshipstormily demanding that he be permitted to renounce while failing to follow through by completing the necessary papersbehavior which might have detracted from his propaganda value.

According to Oswald's "Historic Diary" and the documents furnished to the Commission by the Soviet Government, Oswald was not told that he had been accepted as a resident of the Soviet Union until about January 4, 1960. Although on November 13 and 16 Oswald informed Aline Mosby and Priscilla Johnson that he had been granted permission to remain in the country indefinitely, the diary indicates that at that time he had been told only that he could remain "until some solution is found with what to do with me." The diary is more consistent with the letter Oswald wrote to his brother Robert on December 17, saying that he was then, more than a month after he saw Johnson and Mosby, about to leave his hotel, and with some later correspondence with his mother. Oswald mailed a short note to his mother which she received in Texas on January 5; that same day she mailed a money order to him in Moscow, but it apparently got there too late, because she received it back, unopened, on February 25. Oswald's conflicting statement to the correspondents also seems reconcilable with his very apparent desire to appear important to others. Moreover, so long as Oswald continued to stay in a hotel in Moscow, the inference is that the Soviet authorities had not yet decided to accept him. This inference is supported by information supplied by the CIA on the handling of other defectors in the Soviet Union.

Thus, the evidence is strong that Oswald waited at least until November 16, when he saw Miss Johnson, and it is probable that he was required to wait until January 4, a little over 2.5 months from October 16, before his application to remain in Russia was granted. In mid-November Miss Johnson asked Oswald whether the Russians were encouraging his defection, to which Oswald responded: "The Russians are treating it like a legal formality. They don't encourage you and they don't discourage you." And, when the Soviet Government finally acted, Oswald did not receive Soviet citizenship, as he had requested, but merely permission to reside in Russia on a year-to-year basis.

Asked to comment upon the length of time, 2 months and 22 days, that probably passed before Oswald was granted the right to remain in the Soviet Union, the CIA has advised that "when compared to five other defector cases, this procedure seems unexceptional." Similarly, the Department of State reports that its information "indicated that a 2-month waiting period is not unusual." The full response of the CIA is as follows:

Oswald said that he asked for Soviet citizenship on 16 October 1959. According to his diary, he received word a month later that he could stay in the USSR pending disposition of his request, but it was another month and a half before he was given his stateless passport. When compared to five other defector cases, this procedure seems unexceptional. Two defectors from US Army intelligence units in West Germany appear to have been given citizenship immediately, but both had prior KGB connections and fled as a result of Army security checks. Of the other three cases, one was accepted after not more than five weeks and given a stateless passport apparently at about the same time. The second was immediately given permission to stay for a while, and his subsequent request for citizenship was granted three months later. The third was allowed to stay after he made his citizenship request, but almost two months passed before he was told that he had been accepted. Although the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs soon after told the US Embassy that he was a Soviet citizen, he did not receive his document until five or six months after initial application. We know of only one case in which an American asked for Soviet citizenship but did not take up residence in the USSR. In that instance, the American changed his mind and voluntarily returned to the United States less than three weeks after he had requested Soviet citizenship.

The Department of State has commented as follows:

The files of the Department of State reflect the fact that Oswald first applied for permission to remain in Russia permanently, or at least for a long period, when he arrived in Moscow, and that he obtained permission to remain within one or two months.

A. Is the fact that he obtained permission to stay within this period of time usual?

Answer: Our information indicates that a two months waiting period is not unusual. In the ease of [name withheld] the Supreme Soviet decided within two months to give Soviet citizenship and he was thereafter, of course, permitted to stay.

B. Can you tell us what the normal procedures are under similar circumstances?

Answer: It is impossible for us to state any "normal" procedures. The Soviet Government never publicizes the proceedings in these eases or the reasons for its action. Furthermore, it is, of course, extremely unusual for an American citizen to defect.

The information relating to Oswald's suicide attempt indicates that his application to remain in the Soviet Union was probably rejected about 6 days after his arrival in Moscow. Since the KGB is the Soviet agency responsible for the initial handling of all defectors, it seems likely that the original decision not to accept Oswald was made by the KGB. That Oswald was permitted to remain in Moscow after his release from the hospital suggests that another ministry of the Soviet Government may have intervened on his behalf. This hypothesis is consistent with entries in the "Historic Diary" commenting that the officials Oswald met after his hospital treatment were different from those with whom he had dealt before. The most plausible reason for any such intervention may well have been apprehension over the publicity that would follow the rejection of a devout convert to the Communist cause.

Oswald's Life in Minsk

Marina Oswald testified that foreign nationals are commonly given special treatment in the Soviet Union, and the Central Intelligence Agency has confirmed that it is standard practice in the Soviet Union for Americans and other foreign defectors from countries with high standards of living to be "subsidized." Apparently it is Soviet practice. About a year after Oswald received this money, the ruble was revalued to about 10 times its earlier value to attempt to make life sufficiently pleasant for a foreign defector so that he will not become disillusioned and return to his native country. The Commission has also assumed that it is customary for Soviet intelligence agencies to keep defectors under surveillance during their residence in the Soviet Union, through periodic interviews of neighbors and associates of the defector. Oswald once mentioned that the Soviet police questioned his neighbors occasionally.

Moreover, it is from Oswald's personal writings alone that the Commission has learned that he received supplementary funds from the Soviet "Red Cross." In the notes he made during the return trip to the United States Oswald recognized that the "Red Cross" subsidy had nothing to do with the well-known International Red Cross. He frankly stated that the money was paid to him for having "denounced" the United States and that it had come from the "MVD." Oswald's papers reveal that the "Red Cross" subsidy was terminated as soon as he wrote the American Embassy in Moscow in February 1961 asking that he be permitted to return. (See Commission Exhibit No. 25.) Marina Oswald's testimony confirmed this; she said that when she knew Oswald he no longer was receiving the monthly grant but still retained some of the savings accumulated in the months when he had been receiving it. Since she met Oswald in March and married him in April of 1961, her testimony was consistent with his records.

