Washington, D. C.

The select committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:15 a.m., in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman of the select committee), presiding.
Present: Representatives Stokes, Devine, Preyer, Fauntroy, Thone, Sawyer, Dodd, Ford, Fithian, and Edgar.
Staff present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director; Gary Cornwell, deputy chief counsel; Michael Goldsmith, senior staff counsel; and Elizabeth L. Berning, chief clerk.
Chairman STOKES. A quorum being present, the committee will come to order.
The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.


Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Cuba was an important concern of John F. Kennedy during his brief administration. It prompted the occasion of his "darkest hour"--the aborted Bay of Pigs invasion. In the missile crisis, it also brought the United States--and the world--to the brink of a nuclear holocaust. Understandably, therefore, among the many efforts to understand the assassination, those that include a Cuban element have been very prominent. Indeed, no less a figure than President Lyndon B. Johnson expressed his private view that John F. Kennedy might well have been the victim of the Cuban plot.
The Warren Commission explored the Cuban element in the assassination of the President from two perspectives.
First, it considered the extent to which Oswald "might have been motivated in the assassination by a desire to aid the Castro regime, which President Kennedy so outspokenly criticized."
In the months preceding the assassination, left-wing literature to which Oswald subscribed--chiefly "The Militant" and "The Worker"--reflected an extremely critical attitude toward the Kennedy administration's policy toward Cuba. Indeed, much of what appeared in these papers seemingly called for violent solutions to Cuban problems with the United States.
The possibility that Oswald may have been influenced by this literature seems real. Apparently in all seriousness, he told Michael Paine, the individual in whose home Marina was then living, that "You could tell what they wanted you to do * * * by reading between the lines." Ultimately, however, the Warren Commission decided that it could not ascribe to Oswald any one motive or a group of motives.
Second, the Commission considered the extent to which Oswald's trip to Mexico in late September and early October 1963--a trip during which Oswald visited the Soviet Embassy and the Cuban consulate in Mexico City--may somehow have been related to the assassination. Based largely on the testimony of Sylvia Tirado de Duran, a Mexican national employed at the Cuban consulate, the Commission concluded the following about the visit.
Oswald first visited the Cuban consulate on September 27, 1963. He requested an in-transit visa to permit him to visit Cuba en route to the Soviet Union.
He was informed he could not obtain a visa to Cuba unless he first got one to enter the Soviet Union, and he was told at the Soviet Embassy he should not expect an answer to his visa application for about 4 months.
He carried with him newspaper clippings and other documents, some authentic and some forged, in an attempt to demonstrate he was a "friend of Cuba."
He used these documents, his previous residence in the Soviet Union, and his marriage to a Soviet national to curry favor at the Cuban consulate.
He persisted in his demand for a Cuban visa, resulting in a bitter argument between him and the Cuban Consul, Eusebio Azcue Lopez. Eventually, his request was denied, and he left, apparently in anger.
Ultimately, the Warren Commission expressed its satisfaction with the Duran account, noting that it had-- Reliable evidence from a confidential source that Senora Duran, as well as other personnel at the Cuban Embassy, were genuinely upset upon receiving the news of President Kennedy's death.
It also indicated that- * * * confidential sources of extremely high reliability * * * establishes that her testimony was truthful and accurate in all material respects.
The Commission also checked out a number of specific conspiracy allegations stemming from Oswald's trip to Mexico City, most of which alleged that he had been enlisted by Cuban agents in a plot to carry out the assassination. Nevertheless, the Commission concluded:
Without exception, the rumors and allegations of a conspiratorial contact were shown to be without any factual basis, * * *
History has not permitted so simple a resolution of the complex questions surrounding the assassination, Cuba, and Oswald's trip to Mexico City. Ironically, too, it was the Premier of Cuba, not the President of the United States, who was revealed and documented in Senate Intelligence Committee hearings in 1976 as the target of deadly serious assassination schemes.
Between 1960 and early 1963, the committee concluded, the CIA conspired with known underworld figures to assassinate Premier Castro. Following the missile crisis in October 1962, the CIA-Mafia plots were brought to an end, or so we are told. But other assassination plots continued. Indeed, on November 22, 1963, a CIA case
officer was planning the killing of Castro with an official of the Cuban Government.
The revelation in 1976 that the Premier of Cuba was the target of an unsuccessful assassination planned by the United States served to fuel the fires of speculation that Cuba had been the perpetrator of the successful effort against the President of the United States in 1963. It was recalled that Premier Castro himself, in an interview with Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker on September 7, 1963, seemed to be warning that U.S. leaders who approved terrorist attacks on Cuban leaders could themselves be vulnerable.
The AP story was carried in the New Orleans Times Picayune on September 9. Consequently, it could have been read by Lee Harvey Oswald himself. But the evidence of Cuban intentions may be interpreted in various ways. The Cuban delegate to the United Nations was in contact on September 5, 1963 with William Atwood, a U.S. delegate, to begin talks with the view toward starting the process of normalizing relations. And Jean Daniel, a French journalist, was with Premier Castro on November 22. He described Castro's reaction to the news of the Kennedy assassination as one of genuine surprise and deep regret.
The critics of the Warren Commission, too, have persisted in their questioning of its conclusions, offering the theory that Oswald met with Cuban agents and various additional allegations.
The most serious is the charge that it was, in fact, not Oswald who visited the Cuban consulate, but an imposter. Critics cite as evidence a photograph published by the Commission and thought by the critics to have been taken by a surveillance camera outside the Cuban consulate. It shows a burly man who bears no resemblance to Oswald, but who was identified as the individual who visited the consulate at the time Oswald was supposed to have done so.
Mark Lane, in his "Rush to Judgment," raised the issue of the mysterious photograph and asked, "Was someone posing as Oswald?"
Another widely circulated story after the Warren report was published is that Oswald, in a burst of anger on learning at the Cuban consulate that he could not secure a visa to visit Cuba, expressed an intention to assassinate President Kennedy.
The select committee has sought to explore a number of questions in connection with Oswald's trip to Mexico City. Committee members and staff made two separate trips to both Cuba and Mexico. The cooperation of the Governments of Cuba and Mexico was sought and secured. The committee and the staff expresses its thanks to each government and those officials and citizens of each country that helped the committee in its investigation.
Comment, however, must be made on the lack of cooperation by the Soviet Government. The select committee, both informally and through personal contacts and formally through the State Department, sought the cooperation of the Soviet Government, not only on Oswald's alleged trip to Mexico City where he is supposed to have visited the Soviet Embassy, but also in the period of time Oswald lived in the Soviet Union. Various documents and files not made available to the Warren Commission but which the committee had a reasonable basis to believe existed were requested. The most important were the KGB surveillance files on Oswald. It was hoped that these files particularly might have been assistance to the committee in the crucial area of trying to ascertain Oswald's motive in the assassination. Ironically the KGB may well have the most complete file in the world on this crucial aspect of Oswald's personality.
In addition, a request was made to interview officials and Soviet citizens who had contact with Oswald. The Soviet Government denied any relationship with Oswald or complicity in President Kennedy's death but declined to be of assistance, saying that it would be inappropriate for a great power to put itself in the position of having to defend itself against possible suspicion of complicity in the death of the leader of another country.
The committee posed to itself in its investigation in this area, that is, Oswald's trip to Mexico, as the following:
Was the man who visited the Cuban consulate in fact the man later accused of assassinating President Kennedy?
When did the man alleged to be Oswald visit the Cuban consulate?
What transpired at each visit?
Who were the Cuban officials who dealt with him?
Did he in fact express an intent to assassinate the President?
Did the man alleged to be Oswald have any companions in Mexico City?
The first witness who had been scheduled to be heard on Oswald's alleged trip to Mexico City was Sylvia Tirado Bazan, previously Sylvia Tirado Duran.
Ms. Tirado was employed in September 1963 as secretary to the Cuban consul in Mexico City.
Ms. Tirado was born November 22, 1937, in Mexico City. She is presently employed by the Mexican Social Security Office.
Mr. Chairman, I understand that it has not been possible to secure the appearance of Senora Tirado. I understand, however, with your permission, Mr. Cornwell has a short presentation on her testimony.
Chairman STOKES. The Chair will recognize Counsel Gary Cornwell.
Mr. CORNWELL. I might state, Mr. Chairman, that through the assistance of the Mexican Government, three members of the staff did interview Sylvia Tirado, whose present name is Sylvia Tirado Bazan, on June 6, 1978.
The Mexican Government thereafter agreed that she could come to the United States and testify at these hearings today. Mrs. Tirado Bazan also agreed to come. However, an unexpected business engagement of hers prevented her appearance here today.
There is a photo which was made of her at the time of the interview, which is being displayed on the easel and marked JFK exhibit F-433, and we also have a transcript of the interview marked for identification as JFK exhibit F-440A, and a tape recording of excerpted portions of that interview which we have marked for identification as JFK exhibit F-439.
Although the tape recording was not made for the purpose of playing it at these hearings--it was simply at the time intended as a record of her statements--the staff has learned over the course of the investigation that it is often possible to gain a better understanding of a witness' testimony if you can hear or speak to the witness. Thus, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that at this time each of those exhibits be admitted into evidence, and that we play for the committee selected portions of her statement.
Chairman STOKES. Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this point, and you may proceed to play the recording.
[The tape recording mentioned above, JFK exhibit F-439, is being retained in committee files.]