The nature of Oswald's employment while in Minsk has been examined by the Commission. The factory in which he worked was a large plant manufacturing electronic parts and radio and television sets. Marina Oswald has testified that he was an "apprentice machinist" and "ground small metallic parts for radio receivers, on a lathe." So far as can be determined, Oswald never straightforwardly described to anyone else in the United States exactly what his job was in the Soviet Union. Some of his acquaintances in Dallas and Fort Worth had the impression that he was disappointed in having been given a menial job and not assigned to an institution of higher learning in the Soviet Union. Marina Oswald confirmed this and also testified that her husband was not interested in his work and not regarded at the factory as a very good worker. The documents furnished to the Commission by the Soviet government were consistent with her testimony on this point, since they included a report from Oswald's superior at the factory which is critical of his performance on the job. Oswald's employment and his job performance are thus consistent with his known occupational habits in this country and otherwise afford no ground for suspicion.

Oswald's membership in a hunting club while he was in the Soviet Union has been a matter of special interest to the Commission. One Russian migr testified that this was a suspicious circumstance because no one in the Soviet Union is permitted to own a gun for pleasure. The Commission's investigation, however, has established that this is not so. The Central Intelligence Agency has advised the Commission that hunting societies such as the one to which Oswald belonged are very popular in the Soviet Union. They are frequently sponsored by factories for their employees, as was Oswald's. Moreover, Soviet citizens (or foreigners residing in the Soviet Union) are permitted to own shotguns, but not rifles, without joining a society; all that is necessary is that the gun be registered at the local militia office immediately after it has been purchased. Experts from the Central Intelligence Agency have examined Oswald's club membership certificate and gun permit and expressed the opinion that its terms and numbers are consistent with other information the CIA has about the Soviet Union.

Marina Oswald testified that her husband went hunting only on one occasion during the time of their marriage. However, Oswald apparently joined the Byelorussian Society of Hunters and Fishermen in the summer of 1960 and did not marry until April 30, 1961, so he could have been more active while he was still a bachelor. Oswald made no secret of his membership in the hunting club. He mentioned it on occasion to friends after he returned to the United States; discussed it at some length in a speech at a Jesuit Seminary in Mobile, Ala., in the summer of 1962; included it in his correspondence with his brother Robert; and kept his membership certificate and gun permit until the day he was killed. In view of these facts, it is unlikely that Oswald's membership in a hunting club was contrived to conceal some sort of secret training. Moreover, the CIA has informed the Commission that it is in possession of considerable information on the location of secret Soviet training institutions and that it knows of no such institution in or near Minsk during the time Oswald was there.

Oswald's marriage to Marina Prusakova on April 30, 1961, is itself a fact meriting consideration. A foreigner living in Russia cannot marry without the permission of the Soviet Government. It seems unlikely that the Soviet authorities would have permitted Oswald to marry and to take his wife with him to the United States if they were contemplating using him alone as an agent. The fact that he had a Russian wife would be likely, in their view, to increase any surveillance under which he would be kept by American security agencies, would make him even more conspicuous to his neighbors as "an ex-Russian," and would decrease his mobility. A wife's presence in the United States would also constitute a continuing risk of disclosure. On the other hand, Marina Oswald's lack of English training and her complete ignorance of the United States and its customs would scarcely recommend-her to the Soviet authorities as one member of an "agent team" to be sent to the United States on a difficult and dangerous foreign enterprise.

Oswald's departure from the Soviet Union

Oswald's letter does not seem to have been designed to ingratiate him with the Embassy officials. It starts by incorrectly implying that he had written an earlier letter that was not answered, states that he will return to the United States only if he can first "come to some agreement" on there being no legal charges brought against him, and ends with a reminder to the officials at the Embassy that they have a responsibility to do everything they can to help him, since he is an American citizen.

The Embassy's response to this letter was to invite Oswald to come personally to Moscow to discuss the matter. Oswald at first protested because of the difficulty of obtaining Soviet permission. He wrote two more protesting letters during the following 4 months, but received no indication that the Embassy would allow him to handle the matter by mail. While the Department of State was clarifying its position on this matter, Oswald unexpectedly appeared in Moscow on Saturday, July 8, 1961. On Sunday, Marina Oswald flew to Moscow, and was interviewed by officials in the American Embassy on Tuesday.

The Commission asked the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency to comment on whether the Oswalds' travel to Moscow without permission signified special treatment by the Soviet Union. From their responses, it appears that since Marina Oswald possessed a Soviet citizen's internal passport, she did not require prior approval to make the trip. Although Soviet law did require her husband, as the holder of a "stateless passport," to obtain advance permission for the trip, his failure to do so would not normally have been considered a serious violation. In this respect, the CIA has advised the Commission as follows:

OSWALD'S travel from Minsk to Moscow and return in July 1961 would normally have required prior authorization. Bearers of a Soviet "passport for foreigners" (ridnazhitelstov v. SSSR dlya innostrantsa) are required to obtain travel authorization from the Visa and Registration Department (OVIR) (or Passport Registration Department (PRO) in smaller towns) if they desire to leave the city (or oblast) where they are domiciled. This same requirement is believed to apply to persons, such as OSWALD, holding Soviet "stateless passports" (vid na zhitelstvo v. SSSR dlya lits bez grazhdanstva).

The practicality of even "unauthorized" travel was demonstrated by events related by a United States citizen who defected in 1960, and subsequently was sent to Kiev to study. After repatriating this defector told U.S. authorities he had made a total of seven unauthorized trips from Kiev during his stay in the USSR. He was apprehended on two of his flights and was returned to Kiev each time, the second time under escort. On both occasions he was merely reprimanded by the deputy chief of the institute at which he was studying. Since Marina had a Soviet citizen's internal passport there would have been no restrictions against her making the trip to Moscow.

The answers of the Department of State, together with the Commission's specific questions, are as follows:

B. Could resident foreigners normally travel in this manner without first obtaining such permission?

Answer: There are only a few U.S. nationals now living in the Soviet Union. They include an American Roman Catholic priest, an American Protestant minister, a number of correspondents, some students and technical advisers to Soviet businesses. We know that the priest, the minister, the correspondents and the students must obtain permission from Soviet authorities before taking any trips. The technical advisers notify officials of their project before they travel and these officials personally inform the militia.

C. If travel of this type was not freely permitted, do you believe that Oswald normally would have been apprehended during the attempt or punished after the fact for traveling without permission?

Answer: Based on the information we have, we believe that if Oswald went to Moscow without permission, and this was known to the Soviet authorities, he would have been fined or reprimanded. Oswald was not, of course, an average foreign resident. He was a defector from a foreign country and the bearer of a Soviet internal "stateless" passport ... during the time when he was contemplating the visit to Moscow to come to the Embassy...
The Soviet authorities probably knew about Oswald's trip even if he did not obtain advance permission, since in most instances the Soviet militia guards at the Embassy ask for the documents of unidentified persons entering the Embassy grounds...
An American citizen who, with her American citizen husband, went to the Soviet Union to live permanently and is now trying to obtain permission to leave, informed the Embassy that she had been fined for not getting permission to go from Odessa to Moscow on a recent trip to visit the Embassy.

D. Even if such travel did not have to be authorized, do you have any information or observations regarding the practicality of such travel by Soviet citizens or persons in Oswald's status?

Answer: It is impossible to generalize in this area. We understand from interrogations of former residents in the Soviet Union who were considered "stateless" by Soviet authorities that they were not permitted to leave the town where they resided without permission of the police. In requesting such permission they were required to fill out a questionnaire giving the reason for travel, length of stay, addresses of individuals to be visited, etc. Notwithstanding these requirements, we know that at least one "stateless" person often traveled without permission of the authorities and stated that police stationed at railroad stations usually spot-checked the identification papers of every tenth traveler, but that it was an easy matter to avoid such checks. Finally, she stated that persons who were caught evading the registration requirements were returned to their home towns by the police and sentenced to short jail terms and fined. These sentences were more severe for repeated violations.

When Oswald arrived at the Embassy in Moscow, he met Richard E. Snyder, the same person with whom he had dealt in October of 1959. Primarily on the basis of Oswald's interview with Snyder on Monday, July 10, 1961, the American Embassy concluded that Oswald had not expatriated himself. (See app. XV.) On the basis of this tentative decision, Oswald was given back his American passport, which he had surrendered in 1959. The document was due to expire in September 1961, however, and Oswald was informed that its renewal would depend upon the ultimate decision by the Department of State on his expatriation. On July 11, Marina Oswald was interviewed at the Embassy and the steps necessary for her to obtain an American visa were begun. In May 1962, after 15 months of dealings with the Embassy, Oswald's passport was ultimately renewed and permission for his wife to enter the United States was granted.

The files on Oswald and his wife compiled by the Department of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service contain no indication of any expert guidance by Soviet authorities in Oswald's dealings with the Department or the Service. For example, the letters from Minsk to the Embassy in Moscow, which are in his handwriting, display the arrogant attitude which was characteristic of him both before and after he lived in Russia, and, when compared with other letters that were without doubt composed and written by him, show about the same low level of sophistication, fluency, and spelling. The Department officer who most frequently dealt with Oswald when he began negotiations to return to the United States, Richard E. Snyder, testified that he can recall nothing that indicated Oswald was being guided or assisted by a third party when he appeared at the Embassy in July 1961. On the contrary, the arrogant and presumptuous attitude which Oswald displayed in his correspondence with the Embassy from early 1961 until June 1962, when he finally departed from Russia, undoubtedly hindered his attempts to return to the United States. Snyder has testified that although he made a sincere effort to treat Oswald's application objectively, Oswald's attitude made this very difficult.

In order to leave Russia, it was also necessary for the Oswalds to obtain permission from the Soviet Government. The timing and circumstances under which the Oswalds obtained this permission have also been considered by the Commission.

Marina Oswald, although her memory is not clear on the point, said that she and Oswald first made their intentions to go to the United States known to Soviet officials in Minsk in May, even before coming to Moscow in July for the conference at the American Embassy. The Oswalds' correspondence with the Embassy and the documents furnished the Commission by the Soviet Government show that the Oswalds made a series of formal applications to the Soviets from July 15 to August 21. Presumably the most difficult question for the Soviet-authorities was whether to allow Marina Oswald to accompany her husband. She was called to the local passport office in Minsk on December 25, 1961, and told that authority had been received to issue exit visas to her and Oswald. Obtaining the permission of the Soviet Government to leave may have been aided by a conference which Marina Oswald had, at her own request, with a local MVD official, Colonel Aksenov, sometime in late 1961. She testified that she applied for the conference at her husband's urging, after he had tried unsuccessfully to arrange such a conference for himself. She believed that it may have been granted her because her uncle with whom she had lived in Minsk before her marriage was also an MVD official.

The correspondence with the American Embassy at this time reflected that the Oswalds did not pick up their exit visas immediately. On January 11, 1962, Marina Oswald was issued her Soviet exit visa. It was marked valid until December 1, 1962. The Oswalds did not leave Russia until June 1962, but the additional delay was caused by problems with the U.S. Government and by the birth of a child in February. Permission of the Soviet authorities to leave, once given, was never revoked. Oswald told the FBI in July 1962, shortly after he returned to the United States, that he had been interviewed by the MVD twice, once when he first came to the Soviet Union and once just before he departed. His wife testified that the second interview did not occur in Moscow but that she and her husband dealt with the MVD visa officials frequently in Minsk.

Investigation of the circumstances, including the timing, under which the Oswalds obtained permission from the Soviet Government to leave Russia for the United States show that they differed in no discernible manner from the normal. The Central Intelligence Agency has informed the Commission that normally a Soviet national would not be permitted to emigrate if he might endanger Soviet national security once he went abroad. Those persons in possession of confidential information, for example, would constitute an important category of such "security risks." Apparently Oswald's predeparture interview by the MVD was part of an attempt to ascertain whether he or his wife had access to any confidential information. Marina Oswald's reported interview with the MVD in late 1961, which was arranged at her request, may have served the same purpose. The Commission's awareness of both interviews derives entirely from Oswald's and his wife's statements and letters to the American Embassy, which afford additional evidence that the conferences carried no subversive significance. It took the Soviet authorities at least 5% months, from about July 15, 1961, until late December, to grant permission for the Oswalds to leave the country. When asked to comment upon the alleged rapidity of the Oswalds' departure, the Department of State advised the Commission:

...In the immediate post-war period there were about fifteen marriages in which the wife had been waiting for many years for a Soviet exit permit. After the death of Stalin the Soviet Government showed a disposition to settle these cases. In the summer of 1953 permission was given for all of this group of Soviet citizen wives to accompany their American citizen husbands to the United States.
Since this group was given permission to leave the Soviet Union, there have been from time to time marriages in the Soviet Union of American citizens and Soviet citizens. With one exception, it is our understanding that all of the Soviet citizens involved have been given permission to emigrate to the United States after waiting periods which were, in some cases from three to six months and in others much longer.