[The information follows:]

JFK Exhibit F-440A

Mr. CORNWELL. Also there is a diagram which is made reference to in the transcript. We might mark that separately as F-440B, and with your permission, also enter that in the record, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered into the record.
[The information follows:]


Mr. CORNWELL. The early portion of the transcript simply established her present name, that her name in 1963 was Sylvia Tirado Duran, the fact that the tape recording of the interview began at 5:45 in the afternoon, and that her birthday is November 22, 1937.
We might ask that those who have transcripts--there were copies provided both for the press and the public and to the committee, if you would turn to page 5, we will begin the tape recording at the top of page 5 of the transcript.

[Tape recording was played.]

Mr. CORNWELL. At that point, Mrs. Tirado did make a sketch of the consulate which is now part of the record. We would ask, however, that we now move to page 19 of the transcript and continue her testimony at that point, near the bottom of page 19. [Tape recording was played.]
Mr. CORNWELL. At this point, Mr. Chairman, we would ask that we turn to page 25 of the transcript, beginning near the bottom. [Tape recording was played.]
Mr. CORNWELL. We next ask, Mr. Chairman, that we turn to page 45, or 40, excuse me, near the top of the page. [Tape recording was played.]
Mr. CORNWELL. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that we
turn to page 47, near the top portion of the page. [Tape recording was played.]
Mr. CORNWELL. I next ask, Mr. Chairman, that we turn to page 54, toward the middle or slight upper portion of the page. [The playing of the recording was resumed.]
Mr. CORNWELL. And the final portion of the tape recording, Mr. Chairman, begins on the following page, which is labeled page 1 of tape 2.
[The playing of the recording was resumed.]
Mr. CORNWELL. Mr. Chairman, we also, while we were in Mexico, spoke to Mr. Horacio Duran. That is the man who is displayed in the blue coat, in JFK exhibit F-432, and who was Sylvia Duran's husband in 1953. We also spoke to Ruben Duran, who is Horacio's brother, and who is displayed in the white shirt in JFK exhibit F-431. And to Betty Serratos, the lady on the left in the array of JFK exhibits, numbered F-430, and who was the wife of Ruben.
Each of those individuals was, of course, around Sylvia, spoke to her during the traumatic events after the assassination of the President. And each of them provided information to us of substantially the same nature in all significant respects as that which you have just heard in the tape recording of Sylvia Duran.
We would ask at this time that those three exhibits be placed into evidence.
Chairman STOKES. Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this point.

[The information follows:]

Mr. FAUNTROY. Would the gentleman yield, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from the District of Columbia.
Mr. FAUNTROY. I take it that their statements are also a part of the record, a part of our files.
Mr. CORNWELL. They are part of the files of the committee, that is correct.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Thank you.
Chairman STOKES. Is counsel finished?
Mr. CORNWELL. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, the next witness to be called is Eusebio Azcue Lopez. Mr. Azcue was the Cuban consul in Mexico City in September 1963 who informed the individual who visited the consulate and gave his name as Lee Harvey Oswald that he would not be issued a visa to Cuba. Senor Azcue is presently living in retirement in Cuba. It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Senor Azcue.
Chairman STOKES. Prior to calling the witness, the Chair will once again advise that this particular witness, due to security reasons, we are requesting that all persons remain in their seats any time the witness comes into the hearing room or at any time that the witness is leaving the hearing room. We ask that all persons please cooperate with those arrangements with the committee.


Mr. STANDARD. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I have one other request, if I may.
Chairman STOKES. You may proceed.
Mr. STANDARD. Congressman Thone addressed himself to what in fact happened to the discussion which Senior Azcue had, and I would refer him to what I believe is part of the interviews of your committee and your staff with Mr. Otero, which is not yet part of this record as far as I know; and second to the transcription of the 4-hour interview with President Castro, which I understand will be made part of this record by reference when the witnesses have completed their testimony.
Chairman STOKES. That is correct. The full transcript of the statement with President Castro will be made and incorporated into the entire record.
Mr. STANDARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. Thank you, counsel. At this time, Mr. Azcue, you are excused. All persons are requested to remain in their seats while the witness leaves the room.
Mr. STANDARD. Mr. Chairman, the witness would like to remain
in the room; if I could provide a chair for him, I would.
Chairman STOKES. Professor Blakey.
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, in light of the questions raised as to the identity of the man who visited the Cuban consulate, that is whether or not he was Lee Harvey Oswald, the committee decided to test by handwriting analysis the authenticity of the signature on the visa application. The committee was advised by the Cuban Government that the visa applications had to be typed in duplicate and that the applicant had to sign both copies.
In 1964, one of the forms allegedly signed by Mr. Oswald was turned over to the Warren Commission. In 1978 the committee obtained the second copy, which has been incorporated in the record, in Havana.
Consequently, there are two checks to be made in a handwriting analysis of this question, one, to determine that both visa application forms were signed by the same person, and two, to determine if possible whether the signatures were in fact or are in fact identical with the other writings attributable to Lee Harvey Oswald.
For the purposes of verification, the committee asked its handwriting experts to compare the signatures on the two forms which are part of the record with two other writings. Those other writings were the signature on Oswald's fingerprint card at the time of his arrest in New Orleans in August 1963, and his passport application dated June 24, 1963.
Mr. Chairman, the committee's panel of handwriting experts have in fact made that analysis, and a representative of it will be with the committee on Monday to report in full on those findings.
In essence, however, it is that Lee Harvey Oswald signed both of the visa applications.
That representative of the handwriting panel will be Mr. Joseph P. McNally. The committee will recall that Mr. McNally has already testified before the committee and will be available again on Monday to be fully cross-examined on this and several other issues that have arisen in the handwriting area.
At this time, Mr. Chairman, it would be appropriate to note that another member of the Cuban consulate staff who was present when Oswald allegedly applied for a visa was Senor Alfredo Mirabal Diaz. Senor Mirabal succeeded Senor Azcue as Cuban consul in Mexico City. Senor Mirabal was born August 11, 1923.
It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Senor Mirabal.
Chairman STOKES. Will the witness please stand. Raise your right hand and be sworn.
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God.
[The testimony of Senor Mirabal was given through the interpreter.]
Senor MIRABAL. I do.
Chairman STOKES. Thank you. You may be seated.


Mr. STANDARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. Because of the lateness of the hour, it will be the plan of the committee to make the presentation tomorrow morning of the interview with President Fidel Castro in Cuba. For that reason I would like to make some other remarks at this time.
This committee made two trips to Cuba, one on March 30, which extended from the 30th of March to the 4th of April. The second trip was from August 24 to August 29. Prior to going to Cuba on both occasions, it required a great deal of preparation and a great deal of contact between this committee and the Cuban Interest Section in the Cuban Government.
I want to acknowledge the presence here today at the witness table of one of the gentlemen who was extremely helpful and cooperative to this committee in terms of both of those trips, Senor Ricardo Escartin, who is the Consul and the First Secretary of the Cuban Interest Section. It was necessary for Mr. Escartin and other members of the Cuban Interest Section to meet with me on many occasions and also with Professor Blakey and members of this staff. We spent a great deal of time and received a great deal of cooperation from him on every occasion.
Also, in Cuba, Senor Senen Buergo, the American Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was extremely helpful and cooperative with this committee.
I also want to acknowledge the presence here at the witness table today of another gentleman who was extremely cooperative with us, and that was Senor Felipe Villa, Captain of the Ministry of the Interior, and during the course of both of our trips he extended a great deal of cooperation and help and assistance to this committee.
I would like also to mention two very talented and able Cuban translators who were extremely helpful to us, Ms. Juanita Vera Nellie and Ruiz de Sarade.
Others who gave cooperation and hospitality to this committee were Dr. Mondo Torres Santrail, the Minister of Justice; Oscar Fernandez Mel, the mayor of Havana; Jose Raimond Fernandez, Minister of Education, all of whom were extremely helpful and hospitable to us on our stay in Cuba.
In addition, we want to express our deep appreciation to President Fidel Castro. On the first trip we made to Cuba, President Castro spent in excess of 4 hours being interviewed by the chairman of this committee and other members of the committee and staff. The entire transcript will be put into the record at some point tomorrow.
During that period of time, the President made it very clear that it was the purpose of the Cuban Government to make it very clear that their government had nothing to do whatsoever with this very tragic occurrence in this country. It was the intent of their government to do everything possible to cooperate and see that the Cuban Government did everything in its power to clear up whatever it could around a tragedy of this type.
So we are indeed grateful for the kind of cooperation that this congressional committee has received, and we want to thank each of you gentlemen for the assistance you have given us in this very important matter.
If there is nothing further at this time, I might also say that we are once again indebted to the U.S. Marshall Service for the security arrangements here around the distinguished witnesses who have appeared here today.
We also would like to thank the interpreter from the State Department, Mr. Hervas, for a very efficient job he has done here today. At this time the chair will request that everyone remain seated until our witnesses have departed from the hearing room. Thereafter, we will adjourn these hearings until 9 a.m. tomorrow morning. Thank you, gentlemen. You are excused.
[Whereupon, at 4:22 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 9 a.m., Tuesday, September 19, 1978.]