Both the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency compiled data for the Commission on Soviet wives of American citizens who received exit visas to leave the Soviet Union, where the relevant information was available. In both cases the data were consistent with the above conclusion of the State Department. The Department of State had sufficient information to measure the time span in 14 cases. The Department points out that it has information on the dates of application for and receipt of Soviet exit visas only on those cases that have been brought to its attention. A common reason for bringing a case to the attention of the Department is that the granting of the exit visa by the Soviet Union has been delayed, so that the American spouse seeks the assistance of his own government. It therefore appears that the sampling data carry a distinct bias toward lengthy waiting periods. Of the 14 cases tested, 6 involve women who applied for visas after 1953, when the liberalized post-Stalin policy was in effect. The approximate waiting periods for these wives were, in decreasing order, 13 months, 6 months, 8 months, 1 month, and 10 days. Of the 11 cases examined by the Central Intelligence Agency in which the time period is known or can be inferred, the Soviet wives had to wait from 5 months to a year to obtain exit visas.

In his correspondence with the American Embassy and his brother while he was in Russia, in his diary, and in his conversations with people in the United States after he returned, Oswald claimed that his wife had been subjected to pressure by the Soviet Government in an effort to induce her not to emigrate to the United States. In the Embassy correspondence, Oswald claimed that the pressure had been so intense that she had to be hospitalized for 5 days for "nervous exhaustion." Marina Oswald testified that her husband exaggerated and that no such hospitalization or "nervous exhaustion" ever occurred. However, she did testify that she was questioned on the matter occasionally and given the impression that her government was not pleased with her decision. Her aunt and uncle in Minsk did not speak to her "for a long time"; she also stated that she was dropped from membership in the Communist Youth Organization (Kom-somol) when the news of her visit to the American Embassy in Moscow reached that organization.

A student who took Russian lessons from her in Texas testified that she once referred to the days when the pressure was applied as "a very horrible time." Despite all this Marina Oswald testified that she was surprised that their visas were granted as soon as they wereand that hers was granted at all. This evidence thus indicates that the Soviet authorities, rather than facilitating the departure of the Oswalds, first tried to dissuade Marina Oswald from going to the United States and then, when she failed to respond to the pressure, permitted her to leave without undue delay. There are indications that the Soviet treatment of another recent defector who left the Soviet Union to return to the United States resembled that accorded to the Oswalds.

The Russian-speaking community

Upon his arrival in 1962, Oswald did not know any members of the relatively small and loosely knit Russian-speaking community. Shortly after his arrival Oswald obtained the name of two Russian-speaking persons in Fort Worth from the office of the Texas Employment Commission in that city. Attempts to arrange a prompt visit with one of them failed. The second person, Peter Paul Gregory, was a consulting petroleum engineer and part-time Russian-language instructor at the Fort Worth Public Library. Oswald contacted him in order to obtain a letter certifying to his proficiency in Russian and Marina Oswald later tutored his son in the Russian language. Gregory introduced the Oswalds to George Bouhe and Anna Meller, both of whom lived in Dallas and became interested in the welfare of Marina Oswald and her child. Through them, other members of the Russian community became acquainted with the Oswalds.

The Oswalds met some 30 persons in the Russian-speaking community, of whom 25 testified before the Commission or its staff; others were interviewed on behalf of the Commission. This range of testimony has disclosed that the relationship between Lee Harvey Oswald and the Russian-speaking community was short lived and generally quite strained. During October and November of 1962 Marina Oswald lived at the homes of some of the members of the Russian-speaking community. She stayed first with Elena Hall while Oswald was looking for work in Dallas. In early November, Marina Oswald and the baby joined Oswald in Dallas, but soon thereafter, she spent approximately 2 weeks with different Russian-speaking friends during another separation. Oswald openly resented the help Marina's "Russian friends" gave to him and his wife and the efforts of some of them to induce Marina to leave him. George Bouhe attempted to dissuade Marina from returning to her husband in November 1962, and when she rejoined him, Bouhe became displeased with her as well. Relations between the Oswalds and the members of the Russian community had practically ceased by the end of 1962. Katherine Ford, one of the members of the group, summed up the situation as it existed at the end of January 1963: "So it was rather, sort of, Marina and her husband were dropped at that time, nobody actually wanted to help..."

In April of 1963, Oswald left Fort Worth for New Orleans, where he was later joined by his wife and daughter, and remained until his trip to Mexico City in late September and his subsequent return to the Dallas-Fort Worth area in early October of 1963. With only minor exceptions, there is no evidence that any member of the Russian-speaking community had further contact with Oswald or his family after April. In New Orleans, Oswald made no attempt to make new Russian-speaking acquaintances for his wife and there is no evidence that he developed any friendships in that city. Similarly, after the return from New Orleans, there seems to have been no communication between the Oswalds and this group until the evening of November 22, 1963, when the Dallas Police enlisted Ilya Mamantov to serve as an interpreter for them in their questioning of Marina Oswald.

George De Mohrenschildt and his wife, both of whom speak Russian as well as several other languages, however, did continue to see the Oswalds on occasion up to about the time Oswald went to New Orleans on April 24, 1963. De Mohrenschildt was apparently the only Russian-speaking person living in Dallas for whom Oswald had appreciable respect, and this seems to have been true even though De Mohrenschildt helped Marina Oswald leave her husband for a period in November of 1962.

In connection with the relations between Oswald and De Mohrenschildt, the Commission has considered testimony concerning an event which occurred shortly after Oswald shot at General Walker. The De Mohrenschildts came to Oswald's apartment on Neely Street for the first time on the evening of April 13, 1963, apparently to bring an Easter gift for the Oswald child. Mrs. De Mohrenschildt testified that while Marina Oswald was showing her the apartment, she saw a rifle with a scope in a closet. Mrs. De Mohrenschildt then told her husband, in the presence of the Oswalds, that there was a rifle in the closet. Mrs. De Mohrenschildt testified that "George, of course, with his sense of humorWalker was shot at a few days ago, within that time. He said, 'Did you take a pot shot at Walker by any chance?'" At that point, Mr. De Mohrenschildt testified, Oswald "sort of shriveled, you see, when I asked this question... made a peculiar face ... [and] changed the expression on his face" and remarked that he did target shooting. Marina Oswald testified that the De Mohrenschildts came to visit a few days after the Walker incident and that when De Mohrenschildt made his reference to Oswald's possibly shooting at Walker, Oswald's "face changed, ...he almost became speechless." According to the De Mohrenschildts, Mr. De Mohrenschildt's remark was intended as a joke, and he had no knowledge of Oswald's involvement in the attack on Walker. Nonetheless, the remark appears to have created an uncomfortable silence, and the De Mohrenschildts left "very soon afterwards." They never saw either of the Oswalds again. They left in a few days on a trip to New York City and did not return until after Oswald had gone to New Orleans. A postcard from Oswald to De Mohrenschildt was apparently the only contact they had thereafter. The De Mohrenschildts left in early June for Haiti on a business venture, and they were still residing there at the time they testified on April 23, 1964.

Extensive investigation has been conducted into the background of both De Mohrenschildts. The investigation has revealed that George De Mohrenschildt is a highly individualistic person of varied interests. He was born in the Russian Ukraine in 1911 and fled Russia with his parents in 1921 during the civil disorder following the revolution. He was in a Polish cavalry military academy for 1 1/2 years. Later he studied in Antwerp and attended the University of Liege from which he received a doctor's degree in international commerce in 1928. Soon thereafter, he emigrated to the United States; he became a U.S. citizen in 1949. De Mohrenschildt eventually became interested in oil exploration and production; he entered the University of Texas in 1944 and received a master's degree in petroleum geology and petroleum engineering in 1945. He has since become active as a petroleum engineer throughout the world. In 1960, after the death of his son, he and his wife made an 8-month hike from the United States-Mexican border to Panama over primitive jungle trails. By happenstance they were in Guatemala City at the time of the Bay of Pigs invasion. A lengthy film and complete written log was prepared by De Mohrenschildt and a report of the trip was made to the U.S. Government. Upon arriving in Panama they journeyed to Haiti where De Mohrenschildt eventually became involved in a Government-oriented business venture in which he has been engaged continuously since June 1963 until the time of this report.

The members of the Dallas-Fort Worth Russian community and others have variously described De Mohrenschildt as eccentric, outspoken, and a strong believer in individual liberties and in the U.S. form of government, but also of the belief that some form of undemocratic government might be best for other peoples. De Mohrenschildt frankly admits his provocative personality.

Jeanne De Mohrenschildt was born in Harbin, China, of White Russian parents. She left during the war with Japan, coming to New York in 1938 where she became a successful ladies dress and sportswear apparel designer. She married her present husband in 1959.

The Commission's investigation has developed no signs of subversive or disloyal conduct on the part of either of the De Mohrenschildts. Neither the FBI, CIA, nor any witness contacted by the Commission has provided any information linking the De Mohrenschildts to subversive or extremist organizations. Nor has there been any evidence linking them in any way with the assassination of President Kennedy.

The Commission has also considered closely the relations between the Oswalds and Michael and Ruth Paine of Irving, Tex. The Paines were not part of the Russian community which has been discussed above. Ruth Paine speaks Russian, however, and for this reason was invited to a party in February of 1963 at which she became acquainted with the Oswalds. The host had met the Oswalds through the De Mohrenschildts. Marina Oswald and Ruth Paine subsequently became quite friendly, and Mrs. Paine provided considerable assistance to the Oswalds. Marina Oswald and her child resided with Ruth Paine for a little over 2 weeks while Oswald sought a job in New Orleans in late April and early May 1963. In May, she transported Marina Oswald to New Orleans, paying all of the traveling and other expenses. While the Oswalds were in New Orleans, the two women corresponded. Mrs. Paine came to New Orleans in late September and took Marina Oswald and her child to her home in Irving.

Since Oswald left for Mexico City promptly after Mrs. Paine and his family departed New Orleans, the Commission has considered whether Ruth Paine's trip to New Orleans was undertaken to assist Oswald in this venture, but the evidence is clear that it was not. In her letters to Ruth Paine during the summer of 1963, Marina Oswald confided that she was having continuing difficulties with her husband, and Mrs. Paine urged Marina Oswald to live with her in Irving; the letters of the two women prior to Mrs. Paine's arrival in New Orleans on September 20, 1963, however, contain no mention that Oswald was planning a trip to Mexico City or elsewhere. In New Orleans, Mrs. Paine was told by Oswald that he planned to seek employment in Houston, or perhaps Philadelphia. Though Marina Oswald knew this to be false, she testified that she joined in this deception. At no time during the entire weekend was Mexico City mentioned. Corroboration for this testimony is found in a letter Mrs. Paine wrote her mother shortly after she and Marina Oswald had returned to Irving on September 24, in which she stated that Marina Oswald was again living with her temporarily and that Oswald was job-hunting. When Oswald arrived at the Paine home on October 4, he continued his deception by telling Mrs. Paine, in his wife's presence, that he had been unsuccessful in finding employment. At Oswald's request, Marina Oswald remained silent.

Marina Oswald lived with Ruth Paine through the birth of her second daughter on October 20, 1963, and until the assassination of President Kennedy. During this period, Oswald obtained a room in Dallas and found employment in Dallas, but spent weekends with his family at the Paine home. On November 1 and 5, Ruth Paine was interviewed by agents of the FBI who were investigating Oswald's activities since his return from the Soviet Union, as set forth in greater detail in chapter VIII. She did not then know Oswald's address in Dallas. She was not asked for, nor did she volunteer, Oswald's telephone number in Dallas, which she did know. She advised the Bureau agent to whom she spoke of Oswald's periodic weekend visits, and she informed him that Oswald was employed at the Texas School Book Depository Building.