Washington, D.C.

The select committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:15 a.m., in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman of the select committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Stokes, Devine, Preyer, McKinney, Sawyer, Dodd, Ford, Fithian, and Edgar.
Staff present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director; Leodis Matthews, staff counsel; and Elizabeth L. Berning, chief clerk.

Chairman STOKES. A quorum being present, the committee will come to order.
The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.


Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In late March and early April of this year, three members of the select committee--yourself, Congressman Preyer, and Congressman DODD--as well as three staff members, traveled to Cuba. It was the first of two trips in which the committee sought firsthand information about Lee Harvey Oswald's alleged visit to the Cuban consulate in Mexico City, as well as other evidence about the Kennedy assassination. During the trip to Havana the committee representatives were given an opportunity to interview President Castro himself.
In a 4-hour session, which was tape recorded, President Castro denied that he or any official of his government had anything to do with the death of President Kennedy or with Lee Harvey Oswald other than the visit to the Cuban consulate in September of 1963.
The committee asked President Castro a series of questions. First, the committee asked him to recount whatever details he had learned and could recall regarding Oswald's two visits to the Cuban consulate in Mexico City in September 1963.
Mr. Chairman, I ask that JFK F-429A, a photo taken during the interview of President Castro, be displayed and entered into the record at this point.
Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this place and displayed. [The information follows:]


Mr. BLAKEY. In addition, may a tape of that interview, JFK F-429B, and a transcript, JFK F-429C, also be included in the record at this point?
Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this point.
[Tape referred to above is retained in committee files.] [The information follows:]



September 18, 1978
Ninety-Fifth Congress

G. ROBERT BLAKEY, Chief Counsel and Director, GARY CORNWELL, Deputy Chief counsel Kennedy Task Force, EDWIN JUAN LOPEZ SOTO, Researcher

Table of Contents

This Staff Report contains an interview held with Fidel Castro on April 3, 1978. It is President Castro's story as told by President Castro, about major areas of the Committee's concern.
President Castro's words have been transcribed from the contemporaneous translations of Juanita Vera and Nellie Ruiz de Zarade. Their translations have been used so as to provide as accurate a transcription as possible. It is based solely on statements made by President Castro; it does not rely upon or cite other source material, or evidence the Committee has uncovered. It is based on an interview conducted by the Committee and staff with President Castro in Havana, Cuba. This interview, released today in its entirety, will also be published as an appendix to the Final Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations.
This staff Report should not be reas as "implying" that the Committee believes or disbelieves the statements made. The Committee is currently analyzing and investigating all aspects of the subjects raised in this interview that are related to this investigation. The Final Report will contain a complete analysis of the subjects discussed during the interview related to the investigation. The Final Report will also incorporate all the material that the Select Committee has acquired as a result of its investigation.


Lee Harvey Oswald's Visits to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City
Mr. BLAKEY. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like now to play the recording of President Castro's answer to that first question.
Chairman STOKES. You may proceed. [Tape recording played.]

Interview of Fidel CASTRO

Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, the committee's next question was more specific. It dealt with an account published in 1967 in the National Enquirer claiming that Oswald while at the consulate had voiced an intention to assassinate President Kennedy.
Mr. Chairman, I note that JFK F-428 has already been displayed and ask that it be entered into the record. It is a reproduction of that National Enquirer article.
Chairman STOKES. Without objection, so ordered. [JFK exhibit F-428 follows:]


Mr. BLAKEY. It is probably also appropriate to note that that article has had wide circulation. For example, Daniel Schorr repeats it in his book, "Clearing the Air."
President Castro, according to the story in the National Enquirer, had admitted to being told of the threat, though he had taken no action in response to it. The tape of this portion of President Castro's remarks is not suitable for playing in a public room. Consequently, I will read his response.
President Castro said:
This is absurd. I didn't say that * * * It has been invented from the beginning until the end. I didn't say that. How could I say that? It's a lie from (head to toe). If this man would have done something like that, it woould have been our moral duty to inform the United States. You understand? Because if a man comes here, mentions that he wants to kill Kennedy, we are (being provoked), do you realize that? It would have been similar to a mad person. If somebody comes to us and said that, it would have been our moral responsibility to inform the United States. How could we accept a man from Mexico to Cuba who tells us that he is going to kill President Kennedy? If somebody is trying to create provocation or a trap, and uh * * * we would have denounced him * * * Sure, a person coming here or even in one of our Embassies saying that * * * And that never happened. No part, as far as I know . * * But how could they interview me in a pizzeria. I never go to public restaurants and that man invented that. That was invented.
I do not remember that. And, uh, it is a surprise for me to see because I couldn't have said that. You have to see who wrote it. And, what is the job of that journalist? What is he engaged in? And, what prestige has this journalist? * * * You should have to find who he is and why he wrote it, and with whom he is related * * * and which sense they have to attribute those words which are absolutely invented. I think it is possible that you would be able to find out who that journalist was. Do you have some news about that journalist in that newspaper?
Let me tell you. Of every 100 interviews that are requested of me I only grant one because if I were to give all the interviews that I am requested to, you can be sure that I would not be able to have anything but 24 hours of my life to have interviews. I would not have enough time to do anything else. Barbara Walters waited 3 years for an interview * * * just almost 3 years. And even that of Moyers * * * l didn't want to have that Moyer interview. He started talking and the truth is that he was very insistent from the time he came down from the airplane and in spite of the fact that there was no commitment from me regarding the interview. There are a lot of interview requests and it is very difficult, but I would never have given a journalist an interview in a pizzeria.
Mr. Chairman, the author--
Chairman STOKES. Would you suspend for just one moment?
Mr. BLAKEY. Certainly.
Chairman STOKES. I think I misunderstood you. There was some reason you explained for reading that.
Mr. BLAKEY. Yes; the tape unfortunately, as has been my experience, Mr. Chairman, and I am sure yourself in trials, that any effort, when you have a mechanical device inevitably they fail at least once out of three, and while we made an effort to enhance the quality of that portion of the tape, in which President Castro responded to this particular question, we played it and it just simply was not suitable for playing in a public auditorium. It was not audible. Consequently, it was thought best to read it rather than to play the tape.
Chairman STOKES. Thank you.
Mr. BLAKEY. We really did the best we could.
Mr. Chairman, the author of the National Enquirer story was a British freelance journalist named Comer Clark. He died in 1972.
Nevertheless, the committee, while conducting other investigations in England, made an effort to explore Mr. Clark's background and reputation for veracity. Frankly, it was not good. Apparently, he wrote extensively for the sensationalist press in England. His articles include such items as "British Girls as Nazi Sex Slaves," "I Was Hitler's Secret Love," and "German Plans To Kidnap the Royal Family."
On the other hand, even though there may be considerable doubt as to the fact of Clark's interview with President Castro, the committee has been informed that the substance of the Clark article is supported by highly confidential but reliable sources available to the U.S. Government.
Apart from the reliability of the source, whether or not this source may have provided reliable information in this instance is of course an issue that the committee will have to consider in December. In this connection the Cuban Government has suggested to the committee that the circulation of this story represents a disinformation effort by the Central Intelligence Agency designed to discredit Cuba and to implicate her in the assassination.
Mr. Chairman, President Castro also discussed the general subject of assassination as a means for achieving political change. His thoughts on it are pertinent to the investigation. It would be appropriate, then, to play his response to that question, which fortunately is clear enough to play in a public proceeding.
Chairman STOKES. OK. [Tape recording played.]
Mr. BLAKEY. Finally, Mr. Chairman, President Castro commented on the specific so-called threat reported in the New Orleans Times Picayune of September 9. It would be appropriate, Mr. Chairman, to play the last excerpt.
Chairman STOKES. You may proceed. [Tape recording played.]
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, I would note for the record that President Castro was of course speaking in Spanish, and the simultaneous English translation was provided by Juanita Vera.
Mr. Chairman, in August, during the committee's second trip to Cuba, the Cuban Government made available to the committee one Rolanda Cubela, who identified himself to the committee as AMLASH, on the basis of his reading of the 1976 Senate report. It would be appropriate at this point, Mr. Chairman, to enter into the record and to display JFK F-424, a photograph of Mr. Cubela. [The information follows:]

Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered into the record and displayed accordingly.
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Cubela indicated that he had been prosecuted and convicted by the Cuban Government for plotting against Premier Castro. He said that during that prosecution he did not inform the Cuban Government and the Cuban Government did not learn that his plot had the support of CIA personnel. The Cuban Government affirmed Mr. Cubela's assertion. He also indicated that he had no evidence on which he could say that any official of the U.S. Government or of the CIA higher than his case officer was aware of the assassination aspects of his plot. The Cuban Government suggested that the AMLASH plot in operation on November 22, 1963, as outlined in the Senate report, could not, therefore, have served as a provocation by the U.S. motivating Cuban retaliation against President Kennedy.
Mr. Chairman, another aspect of the committee's investigation of Oswald's trip to Mexico had to do with any associations Oswald may have had while he was there other than those at the Cuban consulate and the Soviet Embassy. The Warren Commission concluded he had Done, that he kept to himself throughout his stay. It turns out, however, that 11 days after the Commission concluded its investigation and issued its report in September 1964, a Mexican woman came forward with quite a different version of Oswald's activities in Mexico City.
Her name is Elena Garro de Paz. Though now divorced, she was at the time the wife of Octavio de Paz, the noted poet and Mexican diplomat. Elena Garro herself is an accomplished author.
Ultimately, Elena Garro's story came to the attention of American intelligence services. As far as it is known, no service initiated a full-scale followup investigation. One reason might be that Elena Garro's credibility is controversial. This committee has been told, on the one hand, that she is absolutely trustworthy, while others have claimed that the same vivid imagination that has made her a literary success has also tended to color her perception of actual events.
That being said, Elena Garro's story is interesting, as is the way it has unfolded in this investigation.
Elena Garro says that along with her daughter, Elenita, and her sister, Deba Galvan, she was invited to a party at the home of her cousin, Ruben Duran Navarro, then the brother-in-law of Sylvia Tirado Duran. She first said that the party was in early October 1963, though, after inspection of her personal calendar for that period, she adjusted the time to late September.
There were three young American men at the party, she says, the guests of Sylvia Duran, and one of the Americans was Lee Harvey Oswald. She describes one of his companions as tall and slender with long blond hair, a gaunt face, and a protruding chin. The other was tall also, with short, light brown hair.
In 1964, Elena Garro became a friend of an American foreign service officer named Charles Thomas, and, over time, she related her story to him in detail. She explained that when she had gone to the American Embassy in October 1964 and told her story, the man she talked to seemed to believe little of it.
She told Thomas that Oswald was wearing a black sweater at the party, and that he stared at the floor a lot. She said the three Americans stuck together rather than mix with the other guests. She said that Eusebio Azcue, the Cuban consul, was also at the party.
Elena Garro told Thomas that on the day of the assassination, she and her daughter went to the Cuban Embassy and shouted, "assassins."
This she claimed was before she saw a newspaper photo identifying Oswald as the suspected assassin.
After she and her daughter returned home on November 22, 1963, a man she thought was an agent of the Mexican Ministry of Government came to her house and told her and Elenita that they were in danger of being harmed by the Communists. He took them to a "sanctuary", a small hotel called the Vermont, where they remained for 8 days. It was after getting to the hotel that Elena Garro first saw a picture of Oswald and realized she had seen him at the Duran party.
This man, who must be referred to here as Mr. X, advised Elena Garro to beware of the American Embassy, that it was staffed by Communists.
Elena Garro also claimed that several months after the assassination she was visited by two Communists who warned her not to tell her story.
Shortly after the assassination, Elena Garro told Thomas, an American woman came and spent several days at her home. This woman, who must be referred to here as Ms. Y, was told the story one evening by Elena Garro's sister, Deba Galvan, who had been drinking. Ms. Y urged the two women to tell their story to American authorities in Texas, not in Mexico. Failing that, Ms. Y offered to arrange a meeting with a high-ranking American official in Mexico. It never transpired, because Elena Garro and Ms. Y had a falling out.
Ms. Y did, however, send the first report on Elena Garro and her story to American authorities in 1964.
Charles Thomas, the American service officer, was concerned about the Elena Garro story and reported her account in memoranda that were circulated in the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. Nevertheless, when the reports reached Washington, neither the CIA nor the FBI showed any interest. No investigation was ordered, even though, on October 10, 1966, it was learned an Elena Garro had indeed been registered at the Hotel Vermont over the period she claimed she was there in 1963.
Charles Thomas returned to Washington in 1967 when his tour of duty in Mexico ended and he was "selected out" of the foreign service in 1969 for failure to be promoted. In 1971, having had some 2,000 job applications rejected, he committed suicide. In 1974 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, having determined that his dismissal was a mistake, had through an act of Congress Mr. Thomas posthumously reinstated.
Mr. Chairman, the committee on Friday of last week received permission from the State Department to make public a group of previously classified documents dealing with Mr. Thomas and Elena Garro de Paz' story. While they have been declassified, there are certain privacy aspects of them that would make it inappropriate to include it in this record now.
Nevertheless, I would ask that they be marked as JFK F-403 and inserted in this record at this point after they have been duly edited.
Chairman STOKES. Without objection it may be done. [The information follows:]
Mr. BLAKEY. The committee has also tried to locate Mr. X and Ms. Y to no avail.
The committee also sought to interview another individual who was employed in the Cuban Embassy in 1963. Although the interview had been prearranged, he left Mexico City suddenly the day committee investigators arrived, and returned the day they were scheduled to depart.
The investigators, having decided to stay an extra day, contacted the former employee by phone, but he refused to speak with them. The committee has learned that Mexican authorities had been requested not to allow the committee investigators to interview the employee.
Members of the Duran family were questioned about Elena Garro's allegations. They denied that they socialized with the people she said were at their party, although Sylvia Duran did recall that Elena herself may have been at one or two parties at her home in the fall of 1963. Sylvia Duran denied that Oswald had been there.
Another Mexican has claimed to have been in contact with Oswald in Mexico City. Oscar Contreras Lartique told an American foreign service officer (not Charles Thomas) in 1967 that as a student at the University of Mexico in 1963 he had met Oswald as he was leaving a roundtable discussion at the School of Philosophy.
Contreras, who described Oswald as "strange and introverted," said he spent the rest of the day, that night and part of the following day with Oswald and some other students. He said Oswald told them he had come to the university looking for Castro students who might help persuade the Cuban Embassy to grant him a visa. Oswald told them, Contreras said, that he was from California and was a member of a pro Castro organization in New Orleans.
Contreras was later reinterviewed by American authorities. He refused to identify other students who had met Oswald, because he said they were still active revolutionaries. Contreras stated that originally Oswald was suspected of being an American intelligence agent, that he never mentioned President Kennedy or assassination, and that he repeatedly expressed a wish to get to Cuba promptly.
Mexican authorities have reported to the committee that there was indeed an Oscar Contreras Lartique registered at the University of Mexico in 1960, but not in 1963. They also reported that Oscar Contreras had once signed a manifesto written by a pro-Castro student group, but that the group ceased to function in 1962.
Nevertheless, the committee placed some significance in Contreras' story because it has been learned that a professor from the University of Mexico held philosophy seminars at the Duran home. The philosophy professor, a close friend of the Durans, was a well known Marxist at the university.
The committee tried to arrange an interview with Contreras through Mexican officials, but when its investigators arrived, Contreras disappeared.
In summation, Mr. Chairman, I must frankly state that the committee has, with the exception of certain witnesses made available by the Cuban and Mexican Governments, largely been frustrated in its attempts to investigate the nature of Lee Harvey Oswald's activities and possible associates in Mexico City through personal interviews with those persons who purportedly have first hand knowledge of such matters.
The only other theoretical possibility for resolving these issues was, of course, physical evidence, either documents or photographs. In this regard, the Cuban Government has suggested that photographic evidence should exist, at least as to Oswald's alleged visits to the Cuban consulate in Mexico City. Such photographs might well include, of course, the identities to the companions, if any, who were with him on those occasions.
In fact, the Cuban Government has provided several photos to the committee. They are reflected in JFK F-438 which, Mr. Chairman, I ask be displayed and entered into the record at this point.
Chairman STOKES. Without objection it may be entered into the record at this point. [The information follows:]
Mr. BLAKEY. To support its claim that there was a photographic surveillance site across the street from the Cuban consulate in 1963, the Cuban Government, Mr. Chairman, has indicated that the top left of the photograph represents a diagram of the Cuban consulate on the left and on the right of the building that is displayed immediately to the right of that diagram. It is from that building that they suggest that photographic surveillance took place.
The three bottom photographs on the exhibit illustrate examples of their ability to photograph the photographer, during the course of his surveillance of the Cuban consulate.
Mr. Chairman, I would indicate that the committee has conducted an extensive investigation to determine who, if anyone, was responsible for the surveillance outlined in this exhibit in the periods of time during which that surveillance was in operation.
It has also sought to identify and personally interview those individuals who may have conducted the surveillance and to obtain, if possible, all relevant photographs.
Once again, however, I have to report to you, Mr. Chairman, that the committee's efforts have met with frustration. No photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald or of any other person who can be said to be an associate of his have been located.
Mr. Chairman, that ends today's presentation on Cuba, Mexico and the assassination.
Chairman STOKES. Thank you, Professor Blakey.
Before you proceed to the next section, once again I think it appropriate for me to indicate for the record the kind of cooperation that was necessary for this committee to obtain in order to do the extensive type of investigation that we have done in this particular area.
I acknowledged in the latter part of yesterday's hearings the kind of cooperation we had gotten from Cuban Government officials. But I might appropriately note at this time that to my knowledge and to the knowledge of the members of this committee, it is unprecedented for a head of a foreign nation to subject himself to interrogation by a congressional committee.
Not only did President Castro spend in excess of 4 1/2 hours with this committee, but he made it clear and apparent to us that in every respect his officials were to give us complete cooperation.
I think the final record in this case will indicate the voluminous documents and witnesses that we interviewed in this area and virtually every request made by this committee was complied with, even to the extent of the fact that the committee when it went there conducted itself in the same way we have attempted to do our work here and that is to work quietly and without any type of fanfare.
And for that reason, we made the same type of request in Cuba that our work there not be announced, that we be accorded the opportunity to work privately and quietly and to that extent the President and his officials afforded us the kind of housing that we needed in order to remain out of public view.
So I think that the record ought to appropriately acknowledge the fact that this committee was given extensive cooperation by President Castro and his officials and we are grateful for that cooperation.
Professor Blakey?

Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, it would be appropriate now to shift the focus of the hearing somewhat from Cuba, Mexico City and the assassination, and begin today and in the days that follow an examination of the performance of the agencies.
The first agency whose performance in 1963 and 1964 will be examined is the Secret Service.
Of all of the Federal agencies that were in any way involved in protecting President Kennedy or investigating his assassination, the Secret Service has come in for the most scathing criticism. Within hours of the tragedy in Dallas, press accounts were pointedly suggesting that the agency had been derelict in its duty to provide Presidential security.
The more obvious questions were first raised. Why had the motorcade been routed through Dealey Plaza, an open, park-like area surrounded by tall buildings? Why wasn't there more physical protection for the President--why, for example, were there no agents in the limousine itself, forming a human shield? Why was the limousine moving at such a slow speed? And why were agents in an open car directly behind the limousine so slow to respond at the sound of the first shot?
The Warren Commission was quite blunt in its admonishment of the Secret Service:
The Commission has concluded that at the time of the assassination the arrangements relied upon by the Secret Service to perform this function were seriously deficient.
And, the Commission adds in its final report:
The Commission believes that the facilities and procedures of the Protective Research Section of the Secret Service prior to November 22, 1963, were inadequate.
The approach of the Warren Commission seems to have been (a) to document the conduct of Secret Service agents physically present at the assassination scene; and (b) to record the perceptions of supervisory personnel as to Secret Service performance on the trip to Dallas and to reforms called for to improve the protective operations of the agency.
The select committee, while not disregarding the performance of the Secret Service on November 22, 1963, has attempted to go one step farther. It has assembled data on threats against President Kennedy from Secret Service files, in an effort to establish a basis for a fair, objective analysis. This has enabled the committee to scrutinize the extent to which Secret Service protective measures reflected the agency's grasp of potential danger to the President during the Kennedy years.
In other words, was the Secret Service in part to blame for the assassination because it failed to gather sufficient information on security problems in Dallas, or because it failed to analyze that information for its full significance?
The questions this committee posed for itself were these:
1. How skillfully did the Secret Service acquire information about threat activitity around the country?
2. What was the quality of the insight used to analyze the information?
3. Did protective operations in the field reflect a thorough awareness of threat activity?
Before we get to testimony bearing on these questions, it would seem useful to consider for a moment the historic background of the Secret Service and its evolving role in Federal law enforcement.
It is worth noting that the Kennedy assassination was the first and only event of its kind since the Secret Service was assigned to full-time protection of the President in 1901, as a result of the assassination of William McKinley. Originally, when it was formed in 1865, the Secret Service was not given responsibility for Presidential protection, even though that was the year Lincoln was murdered.
The primary purpose of the Secret Service at the outset was to deal with counterfeiting which had become a national outrage in the period before 1862 when a standardized national currency was adopted. By the end of the 1860's the new agency had all but eliminated the problem.
For the balance of the 19th century, the Secret Service engaged in various criminal detection activities. It investigated the Ku Klux Klan in the 1870's, Spanish espionage in the 1890's, organized crime in New York City in the eighties and nineties, and syndicated gambling in Louisiana at the turn of the century.
Even with the assignment of Presidential protection as its primary role, the Secret Service was not guaranteed, however, necessary annual appropriation to carry out the task. It wasn't until 1908 that the agency's mission was clarified, and, at that, for an ironic reason.
When the Secret Service exposed the participation in land fraud schemes by Members of Congress from several Western States, legislation was passed restricting the operations of the agency and creating a new Federal law enforcement body which ultimately became the Federal Bureau of Investigation. So, the original FBI men were eight agents transferred from the Secret Service.
The law limiting the Secret Service's responsibilities left it with two concerns: Treasury matters, or counterfeiting, and protection of the President. On occasion, however, it was given exceptional assignments.
During World War I, for example, it went after German saboteurs, and in 1921 it was the body that investigated the roles of Secretary of the Interior Albert B. Fall and Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty in the Teapot Dome Scandal.
From about 1930 on, the Secret Service was an anticounterfeiting agency with the additional assignment of protecting the President. For the latter function, on only two occasions before November 22, 1963, was the agency tested by an actual assault on a President:
In February 1932, the car in which President Roosevelt was riding was fired on in Miami, killing the mayor of Chicago, Aaron Cermak. In November 1950, members of the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party tried to force their way into Blair House, the temporary home of President Truman.
It ought to be clear, therefore, that the best way to evaluate the performance of the Secret Service at the time of the Kennedy assassination is to look at it not so much in the context of history, but rather in the context of the climate in 1963 and how well the Secret Service appreciated that climate, especially as it might have been evident in Texas.
President Kennedy posed a problem for the Secret Service from the start. As a policymaker, he was liberal and innovative, perhaps startlingly so in comparison with the cautious approach of President Eisenhower. His personal style was known to cause agents assigned to him to tear their hair. He traveled more frequently than any of his predecessors, and he relished contact with crowds of well wishers. He scoffed at many of the measures designed to protect him and treated the danger of an assault philosophically, if someone wanted to kill him, he reasoned, it would not be very difficult to stop him. On at least one occasion, President Kennedy was literally "lost" by the Secret Service detail guarding his hotel room.
Indeed, on the very day of the assassination, Presidential Assistant Kenneth O'Donnell is reported to have told a Secret Service agent, "you are not at fault. You can't mix security and politics. We chose politics."
The core of the Presidential security arm of the Secret Service is the White House detail, which in 1963 was composed of 36 special agents. In addition, there were six special agent drivers, eight special agents assigned to the Kennedy family, and five special officers detailed to the Kennedy home in Hyannisport, Mass. On the trip to Texas, there were 28 special agents in the Presidential entourage.
In all, out of 552 employees in November 1963, there were 70 special agents and 8 clerks--17 percent of the total Secret Service work force--assigned to protecting the President and Vice President directly or to the Protective Research Service, a preventive intelligence division charged with gathering and evaluating threat information and seeing that it is usefully disseminated.
In addition, there were 30 employees in the office of the Chief of the Secret Service, plus 313 agents and 131 clerks in 66 field offices, all of whom were on call to assist in Presidential protection.
The time of need for the most manpower was in 1963, as it is now, when the President traveled and was exposed to crowds of people in open spaces. Then, the Secret Service called on municipal, county, and State law enforcement agencies for personnel who assisted in the preparation of large-scale protective plans.
In planning a Presidential trip, a set of procedures was customarily followed. It is expected that they will be detailed in testimony today, along with answers to certain specific issues stemming from the Kennedy assassination, such as securing buildings along a parade route and liaison between the Secret Service and other agencies, Federal as well as State, county, and local.
From the beginning of its investigation of the Secret Service, the committee realized the great importance of the Protective Research Service. PRS is the memory of the agency, and it is responsible for analyzing threat data. By reviewing PRS files and interviewing its personnel, the committee has sought to clarify just how much the Secret Service, as an agency, knew about the sort and degree of the dangers the President faced in the fall of 1963, and to learn what protective tactics had been devised in response to them.
The committee was at pains to make a valid distinction between major and minor threats to the President in order that it could concentrate on the followup action to the significant ones. A threat was considered major if (a) it was verbal or communicated by a threatening act, and (b) if it created a danger great enough to require an in-depth and intense investigation by the Secret Service or other law enforcement agency.
The committee examined all threat profile investigations from March to December 1963, 313 of them in all, and it incorporated into its analysis information on some major threat activity back to December 1962.
The committee also considered the following questions in its investigation of Secret Service threat activity files, questions raised by the Kennedy assassination itself:
One: Was there an indication of a conspiracy to harm Secret Service protectees?
Two: Was there information developed in investigations of earlier threats that might be useful in the investigation of the assassination?
Three: Was the pertinent information in the Secret Service files made available to the Warren Commission?
The first witness today will be Inspector Thomas J. Kelley. Inspector Kelley was assigned to represent the Secret Service in the investigation of President Kennedy's assassination. Inspector Kelley served as Secret Service liaison to the Warren Commission.
Inspector Kelley received a B.A. from Providence College and an LL.B. from Georgetown University Law School. He has been the special agent in charge of the Philadelphia Field Office, an Inspector in the Washington office, the Assistant Director of Protective Intelligence and Investigations in Washington, D.C., and he currently is the Assistant Director of Protective Operations in Washington, D.C.
Inspector Kelley is a member of the International Association of Chiefs of Police and he has served as consultant to several Far Eastern police agencies, as well as consultant to the Dominican Republic on protective matters.
It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Inspector Kelley.
Chairman STOKES. The committee calls Inspector Kelley. Sir, would you raise your right hand and be sworn?
Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before the committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?


Chairman STOKES. The committee will recess for the noon hour and we will therefore have recess until 2 p.m. this afternoon.
[Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m. the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m.]