On November 10, Ruth Paine discovered a draft of Oswald's letter written the day before to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, in which he indicated that he had journeyed to Mexico City and conferred with a "comrade Kostine in the Embassy of the Soviet Union, Mexico City, Mexico." (This letter is discussed later in this chapter.) Mr. and Mrs. Paine testified that although they initially assumed the letter was a figment of Oswald's imagination, the letter gave Mrs. Paine considerable misgivings. She determined that if the FBI agents returned she would deliver to them the copy of a draft of the letter which, unknown to Oswald, she had made. However, the agents did not return before the assassination. On November 19, Mrs. Paine learned that Oswald was living in his Dallas rooming house under an assumed name. She did not report this to the FBI because, as she testified, she "had no occasion to see them, and ... did not think it important enough to call them after that until the 23d of November."

The Commission has thoroughly investigated the background of both Paines. Mrs. Paine was born Ruth Hyde in New York City on September 8, 1932. Her parents moved to Columbus, Ohio, in the late 1930's. They were divorced in 1961. Ruth Paine graduated from Antioch College in 1955. While in high school she first. became interested in Quaker activities; she and her brother became Quakers in 1951. In 1952, following completion of her sophomore year at Antioch College, she was a delegate to two Friends conferences in England.

At the time the Paines met in 1955, Mrs. Paine was active in the work of the Young Friends Committee of North America, which, with the cooperation of the Department of State, was making an effort to lessen the tensions between Soviet Russia and the United States by means of the stimulation of contacts and exchange of cultures between citizens of the two nations through "pen-pal" correspondence and exchanges of young Russians and Americans. It was during this period that Mrs. Paine became interested in the Russian language. Mrs. Paine participated in a Russian-American student exchange program sponsored by the Young Friends Committee of North America, and has participated in the "pen- pal" phase of the activities of the Young Friends Committee. She has corresponded until recently with a schoolteacher in Russia. Although her active interest in the Friends' program for the lessening of East-West tensions ceased upon her marriage in December 1957, she has continued to hold to the tenets of the Quaker faith.

Michael Paine is the son of George Lyman Paine and Ruth Forbes Paine, now Ruth Forbes Young, wife of Arthur Young of Philadelphia, Pa. His parents were divorced when he was 4 years of age. His father, George Lyman Paine, is an architect and resides in California. Michael Paine testified that during his late grammar and early high school days his father participated actively in the Trotskyite faction of the Communist movement in the United States and that he attended some of those meetings. He stated that his father, with whom he has had little contact throughout most of his life, has not influenced his political thinking. He said that he has visited his father four or five times in California since 1959, but their discussions did not include the subject of communism. Since moving to Irving, Tex., in 1959, he has been a research engineer for Bell Helicopter Co. in Fort Worth. Mr. Paine has security clearance for his work. He has been a long-time member of the American Civil Liberties Union. Though not in sympathy with rightist political aims, he has attended a few meetings of far-right organizations in Dallas for the purpose, he testified, of learning something about those organizations and because he "was interested in seeing more communication between the right and the left."

The Commission has conducted a thorough investigation of the Paines' finances and is satisfied that their income has been from legitimate and traceable sources, and that their expenditures were consistent with their income and for normal purposes. Although in the course of their relationship with the Oswalds, the Paines assumed expenses for such matters as food and transportation, with a value of approximately $500, they made no direct payments to, and received no moneys or valuables from, the Oswalds.

Although prior to November 22, Mrs. Paine had information relating to Oswald's use of an alias in Dallas, his telephone number, and his correspondence with the Soviet Embassy, which she did not pass on to the FBI, her failure to have come forward with this information must be viewed within the context of the information available to her at that time.

There is no evidence to contradict her testimony that she did not then know about Oswald's attack on General Walker, the presence of the rifle on the floor of her garage, Oswald's ownership of a pistol, or the photographs of Oswald displaying the firearms. She thus assumed that Oswald, though a difficult and disturbing personality, was not potentially violent, and that the FBI was cognizant of his past history and current activities.

Moreover, it is from Mrs. Paine herself that the Commission has learned that she possessed the information which she did have. Mrs. Paine was forthright with the agent of the FBI with whom she spoke in early November 1963, providing him with sufficient information to have located Oswald at his job if he had deemed it necessary to do so, and her failure to have taken immediate steps to notify the Bureau of the additional information does not under the circumstances appear unusual. Throughout the Commission's investigation, Ruth Paine has been completely cooperative, voluntarily producing all correspondence, memoranda, and other written communications in her possession that had passed between her and Marina Oswald both before and after November 22, 1963. The Commission has had the benefit of Mrs. Paine's 1963 date book and calendar and her address book and telephone notation book, in both of which appear many entries relating to her activities with the Oswalds. Other material of a purely personal nature was also voluntarily made available. The Commission has found nothing in the Paines' background, activities, or finances which suggests disloyalty to the United States, and it has concluded that Ruth and Michael Paine were not involved in any way with the assassination of President Kennedy.

Communist Party, U.S.A.; Socialist Workers Party. In August of 1962, Oswald subscribed to the Worker, a publication of the Communist Party, U.S.A. He also wrote the Communist Party to obtain pamphlets and other literature which, the evidence indicates, were sent to him as a matter of course.

Oswald also attempted to initiate other dealings with the Communist Party, U.S.A., but the organization was not especially responsive. From New Orleans, he informed the party of his activities in connection with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee discussed below, submitting membership cards in his fictitious chapter to several party officials. In a letter from Arnold S. Johnson, director of the information and lecture bureau of the party, Oswald was informed that although the Communist Party had no "organizational ties" with the committee, the party issued much literature which was "important for anybody who is concerned about developments in Cuba." In September 1963 Oswald inquired how he might contact the party when he relocated in the Baltimore-Washington area, as he said he planned to do in October, and Johnson suggested in a letter of September 19 that he "get in touch with us here [New York] and we will find some way of getting in touch with you in that city [Baltimore]." However, Oswald had also written asking whether, "handicapped as it were, by ... [his] past record," he could "still ... compete with anti progressive forces, above ground or whether in your opinion ... [he] should always remain in the background, i.e., underground, "and in the September 19 letter received the reply that "often it is advisable for some people to remain in the background, not underground."

In a letter postmarked November 1, Oswald informed the party that he had moved to Dallas, and reported his attendance at a meeting at which General Walker had spoken, and at a meeting of the American Civil Liberties Union; he asked Johnson for the party's "general view" of the latter organization and "to what degree, if any, [he] should attempt to heighten its progressive tendencies." According to Johnson, this letter was not received by the Communist Party until after the assassination. At different times, Oswald also wrote the Worker and the Hall-Davis Defense Committee, enclosing samples of his photographic work and offering to assist in preparing posters; he was told that "his kind offer [was] most welcomed and from time to time we shall call on you," but he was never asked for assistance. The correspondence between Oswald and the Communist Party, and with all other organizations, is printed in the record accompanying this report.

When Oswald applied for a visa to enter Cuba during his trip to Mexico City, discussed below, Senora Silvia Duran, the Cuban consular employee who dealt with Oswald, wrote on the application that Oswald said he was a member of the Communist Party and that he had "displayed documents in proof of his membership." When Oswald went to Mexico, he is believed to have carried his letters from the Soviet Embassy in Washington and from the Communist Party in the United States, his 1959 passport, which contained stamps showing that he had lived in Russia for years, his Russian work permit, his Russian marriage certificate, membership cards and newspaper clippings purporting to show his role in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, and a prepared statement, of his qualifications as a "Marxist." Because of the mass of papers Oswald did present showing his affinity for communism, some in the Russian language, which was foreign to Senora Duran, and because further investigation, discussed below, indicated that Oswald was not a member of the party, Senora Duran's notation was probably inaccurate.

Upon his arrest after the assassination, Oswald attempted to contact John J. Abt, a New York attorney, to request Abt to represent him. Abt was not in New York at the time, and he was never reached in connection with representing' Oswald. Abt has testified that he at no time had any dealings with Oswald and that prior to the assassination he had never heard of Lee Harvey Oswald.

After his return from the Soviet Union, Oswald also carried on a limited correspondence with the Socialist Workers Party. In October of 1962 he attempted to join the party, but his application was not accepted since there was then no chapter in the Dallas area. Oswald also wrote the Socialist Workers Party offering his assistance in preparing posters. From this organization too he received the response that he might be called upon if needed. He was asked for further information about his photographic skills, which he does not appear to have ever provided. Oswald did obtain literature from the Socialist Workers Party, however, and in December 1962 he entered a subscription to the affiliated publication, the Militant. Apparently in March of 1963 Oswald wrote the party of his activities and submitted a clipping with his letter. In response, he was told that his name was being sent to the Young Socialist Alliance for further correspondence, but the files of the alliance apparently contain no reference to Oswald. Neither the letter nor the clipping which Oswald sent has been located.

Investigation by the Commission has produced no plausible evidence that Lee Harvey Oswald had any other significant contacts with the Communist Party, U.S.A., the Socialist Workers Party, or with any other extreme leftist political organization. The FBI and other Federal security agencies have made a study of their records and files and contacted numerous confidential informants of the agencies and have produced no such evidence. The Commission has questioned persons who, as a group, knew Oswald during virtually every phase of his adult life, and from none of these came any indication that Oswald maintained a surreptitious relationship with any organization. Arnold S. Johnson, of the American Communist Party; James T. Tormey, executive secretary of the Hall-Davis Defense Committee; and Farrell Dobbs, secretary of the Socialist Workers Party, voluntarily appeared before the Commission and testified under oath that Oswald was not a member of these organizations and that a thorough search of their files had disclosed no records relating to Oswald other than those which they produced for the Commission. The material that has been disclosed is in all eases consistent with other data in the possession of the Commission.

Socialist Labor Party. Oswald also wrote to the Socialist Labor Party in New York in November 1962 requesting literature. Horace Twiford, a national committeeman at large for the party in the State of Texas, was informed by the New York headquarters in July of Oswald's request, and on September 11, 1963, he did mail literature to Oswald at his old post office box in Dallas. On his way to Mexico City in September 1963, Oswald attempted to contact Twiford at his home in Houston; Oswald spoke briefly with Twiford's wife, identifying himself as a member of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, but since Twiford was out of town at the time, Oswald was unable to speak with him. Arnold Peterson, national secretary and treasurer of the Socialist Labor Party, has stated that a search of the records of the national headquarters reveals no record pertaining to Oswald; he explained that letters requesting literature are routinely destroyed. The Socialist Party-Social Democratic Federation has also advised that a review of its records fails to reflect any information or correspondence pertaining to Oswald.

Fair Play for Cuba Committee. During the period Oswald was in New Orleans, from the end of April to late September 1963, he was engaged in activity purportedly on behalf of the now defunct Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC), an organization centered in New York which was highly critical of U.S. policy toward the Cuban Government under Fidel Castro. In May 1963, after having obtained literature from the FPCC, Oswald applied for and was granted membership in the organization. When applying for membership, Oswald wrote national headquarters that he had

...been thinking about renting a small office at my own expense for the purpose of forming a FPCC. branch here in New Orleans.
Could you give me a charter?

With his membership card, Oswald apparently received a copy of the constitution and bylaws for FPCC chapters, and a letter, dated May 29, which read in part as follows (with spelling as in original):

It would be hard to conceive of a chapter with as few members as seem to exist in the New Orleans area. I have just gone through our files and find that Louisiana seems somewhat restricted for Fair Play activities. However, with what is there perhaps you could build a larger group if a few people would undertake the disciplined responsibility of concrete organizational work.
We certainly are not at all adverse to a very small Chapter but certainly would expect that there would be at least twice the amount needed to conduct a legal executive board for the Chapter. Should this be reasonable we could readily issue a charter for a New Orleans Chapter of FPCC. In fact, we would be very, very pleased to see this take place and would like to do everything possible to assist in bringing it about.