Chairman STOKES. The committee will come to order. The Chair
recognizes Professor Blakey.
Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The next witness to be called this afternoon will be former Secret Service Chief James J. Rowley. Chief Rowley was Director of the Secret Service from 1961 until his retirement in 1972.
As Director of the Secret Service in 1963 he exercised general supervision over President Kennedy's trip to Dallas.
Chief Rowley entered the Secret Service in 1938 as a special agent. He received a master's degree in law from St. John's University in Brooklyn, and in 1939 he was transferred to the Presidential Protective Division. He was named special agent in charge of the division in 1947, a post he held until he was appointed Director of the Secret Service in 1961.
Chief Rowley has served six Presidents during his career with the Secret Service--Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Chief Rowley.
Chairman STOKES. Would the witness please stand and raise your right hand and be sworn.
Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Chief ROWLEY. I do.


Chairman STOKES. There will be a meeting of the full committee in executive session at 5 p.m. this evening in H-328. The next public meeting of the committee will be at 9 a.m. tomorrow morning.
The Chair now adjourns the meeting to 5 p.m. this evening in executive session.
[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene in executive session at 5 p.m.]

Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 9:18 a.m., pursuant to recess, in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman oF the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Stokes, Preyer, Dodd, Ford, Fithian, Edgar, Devine, McKinney, and Sawyer.
Staff present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director; I. Charles Mathews, special counsel; James E. McDonald, staff counsel; Robert W. Genzman, staff counsel; and Elizabeth L. Berning, chief clerk.

Chairman STOKES. A quorum being present, the committee will come to order.
The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.


Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The murder of President Kennedy was probably the most significant crime committed in the 70-year history of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that the Bureau was called upon to investigate. It is, thankfully, the only Presidential assassination of modern times, and for that reason alone, the FBI was presented in its investigation with a monumental task, one complicated further by a rapid succession of events, including: The fatal shooting of the accused assassin at Dallas Police Headquarters on November 24, 1963; and the establishment of a Presidential commission to learn the facts about the assassination, for which the FBI had primary responsibility to do the investigative work.
At the moment word came of the President's depth in Dallas, there was confusion in Washington over the FBI's role m the investigation. It was not at that time a Federal felony to assassinate a President, though to threaten harm to him or to conspire to injure any Federal officer, while he was discharging his official duties, did fall within the Bureau's jurisdiction.
Originally, the FBI's entry into the case was predicated on a statute covering an assault on a Federal officer, though there was considerable debate at FBI headquarters over the basis for the investigation. The problem became moot, however, when President Johnson ordered the FBI to enter the case in the interest of national security.
It would be instructive, given this early legal dilemma as well as the controversy that developed over the FBI's investigation, to trace the history of the Bureau from its inception in 1908.
Up until that time, Federal agencies and departments were responsible for their own investigations, and the Department of Justice was primarily a prosecutorial body, although it was given statutory authority to perform investigations in 1871.
In 1907, Attorney General Charles J. Bonaparte proposed an investigative force in the Department of Justice and went ahead with it despite the objections in Congress. His successor, George Wickersham, named the force the Bureau of Investigation.
By the end of World War I, the Bureau was firmly established as the main law enforcement arm of the Federal Government, its size increasing fivefold from 1916 to 1920. The two major influences on this growth were (1) the war itself, which confronted the Bureau with the task of enforcing President Wilson's alien enemy proclamations and with the problems of draft evasion and enemy espionage, and (2) the Mann Act, giving the Federal Government jurisdiction over certain interstate criminal activities, making a marked increase in the demands on the Bureau, as well as calling for additional appropriations.
After the war--in the period 1919 to 1924--two successive Attorneys General abused the power of the Bureau of Investigation.
A. Mitchell Palmer, in his campaign against Bolshevist radicals, acted with questionable legality. After the bombing of his home in June 1919, Palmer created the General Intelligence Division of the Bureau to deal with radicalism, and he named a young Justice Department attorney, J. Edgar Hoover, to head the division. The division used covert as well as overt means to gather information on suspected radicals.
In 1920, Attorney General Palmer also directed the wholesale deportation of members of the American Communist Party and the Communist Labor Party. This led to the controversial "Palmer raids," which, though they diminished the standing of American Communists, came to symbolize for many the abuse of police power for a political purpose.
Then came the Harding administration, which saw Harry Daugherty, the President's campaign manager, named Attorney General. Daugherty, in turn, appointed his friend, William S. Burns, of the detective agency, to run the Bureau. Burns was antiradical and antilabor, as well, and be continued the questionable practices of unlawful wiretapping and illegal surreptitious entry in investigative work.
Although the primary target continued to be Communists, the Bureau is credited during this period with having dealt a heavy blow to the Ku Klux Klan.
Harlan Fiske Stone, a New York attorney and civil libertarian, was appointed Attorney General by Calvin Coolidge in 1924. Stone was a reformer, and he named Hoover Director of the Bureau of Investigation with a clear mandate to clean it up. Hoover created a structure and a set of policies that would endure for nearly 50 years. He also established the independence of the Bureau within the Department of Justice.
The Bureau stayed out of the limelight until the 1930's when the emergence of a resourceful criminal underworld, feeding on public response to prohibition, became a national concern. The Bureau was recognized then as the single law enforcement agency in the country that could cope with crime of such interstate dimensions.
Public outrage over the kidnaping of Charles Lindbergh's infant son led to enactment of the so-called Lindbergh Law in 1933, adding kidnaping to the list of interstate crimes that came under the jurisdiction of the Bureau.
Then, in 1934, there was a major expansion of Federal criminal laws when Congress passed a package of nine new statutes. They dealt with such crimes as killing or assaulting a Federal law enforcement officer, fleeing across a State line to avoid apprehension or prosecution and extortion involving interstate commerce.
That same year, Bureau agents were granted authority to go beyond general investigative power and to serve warrants and subpenas, to make seizures and arrests, and to carry arms.
The Bureau was renamed in 1935, becoming the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and by the end of the decade, it was able to point to an array of important accomplishments, for example: a Division of Indentification with central fingerprint records; an FBI laboratory with up-to-date scientific law enforcement techniques; and a National Police Academy for training State and local law enforcement officers.
The Bureau then had no internal security or counterintelligence functions until they were established, beginning in 1936, by a series of Presidential orders coupled with a secret oral agreement be
tween Hoover and President Roosevelt. The FBI was authorized to store intelligence information collected by Federal agencies.
In 1939, a written directive was issued providing that the FBI take charge of investigative work relating to "espionage, sabotage, and violations of neutrality regulations. Subversive activities were not specifically mentioned until 1950, in an Executive order by President Truman.
The FBI's primary responsibility during World War II was enforcement of laws dealing with espionage, sabotage, and conscription. It also conducted the apprehension of enemy aliens, but Hoover opposed the relocation of Japanese citizens as a violation of their civil rights.
The FBI also conducted foreign intelligence in South America, attempting to gather information on activities detrimental to U.S. interests.
After World War II the fear of communism was such that internal security activities against it was acceptable to most Americans. The FBI's actions were based on a series of statutes that covered membership in the Communist Party, including the Smith Act, the Internal Security Act of 1950, and the Communist Control Act of 1954.
J. Edgar Hoover himself defined as disloyal any acts that could pose a threat to the Government, and even after the anti-Communist fervor of the McCarthy era had subsided, the internal security operations of the FBI continued.
By 1960, Hoover had developed a force of agents who employed sophisticated investigative techniques and enjoyed unusual independence. Hoover himself had become a formidable figure who deftly handled Presidents, Attoneys General, and Members of Congress, as he groomed his image as an extraordinary crime fighter.
FBI appropriations would pass without serious opposition in Congress after only pro forma hearings.
J. Edgar Hoover's three distinct priorities in those years were the fight against communism, statistics that reflected FBI progress and the positive image of the Bureau. He also had, according to some, two glaring crime spots in the area of civil rights and organized crime that put him at odds with the Kennedy administration.
It has been documented that little priority was given by the FBI to requests by the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice. Not all would agree with his choice of words, but his point was widely shared. Historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in his recent book, "Robert Kennedy and His Times," writes that Hoover had "the racist instincts of a white man who had grown up in Washington when it was still a southern city."
By 1964, under pressure from the Kennedy Justice Department, the FBI was beginning to alter its stance, but before then, Schlesinger noted that:
"For reasons of policy as well as prejudice, Hoover succeeded in withdrawing the FBI almost completely from civil rights investigations. Internally he preserved it as a lily-white agency."
Hoover was also reluctant, according to some, to allow the Bureau to join Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy's all-out fight on organized crime. Indeed, as late as the early 1960's, Hoover himself had been quoted as saying that no national coalition of underworld figures dominated organized crime. On that, Schlesinger wrote:
Kennedy had determined to stop the drain of power in America to obscure forces beyond moral and legal accountability. In insisting on the spreading threat of organized crime, he offended J. Edgar Hoover doubly--by dismissing the cherished Red menace and by raising a question the Director had done his best for 40 years to ignore.
The FBI priority here too came under sharp challenge during the new administration. Turning to the investigation of the assassination itself, the Bureau's investigation was of a magnitude unsurpassed in the annals of American law enforcement. In all, 80 FBI personnel were on the scene in Dallas within a few hours of the fatal shots and by the time it was over, 2,300 reports consisting of over 25,000 pages based on 25,000 interviews had been filed, most within weeks of the assassination itself.
The quality of the investigation, however, has been the subject of mounting criticism over the years. At first, taking potshots at the Bureau was an exclusive avocation of critics of the Warren Commission. Eventually, however, doubts and misgivings were being expressed by committees of both Houses of Congress, by former high-ranking officials of the FBI itself, and by members and staff of the Warren Commission, which had relied on the Bureau for its fieldwork.
There are four principal issues that the select committee has considered in its assessment of the quality of the FBI investigation. Not necessarily in the order that they will be discussed in the hearing today, or their relative importance, they are as follows:
One, did the FBI's early conclusion that Oswald alone was the assassin, that he had assistance from no one, hamper the thoroughness of the investigation that followed?
In 1976, the Select Committee on Intelligence issued a report in which it noted that within 3 weeks of the assassination, just as the Warren Commission was beginning its investigation, the FBI prepared a position paper, "concluding that Oswald was the assassin and that he had acted alone." The Senate committee went on to note, "The Bureau issued its report on the basis of a narrow investigation of the assassination focused on Oswald, without conducting a broad investigation of the assassination which would have revealed any conspiracy, foreign or domestic."
Two, did senior FBI officials, wanting to close the case quickly, compromise the proficiency of Bureau field personnel?
Make no bones about it, this charge has been leveled at the late Director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, and against a few of his close personal associates. Evidence of Mr. Hoover's position has been cited from a statement he is said to have made by telephone to President Johnson just hours after Oswald had been shot down by Jack Ruby:
"The thing I am most concerned about * * * is having something issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin." In a memorandum dated November 29, 1963, relating a conversation that day with President Johnson: "I advised the President that we hope to have the investigation wrapped up today, but probably won't have it before the first of the week."
Three, was the FBI investigation internally mismanaged?
Just such an allegation has been made by a former Assistant Director who supervised major aspects of the investigation. The criticism has also been directed at the organizational structure of the probe. It was divided between two FBI divisions.
The Central Investigative Division was assigned the task of assembling the facts of the assassination itself, because this is the division that is customarily put in charge of murder investigations. The actual work was supervised by an official who headed the bank robbery desk, because the manual of operations designates that desk to handle assaults on Federal officials.
The Domestic Intelligence Division was assigned the question of possible conspiracy, as well as other aspects of subversion. Domestic Intelligence was also given the job of piecing together the background puzzle of Lee Harvey Oswald, his activities, associates, motivations, and so on. A source of a lack of confidence in the FBI investigation that has developed since 1964 is the realization that 20 members of the Domestic Intelligence Division, including an assistant director, were secretly censured by Director Hoover for their mishandling of a preassassination investigation of the activities of Lee Harvey Oswald.
Four, was the FBI investigation conducted in such a way that the Bureau's specialists on Cuba and organized crime did not actively participate?
The FBI had, prior to the assassination, considered Jack Ruby sufficiently knowledgeable about "criminal elements in Dallas" to contact him as a potential informant on nine separate occasions, and questions have been raised about the failure to probe his known connections with gangster elements in Chicago, Dallas, New Orleans, Havana and elsewhere.
In addition, the Bureau had specialists on Cuban and Cuban exile activities. They were not called on in the assassination investigation, even though both Oswald and Ruby had suspected ties to Cubans or Cuban exiles.
Mr. Chairman, a former official of the FBI is here today to testify about the investigation of the Kennedy assassination. He is James R. Malley, who joined the Bureau as a special agent in 1937. Mr. Malley was an inspector in the General Investigative Division and principal assistant to Director Alex Rosen. He played an important role in putting together the Bureau's four-volume report on the assassination given to the President in December 1963.
Subsequently, as the FBI liaison officer to the Warren Commission, Mr. Malley was in a position to closely observe the key role in the assassination investigation played by the FBI.
Mr. Malley retired from the FBI in 1971. It would be appropriate at this time to call him.
Chairman STOKES. The committee calls Mr. Malley.
Mr. MALLEY. Where do you want me to sit?
Chairman STOKES. At the witness table right in front of me.


Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The FBI security case on Lee Harvey Oswald was opened on October 31, 1959, after it was learned that he had defected to the Soviet Union and had informed officials at the American Embassy in Moscow that he intended to provide radar secrets to the Russians.
The case was intermittently closed and reopened during the following 4 years as Oswald returned from the Soviet Union and moved from Fort Worth to Dallas to New Orleans and back again to Dallas.
It is the handling of the Oswald case that resulted in a decision by Director J. Edgar Hoover, not made public at the time, to discipline a number of Bureau employees, including an assistant director.
The next witness, Mr. Chairman, is a retired official of the FBI, James H. Gale. Immediately after the assassination of President Kennedy, Director Hoover assigned Mr. Gale to conduct an inspection of the Bureau's performance in the Oswald security case prior to the assassination. Mr. Gale's reports resulted in the censuring of a number of FBI employees.
Mr. Gale was hired as an FBI clerk on November 29, 1939, and became an agent on June 21, 1943. He has served as the assistant special agent in charge and special agent in charge in Anchorage, Alaska, and a special agent in charge in Richmond, Cincinnati, and the Washington field offices, as well as Chicago.
In 1962, Mr. Gale became Assistant Director for the Inspection Division. In 1964, Mr. Gale became Assistant Director of the Special Investigative Division. He retired from the Bureau on October 1, 1971.
Mr. Chairman, before calling Mr. Gale, it may be appropriate to note for the record that the select committee has deposed Special Agent James B. Hosty. His testimony was also taken earlier by other House and Senate committees and the select committee has, through the courtesy of those committees, full access to Mr. Hosty's testimony.
The select committee has also been in recent contact with Special Agent Hosty. Mr. Hosty has now new information to offer this committee. Newspaper stories that have recently indicated otherwise are not rounded in fact. Mr. Hosty's role in the Oswald secu-
rity case and subsequently will, of course, be treated in the final committee report in December. He will not be called to testify here today.
It would be appropriate, Mr. Chairman, at this time to call Mr. Gale.
Chairman STOKES. The committee calls Mr. Gale.
Do you solemnly swear the testimony you give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. GALE. Yes, I do.
Chairman STOKES. Thank you, you may be seated.


Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 8:04 a.m. pursuant to recess, in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Stokes, Preyer, Dodd, McKinney, Sawyer, Thone, Fithian, and Edgar.
Staff present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director; Gary T. Cornwell, deputy chief counsel; Elizabeth L. Berning, chief clerk; I. Charles Mathews, special counsel.

Chairman STOKES. A quorum being present the committee will come to order.
The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.
Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I understand that one of our distinguished witnesses this morning is on somewhat of a tight time schedule. In the interest of time, therefore, I would summarize my normal narration, but I would ask that it be included in the record as if read in full.
Chairman STOKES. So ordered.
Mr. BLAKEY. President John F. Kennedy was the fourth American President to be assassinated, but his death was the first that led to the formation of a special commission for the purpose of making a full investigation into its circumstances.
In the earlier assassinations, the investigations were left to existing judicial bodies:
In the case of Abraham Lincoln in 1865, a military commission determined that John Wilkes Booth was part of a conspiracy, and the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Army saw to the prosecution of six defendants, four of whom were hanged.
The assassins of James A. Garfield in 1881 and William McKinley in 1901 were promptly tried in courts of law and executed.
In the aftermath of the Kennedy assassination, it was decided by President Lyndon B. Johnson that a panel of distinguished citizens should be given the responsibility for finding the full facts of the case and reporting them, along with appropriate recommendations, to the American people.
The Commission was authorized by Executive Order 11130 to set its own procedures and to employ whatever assistance it deemed necessary from Federal agencies, all of which were ordered to cooperate to the maximum with the Commission, which had, under an act of Congress, subpena power and the authority to grant immunity to witnesses who invoked the fifth amendment.
The Chief Justice of the United States Earl Warren was selected by President Johnson to head the Commission. Two senior members of the Senate, Richard B. Russell, Democrat of Georgia, and John Sherman Cooper, Republican of Kentucky, were chosen to serve on the Commission, as were two distinguished members from the House of Representatives, Hale Boggs, Democrat of Louisiana, and Gerald Ford, Republican of Michigan. Two attorneys who had long been in active Government service, Allen W. Dulles, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and John J. McCloy, former president of the World Bank, were also named to the Commission. J. Lee Rankin, former Solicitor General of the United States, was sworn in as general counsel on December 16, 1963, and 14 attorneys were appointed within a few weeks to serve as assistant counsels.
The Commission did not employ its own investigative staff. Instead, it relied on agencies in place--the FBI and Secret Service for domestic aspects, the CIA when activities involving foreign countries required probing.
In September 1964, following a 9-month effort, the Warren Commission published a report that not only included its findings and conclusions, but also a detailed analysis of the case as the Commission perceived it. In addition, in its report the Commission wrote its own description of the challenge it undertook to meet: "... to uncover all the facts concerning the assassination of President Kennedy and to determine if it was in any way directed or encouraged by unknown persons at home or abroad."
In the years since the Warren Commission completed its work, there has been both praise and criticism of the product. The praise came first, and it was based on the obvious enormity of the effort. After all, the Commission had combed through so much evidence that only a part of it could be contained in 26 supplemental volumes, with the rest of it stored at the National Archives. And it had taken testimony, either in person or through deposition, from a total of 552 witnesses.
A Pulitizer Prize-winning journalist, in an introduction to one edition of the Warren Report, wrote:
The Warren Commission spent the better part of a year in an exhaustive investigation of every particle of evidence it could discover .... No material question now remains unresolved so far as the death of President Kennedy is concerned. Evidence of Oswald's singlehanded guilt is overwhelming.
It was the determination of Oswald acting alone that opened the Commission to attack from critics. For the most part, they were authors and independent investigators who rounded up numerous clues, some sounder than others, of a conspiracy. Some suggested that the Federal Government, the Warren Commission itself included, was covering up the conspiracy by suppressing evidence.
A result of the criticism was a growing doubt among the American people that the Warren Commission was right, that Oswald had indeed been the lone assassin. Then, in 1976, it was revealed in hearings before the Senate Intelligence Committee that certain Federal agencies had not been as candid with the Commission as had been thought. The Warren Commission was not accused of being a party to the failure to find the truth, but its victim. The culpable agencies? The FBI and the CIA, both of which, the Senate committee concluded, had withheld significant information from the Commission.
The mandate of the Select Committee on Assassinations calls for an investigation of the performance of Federal agencies assigned to any aspect of the Kennedy case. With the Warren Commission itself, the issue to be considered is whether its procedures, techniques and organization were sufficient to carry out its mandate. In other words, the committee must consider the quality of the conduct of the Commission to judge the reliability of its conclusions.
Mr. Chairman, the three members of the Warren Commission still living have agreed to appear today and testify. They are: Gerald R. Ford, John Sherman Cooper and John J. McCloy.
President Ford received an A.B. from the University of Michigan in 1935 and an LL.B. from Yale Law School in 1941. President Ford practiced law in Grand Rapids from the time of his admission to the Michigan State bar in 1941 until he was elected to Congress as a Republican of Michigan in 1949. President Ford was a Member of the 81st to the 93rd Congresses; he was elected minority leader in 1965 and he became Vice President of the United States in 1973. He served as President of the United States from 1974 to 1977.
It would be appropriate now, Mr. Chairman, to call President Ford.
Chairman STOKES. The committee calls President Ford.
All persons in the room are requested to remain seated when the former President comes into the room. This is for security reasons.
Good morning, Mr. President.