You must realize that you will come under tremendous pressures with any attempt to do FPCC work in that area and that you will not be able to operate in the manner which is conventional here in the north-east. Even most of our big city Chapters have been forced to Abandon the idea of operating an office in public... Most Chapters have discovered that it is easier to operate semi-privately out of a home and maintain a P.O. Box for all mailings and public notices. (A P.O. Box is a must for any Chapter in the organization to guarantee the continued contact with the national even if an individual should move or drop out.) We do have a serious and often violent opposition and this procedure helps prevent many unnecessary incidents which frighten away prospective supporters. I definitely would not recommend an office, at ]east not one that will be easily identifiable to the lunatic fringe in your community. Certainly, I would not recommend that you engage in one at the very beginning but wait and see how you can operate in the community through several public experiences.

Thereafter Oswald informed national headquarters that he had opened post office box No. 30061, and that against its advice he had decided "to take an office from the very beginning"; he also submitted copies of a membership application form and a circular headed "Hands Off Cuba!" which he had had printed, and informed the headquarters that he intended to have membership cards for his chapter printed, which he subsequently did. He wrote three further letters to the New York office to inform it of his continued activities. In one he reported that he had been evicted from the office he claimed to have opened, so that he "worked out of a post office box and by using street demonstrations and some circular work ... sustained a great deal of interest but no new members."

Oswald did distribute the handbills he had printed on at least three occasions. Once, while doing so, he was arrested and fined for being involved in a disturbance with anti-Castro Cuban refugees, one of whom he had previously met by presenting himself as hostile to Premier Castro in an apparent effort to gain information about anti-Castro organizations operating in New Orleans. When arrested, he informed the police that His chapter had 35 members. His activities received some attention in the New Orleans press, and he twice appeared on a local radio program representing himself as a spokesman for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. After his return to Dallas, he listed the FPCC as an organization authorized to receive mail at his post office box.

Despite these activities, the FPCC chapter which Oswald purportedly formed in New Orleans was entirely fictitious. Vincent T. Lee, formerly national director of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, has testified that the New York office did not authorize the creation of a New Orleans chapter, nor did it provide Oswald with funds to support his activities there. The national office did not write Oswald again after its letter of May 29. As discussed more fully in chapter VII, Oswald's later letters to the national office purporting to inform it of his progress in New Orleans contained numerous exaggerations about the scope of his activities and the public reaction to them. There is no evidence that Oswald ever opened an office as he claimed to have done. Although a pamphlet taken from him at the time of his arrest in New Orleans contains the rubber stamp imprint "FPCC, 544 CAMP ST., NEW ORLEANS, LA.," investigation has indicated that neither the Fair Play for Cuba Committee nor Lee Harvey Oswald ever maintained an office at that address. The handbills and other materials bearing the name of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee were printed commercially by Oswald without the approval of the national headquarters. Oswald's membership card in the "New Orleans chapter" of the committee carried the signature of "A. J. Hidell," purportedly the president of the chapter, but there is no evidence that an "A. J. Hidell" existed and, as pointed out in chapter IV, there is conclusive evidence that the name was an alias which Oswald used on various occasions. Marina Oswald herself wrote the name "Hidell" on the membership card at her husband's insistence.

No other member of the so-called New Orleans chapter of the committee has ever been found. The only occasion on which anyone other than Oswald was observed taking part in these activities was on August 9, 1963, when Oswald and two young men passed out leaflets urging "Hands Off Cuba!" on the streets of New Orleans. One of the two men, who was 16 years old at the time, has testified that Oswald approached him at the Louisiana State Employment Commission and offered him $2 for about an hour's work. He accepted the offer but later, when he noticed that television cameras were being focused on him, he obtained his money and left. He testified that he had never seen Oswald before and never saw him again. The second individual has never been located; but according to the testimony of the youth who was found, he too seemed to be someone not previously connected with Oswald. Finally, the FBI has advised the Commission that its information on undercover Cuban activities in the New Orleans area reveals no knowledge of Oswald before the assassination.

Right-wing groups hostile to President Kennedy. The Commission also considered the possibility that there may have been a link between Oswald and certain groups which had bitterly denounced President Kennedy and his policies prior to the time of the President's trip to Dallas. As discussed in chapter II, two provocative incidents took place concurrently with President Kennedy's visit and a third but a month prior thereto. The incidents were (1) the demonstration against the Honorable Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, in late October 1963, when he came to Dallas on United Nations Day; (2) the publication in the Dallas Morning News on November 22 of the full page, black-bordered paid advertisement entitled, "Welcome Mr. Kennedy"; and (3) the distribution of a throwaway handbill entitled "Wanted for Treason" throughout Dallas on November 20 and 21. Oswald was aware of the Stevenson incident; there is no evidence that he became aware of either the "Welcome Mr. Kennedy" advertisement or the "Wanted for Treason" handbill, though neither possibility can be precluded.

The only evidence of interest on Oswald's part in rightist groups in Dallas was his alleged attendance at a rally at the Dallas Auditorium the evening preceding Ambassador Stevenson's address on United Nations Day, October 24, 1963. On the evening of October 25, 1968, at the invitation of Michael Paine, Oswald attended a monthly meeting of the Dallas chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union in which he was later to seek membership. During the course of the discussion at this meeting, a speaker mentioned Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker (Resigned, U.S. Army). Oswald arose in the midst of the meeting to remark that a "night or two nights before" he had attended a meeting at which General Walker had spoken in terms that led Oswald to assert that General Walker was both anti-Catholic and anti-Semitic. General Walker testified that he had been the speaker at a rally the night before Ambassador Stevenson's appearance, but that he did not know and had never heard of Oswald prior to the announcement of his name on radio and television on the afternoon of November 22. Oswald confirmed his attendance at the U.S. Day rally in an undated letter he wrote to Arnold Johnson, director of the information and lecture bureau of the Communist Party, mailed November 1, 1963, in which he reported:

On October 23rd, I had attended a ultra-right meeting headed by General Edwin a. Walker, who lives in Dallas.
This meeting preceded by one day the attack on a. e. Stevenson at the United Nations Day meeting at which he spoke.
As you can see, political friction between 'left' and 'right' is very great here.

In the light of Oswald's attack upon General Walker on the evening of April 10, 1963, discussed in chapter IV, as well as Oswald's known political views, his