Professor Blakey.
Mr. BLAKEY. Our next two witnesses this morning, Senator Cooper and Mr. McCloy, will be called as a panel.
Mr. Cooper received an A.B. degree from Yale University in 1923, and LL.B. from Harvard Law School in 1925. He served the State of Kentucky as U.S. Senator from 1947 through 1949, 1953 through 1955, and 1957 through 1973. Currently he is in private practice in Washington, D.C. as counsel of Covington & Burling.
Mr. McCloy received an A.B. degree from Amherst College in 1916 and an LL.B. degree from Harvard Law School in 1921. He is admitted to practice in New York and the District of Columbia. Currently he is in private practice in New York with the firm of Bilbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy.
Mr. Chairman, at this time it would be appropriate to call both Senator Cooper and Mr. McCloy.
Chairman STOKES. The committee calls both witnesses.



Chairman STOKES. The committee will come to order. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.
Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The next witness to be called this afternoon is J. Lee Rankin. Mr. Rankin served as General Counsel to the Warren Commission. He received an A.B. degree in 1928, and LL.B. degree in 1930, from the University of Nebraska. He is admitted to practice in New York, Nebraska, and the District of Columbia.
Mr. Rankin served from 1953 to 1956 as an Assistant Attorney General of the United States Department of Justice, in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel, and from 1956 to 1961 as the Solicitor General of the United States.
After serving as General Counsel to the Warren Commission, he became the corporation counsel for the city of New York from 1966 to 1972. Currently he is in private practice in New York with the firm of Rankin and Rankin.
It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Mr. Rankin.
Chairman STOKES. The committee calls Mr. Rankin.
Please raise your right hand to be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Thank you, you may be seated.
The Chair recognizes counsel for the committee, Mr. Klein.
Mr. KLEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Sir, could you please state your full name for the record?


Prior to the recognizing of counsel, I would like the record to reflect the fact I am informed by counsel for the committee that prior to April 4, 1964, that is, February 1964, to April 4, 1964, that the FBI did have access to Nosenko, although Nosenko was under the control at that time of the CIA. After April 4, 1964, they did not again have access to him until 1969.
The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.
Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is time now to consider the role of the Department of Justice in the investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy.
Senior officials at Justice were, of course, active in supervising the investigation, though the responsibility for carrying it out was in the hands of the FBI. In the de facto absence of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy in the days following his brother's murder, the job of coordinating the Department's activities was up to Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach.
Soon after the assassination, Katzenbach became a proponent of an independent Presidential commission to investigate the assassination.
The proposal he and others suggested to President Johnson called for the creation of a blue ribbon body that was to become the Warren Commission. It would, he recommended, be composed of present and former Government officials of eminent stature, such as the former Commission members who have testified here today.
When the Commission was created on November 29, 1963, the Department of Justice no longer was involved in the investigation in any way, although it continued to perform liaison functions for the Commission.
Here today, Mr. Chairman, is the Honorable Nicholas Katzenbach, former Attorney General of the United States. Mr. Katzenbach became Attorney General in 1964, when Robert Kennedy ran successfully for the Senate from New York. Mr. Katzenbach was later named by President Johnson to serve as Undersecretary of State.
Presently, he is general counsel and vice president of the IBM Corp.
It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Mr. Katzenbach.
Mr. PREYER [presiding]. The committee calls Mr. Katzenbach.


On September 25, 1978, Mr. Katzenbach mailed to the committee the following letter supplementing his testimony:

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Old Orchard Road, Armonk, New York 10504
September 25, 1978
The Honorable Louis Stokes
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
331 House Office Building, Annex 2
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In my testimony before the Committee on Thursday, September 21, I stated that I had absolutely no recollection of meeting with Mr. Helms with respect to the Nosenko case. I understand that Mr. Helms said there was such a meeting, and it took place on April 2, 1964.
On my return to my office this morning I checked on the notes of meetings which were kept by my secretary, and they confirm Mr. Helms' recollection. I am attaching a copy of the relevant page of the calendar. Although it is clear form this page that there was such a meeting, I continue to have absolutely no recollection of it, and therefore cannot tell you what was discussed beyond what is stated in the calendar itself.
It was not my custom to make notes on such meetings, and I doubt that there are in the files of the Department any notes made by me. However it is possible that Mr. Yeagley or Mr. Foley made such notes. I believe Mr. Foley is now deceased, but Mr. Yeagley is now a judge in the District of Columbia, and perhaps he would have some recollection of the meeting.
I had, prior to my testimony, checked my calendar diary for the period dealing with the assassination and the creation of the Warren Commission, but had not thought it relevant to the Committee's investigation to go as far as April. Hence I was unaware of this entry. While
this calendar does not refresh my recollection and therefore would not change my testimony, it did seem to me that in fairness ot both the Committee and Mr. Helms I should make it available to you.

Respectfully yours,
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

cc:Mr. Gary Cornwell
Hon. Richard C. Helms
Edward Bennett Williams, Esqu.
Thursday, April 2, 1964
Harold Reis)9:35 a.m.SAW
Sol Lindenbaum) Civil9:35 a.m.SAW
Joseph Dolan) Rights9:35 a.m.SAW
David Filvaroff) briefing9:35 a.m.SAW
John Douglas) 9:35 a.m.SAW
Jack Rosenthal)9:35 a.m.SAW
Burke Marshall) 9:35 a.m.SAW
David Filvaroff 11:55 a.m.SAW
William Foley 12:27 a.m.SAW
William Orrick1:50 p.m.SAW
Marshal McShane2:37 p.m.SAW
David Filvaroff3:10 p.m.SAW
William Geoghegan3:25 p.m.SAW
Edgar Chan, O.L.C.3:30 p.m.SAW
Burke Marshall3:32 p.m.SAW
Burke Marshall4:07 p.m.SAW
[Lawrence Houston, CIA4:08 p.m.SAW
[Richard Helms, CIA4:08 p.m.SAW
[David Murphy, CIA4:08 p.m.SAW
[J. Walter Yeagley4:08 p.m.SAW
[William Foley, Crim. Div.4:08 p.m.SAW
[Defector Case]4:08 p.m.SAW
Addressed Brandeis Univ.4:40 p.m.SAW
Students (40) in AG's office
Sol Lindenbaum6:45 p.m.SAW
John Douglas6:56 p.m.SAW
William Orrick7:06 p.m.SAW
David Filvaroff7:12 p.m.SAW
Joseph Dolan7:15 p.m.SAW
Friday, April 3, 1964
John Duffner (White Motor)9:15 a.m.SAW
Sol Lindenbaum)9:30 a.m.SAW
Harold Reis) Civil9:30 a.m.SAW
David Filvaroff ) Rights9:30 a.m.SAW
Burke Marshall) briefing9:30 a.m.SAW
Jack Rosenthal)9:30 a.m.SAW
Joseph Dolan)9:30 a.m.SAW
NdeBK to Puerto Rico 10:15 a.m.

Volume IV